This post examines an opinion from the Supreme Court of Mississippi: Nuckolls v. State, 2015 WL 8482698 (2015). This court, unlike most courts, did not begin
its opinion by explaining what facts led to Samuel Nuckolls’ being charged with
video voyeurism. If you check out the
news stories you can find here, here and here, you can learn about how, and
why, the case arose.
The Supreme Court begins its opinion by explaining that,
“[i]n this thirteen-count, video-voyeurism bench trial, the parties agreed to
forego calling witnesses and to have the trial judge decide the case on a
submission of stipulated facts.” Nuckolls
v. State, supra. I must admit that I
was not aware of that as an option, so I did some online research. If you would like to read more about a trial
on stipulated facts, check out the entries you can find here, here and here.
I need to note one other aspect of the opinion: The opinion examined in this post is the
opinion of the Supreme Court, as a court that, as Wikipedia explains, consists
of nine Justices. Two of the Justices –
Michael K. Randolph Randy G. Pierce – concurred with the majority of justices
on certain issues and dissented on certain issues, in an opinion written by
Justice Randolph. Nuckolls v. State, supra.
Getting back to Samuel Nuckolls, the Supreme Court went on
to explain that on
February 14, 2012, a DeSoto County
grand jury indicted Samuel Nuckolls for thirteen violations of Mississippi Code Section 97–29–63, which provides:
`Any person who with lewd, licentious
or indecent intent secretly photographs, films, videotapes, records or
otherwise reproduces the image of another person without the permission of such
person when such a person is located in a place where a person would intend to
be in a state of undress and have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
including, but not limited to, private dwellings or any facility, public or
private, used as a restroom, bathroom, shower room, tanning booth, locker room,
fitting room, dressing room or bedroom shall be guilty of a felony. . . .
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
Next, it pointed out that The Supreme Court then went on to
explain that the
original indictment charged that
Nuckolls `secretly filmed and videotaped’ women in his bathroom on thirteen
occasions. When Nuckolls moved to dismiss most of the counts because they had
occurred outside the two-year statute of limitations, the State
obtained an amended indictment, adding language charging that Nuckolls
`otherwise reproduced’ the images within the statute of limitations by saving
them on his computer.
Nuckolls's attorney then moved for a
continuance, arguing that the State had made no allegation and had no proof as
to where the images had been reproduced. The circuit judge denied the motion
and found that all of the counts survived the statute of limitations.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The court then outlined the proceedings below, explaining
that Nuckolls
then waived his right to a trial by jury, and the parties submitted an agreed stipulation of facts to the
circuit judge, asking the circuit judge to decide the case based on that
stipulation. The stipulation included no information as to where the images
allegedly were reproduced, and Nuckolls preserved his challenge to the statute
of limitations. Based on the stipulation of facts, the circuit judge
convicted Nuckolls on all thirteen counts.
On appeal, Nuckolls attacks his ten
transfer convictions on two grounds: (1) the statute does not criminalize the
transfer of images to a computer; and (2) even if it does, the State failed to prove
where the transfer took place, or who made the transfer. He also challenges one
of his three filming convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove that
it occurred within the statute of limitations. He has not appealed the other
two filming convictions.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with Nuckolls’
challenge to his convictions on the “transfer” counts, explaining, initially,
that
[w]hen we consider the sufficiency of
the evidence, our `”relevant inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’ `”The state receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”’
¶ 7. The stipulation -- which was the
sole evidence at trial -- is entirely silent as to where the transfers
occurred. The State has not suggested otherwise in its brief. And when asked
about the venue issue at oral argument, the State responded that, because
Nuckolls resides in DeSoto County, the trial judge was within his discretion to
find that the transfers took place there.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The court went on to point out that
[w]e consistently have held that venue
is an essential part of the State's burden of proof that `may be proved by direct
or circumstantial evidence.’ This precedent is based on the Mississippi Constitution's
requirement that “an accused has the right to trial “by an impartial jury of
the county where the offense was committed.”’ Also, venue in this case—as in
all criminal cases—constitutes a material allegation of the indictment that
becomes a part of the State's burden of proof.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The Supreme Court then began its substantive analysis of
Nuckolls’ venue argument, noting, initially, that
[n]o evidence was provided at trial to
show where the transfers took place. And to imply, as the State suggests, that
the transfers occurred in DeSoto County simply because Nuckolls resided there—even
though he allegedly used a laptop computer that (1) was purchased in Tennessee,
(2) was found in Arkansas, and (3) could operate anywhere—would strain
credibility and obviate the State's burden of proof.
¶ 10.The stipulation did not state . .
. that the transfers occurred at either of Nuckolls's residences. For example,
for Count 1 (which largely mirrors the language of the other counts), the
stipulation states in its entirety:
In Count 1 the State would show that
SAMUEL NUCKOLLS, between the dates of June 1, 2007 and October 29, 2011, did
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd, licentious or indecent intent
secretly photograph, film, videotape, record, or otherwise reproduce the image
of another, to wit: Ashley Fisher, without the permission of Ashley Fisher when
Ashley Fisher was located in a place where a person would intend to be in a
state of undress and have a reasonable expectation of privacy, to-wit: in the
bathroom.
The State would offer four videos. The
first video, labeled `af’ shows Sammy Nuckolls setting up video equipment in
the bathroom located at 9848 Pigeon Roost Circle, Olive Branch, Mississippi.
That video shows Ashley Fisher enter the bathroom, undress, and take a shower.
She finishes and leaves the bathroom. Ashley Fisher would testify that she did
not give permission or consent to be recorded.
The second video, labeled `afh’ shows
Sammy Nuckolls setting up video equipment in the bathroom located at 9848
Pigeon Roost Circle, Olive Branch, Mississippi. That video shows Ashley Fisher
enter the bathroom, undress, and take a shower. She finishes and leaves the
bathroom. Ashley Fisher would testify that she did not give permission or
consent to be recorded. This video appears to be older than the video labeled
`af’ due to a piece of furniture not being present in `afh.’
The third video, labeled `afp’ shows
Sammy Nuckolls setting up video equipment in the bathroom located at 9848
Pigeon Roost Circle, Olive Branch, Mississippi. That video shows Ashley Fisher
enter the bathroom, undress, and take a shower. She finishes and leaves the
bathroom. Ashley Fisher would testify that she was pregnant in this video.
Ashley Fisher would testify that she did not give permission or consent to be
recorded. The piece of furniture seen in `af’ is present.
The fourth video, labeled `afrp’ shows
Sammy Nuckolls setting up video equipment in the bathroom located at 9848
Pigeon Roost Circle, Olive Branch, Mississippi. That video shows Ashley Fisher
enter the bathroom, undress, and take a shower. She finishes and leaves the
bathroom. Ashley Fisher would testify that she did not give permission or
consent to be recorded. Ashley Fisher would testify that she was pregnant when
this was recorded. She would further testify that this video took place some
time after `afp.’ Testimony would
establish that these videos were found on the Defendant's Apple MacBook Pro (Serial
number W8047932ATMA1344). The videos were all located in the subfolder orange.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The opinion also explained that
[n]othing in the stipulation suggests
where the transfer to the laptop took place. Every mention of Nuckolls's
residence—in this count and all others—pertains only to where the filming took
place. . . .
Nuckolls v. State,
supra. And it noted that,
[a]lso, Presiding Justice Randolph
incorrectly contends that Nuckolls waived this assignment of error by failing
to obtain a ruling in the trial court. As stated, venue is a constitutional
requirement, and this Court has said repeatedly `that the question could be
raised for the first time in [the Supreme Court] court,’ on appeal. As
recently as 2012, we have recognized and reaffirmed this principle.
¶ 13. Nuckolls has raised this issue on
appeal. . . . Nuckolls argued that `the State presented no evidence to the
Court showing where the transfer took place. . . .’ With regard to
the State's burden of proof, a complaint that the State failed to prove where
the crime took place can be read only as a statement that the State failed to
prove venue.
¶ 14.Further, the record contradicts
Presiding Justice Randolph's assertion that Nuckolls `agreed that the evidence
the State would offer was sufficient to convict Nuckolls.’ When the parties
appeared before the circuit judge to submit the stipulation of facts, the
parties repeatedly affirmed that they were asking the judge to adjudicate the
defendant's guilt. Defense counsel, the circuit judge, and the prosecutor
each specifically noted at one point or another that the judge had to determine
whether the stipulation established Nuckolls's guilt. In fact, at one point
when the circuit judge specifically asked if Nuckolls was entering a guilty
plea, the prosecutor informed the judge that he had to determine Nuckolls's
guilt.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra (emphasis in the original).
The Supreme Court then explained that
there was no attempt to plead guilty. .
. . To adopt Presiding Justice Randolph's reading would conflict with the rest
of the parties' and the judge's statements. And the circuit judge apparently
did not believe Nuckolls had admitted his guilt because, when the court
reconvened, the trial judge began by stating
heretofore the Court was informed by
counsel for the defense and counsel for the state that they wished a bench
trial. That is, they wanted the Court to rule on the defendant's
guilt or innocence based on a stipulation of fact.
(Emphasis added.) The judge then
rendered his verdict count by count, formally finding that the stipulation
provided sufficient evidence to support each one. In no way did he suggest that
the parties had conceded that the stipulation provided sufficient evidence.
¶ 18.Because the State offered no
evidence to meet its constitutional burden to prove venue, we must reverse the
transfer convictions.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra (emphasis in the original). Since the court reversed Nuckolls’ convictions
on ten of the transfer accounts because of the venue issue, it noted that it
did not need to “address Nuckolls’s contention that the statute does not
criminalize his conduct.” Nuckolls v. State, supra.
And then the Supreme Court took up Nuckolls’ final argument,
i.e., that “the State failed to prove that count eleven occurred within the
statute of limitations because the parties stipulated that the filming occurred
within a range of dates, including dates both within and outside the two-year
statute of limitations.” Nuckolls
v. State, supra. It began its
analysis by noting that
[w]hen considering the sufficiency of
the evidence, our `”relevant inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’ `”The state receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”’ And the State bears the burden to
prove that an offense occurred within the statute of limitations.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The court then explained that
¶ 20.Here, the parties stipulated that
count eleven occurred between June 1, 2007, and October 29, 2011. They
also stipulated that it occurred at Nuckolls's Meadow Ridge residence, where he
moved on October 6, 2009. So the date range includes a short time
period—October 6, 2009, to October 28, 2009—more than two years before
Nuckolls's arrest on October 29, 2011, and outside the statute of limitations.
¶ 21.The parties also stipulated,
however, that `[t]he [count eleven] video ends with Sammy Nuckolls entering
with a silver laptop consistent with the Apple MacBook Pro.’ Nuckolls purchased
the Apple MacBook Pro on January 5, 2011. So, drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the State, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence
because the stipulation gives rise to a strong inference that the video depicts
the same computer purchased in January 2011, and that the recording must have occurred
after that date.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
The Supreme Court then announced its rulings, explaining
that
Nuckolls has not appealed his
convictions on counts three and four, so those convictions are not before us.
The State presented sufficient evidence
to prove that count eleven—filming—occurred within the statute of limitations,
so that conviction is affirmed. But the State failed to prove venue for counts
one, two, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, twelve, and thirteen, so we
reverse the trial count's judgment as to those convictions.
Nuckolls v. State,
supra.
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