This post examines a recent opinion from the Supreme Court, Genesee County, New York: Vega v. Crane,
2017 WL 887159 (2017). The case involved
a civil suit brought by Carmen Vega who was
seeking to recover for injuries she
sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 8, 2012. The
Plaintiff's vehicle was struck by a car driven by Collin Ward Crane, who died
as a result of injuries he sustained in the accident (herein after referred to
as `Decedent’). Plaintiff alleges that the Decedent's girlfriend, Taylor
Cratsley, [a named defendant], (herein after referred to as `Cratsley’), was
texting the Decedent while he was driving, thus distracting him and causing the
accident.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and serious injury. These motions were
granted against the decedent, his estate and his father and reduced to a
separate order, which was granted on December 7, 2016. Cratsley, moved for
summary judgment seeking to dismiss the Plaintiff's action against her in its
entirety. The Court reserved on Cratsley's motion for Summary Judgment, which
now follows.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The court began the substantive part of the opinion by
explaining that
[o]n December 8, 2012, a motor vehicle
accident occurred on New York State Route 33 when the vehicle driven by the
Decedent struck head-on a vehicle driven by the Plaintiff. The New York State Police investigation concluded that Decedent's vehicle crossed the center line
before colliding with Plaintiff's vehicle. Though the accident was unwitnessed,
New York State Police investigators concluded that the Decedent most likely was
distracted, as there were no signs that Decedent attempted to avoid or take
evasive measures to elude contact with the Plaintiff's vehicle.
Upon inspection of the Decedent's
vehicle, investigators located a cell phone on the floor of the driver's side,
in front of the Decedent and between his legs. The cellular phone, which was
significantly damaged, was examined by the New York State Police. Upon
inspection, it appeared that the Decedent and Ms. Cratsley were texting before
the accident occurred. After recovering the digital information from the
Decedent's cellular phone, New York State Police investigators interviewed Ms.
Cratsley.
She indicated to the investigators, and
subsequently confirmed in her deposition and later an affidavit, that although
she was texting the Decedent on the date of the accident, she was unaware that
the Decedent was driving at the time they were exchanging text messages. (See Affidavit
of Taylor Cratsley, dated November 21, 2016). Mrs. Cratsley added that often,
when the Decedent was returning from work, a family member would pick him up
and drive him home. She also stated that on the date of the accident, although
she was aware he was working, she was unaware if he was driving himself or
getting a ride to work. Cratsley testified at her deposition that she never
expected nor asked the Decedent to send her text messages or read text messages
while driving. None of the text messages produced contradict Mrs. Cratsley's
testimony.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The Supreme Court concluded the introductory part of the
opinion by noting that
Cratsley moved for summary judgment,
arguing that since New York State does not recognize a duty to control the
actions of a third party, there existed no special relationship between
Cratsley and the Plaintiff that would give rise to any special duty. Plaintiff
opposed the motion, citing New Jersey precedent that establishes a special
relationship and resulting duty under similar circumstances.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue in the
case by explaining that the
Plaintiff acknowledges that there is no
New York State precedent to establish a duty that would obligate Cratsley to
protect a third party, namely the Plaintiff, from harm. Plaintiff submits that
the matter before the Court is a case of first impression in the State of New
York. However, the Plaintiff maintains that the duty that should be imposed is
consistent with the public policy of the State of New York, which has
established similar duties to third parties in other cases.
If Plaintiff's argument is entertained,
the Court would be forced to engage in a profound re-examination of negligence law that was addressed in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Palsgraf, an oft-cited
authority, held that in order to recover for the negligent act of others, a
plaintiff must establish duty, standard of care, breach of duty, and proximate cause. Since Palsgraf, New York courts have carefully examined
those components to establish negligence and have elaborated on them to justify
a recovery for damages.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The opinion then explains that the
Plaintiff cites to a New Jersey case
that establishes liability in circumstances where a person contributes to a
driver's distraction that results in an accident that causes injury. In Kubert
v. Best, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that
a third party, who had knowledge that the motorist they were texting was
driving at a time the parties were exchanging text messages, could be found
liable for any resulting damages. 432 N.J.Super. 495, 75 A.3d 1214
(N.J.App.2013).
In Kubert, the
Plaintiffs were riding on a motorcycle when a driver crossed the center line
and struck them. Both Plaintiffs lost their legs as a result of the injuries
they sustained in the accident. Not only did the Plaintiffs sue the driver who
struck their motorcycle, but they also sued Shannon Colonna, the party who
allegedly was texting the defendant motorist. At her deposition, Colonna
testified that she had sent the defendant 180 text messages in less than twelve
(12) hours on the day of the accident. Colonna also testified that she did not
pay attention to whether the recipient of her texts was driving a car at the
time or not.
On motion, the underlying New Jersey
trial court granted Colonna summary judgment holding that she had no legal duty
to avoid sending text messages to Best even though she knew he was driving. The
Appellate Division reversed, though still affirming summary judgment on behalf
of Colonna. While affirming that Colonna could not be held liable because of
the lack of proof demonstrating she knew Best was indeed driving at the time
the texts were exchanged, the Appellate Division concluded that `a person
sending text messages has a duty not to text someone who is driving if the
texter knows, or has special reason to know, the recipient will view the text
while driving. Id. Because the Plaintiffs had failed to establish
that Colonna had such knowledge while texting Best, she could not be held
liable for the resulting injuries caused by the accident.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The opinion then returns to the issue in this case,
explaining that the
Plaintiff would have this Court adopt
the reasoning employed by the New Jersey Appellate Division in Kubert to
deny Cratsley's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff also relies on to Sartori
v. Gregoire, wherein the Fourth Department held that a passenger in a
vehicle could be held liable for verbally or physically distracting a driver
immediately prior to an accident. 259 A.D.2d 1004 (4th Dept.1999). Further,
Plaintiff argues that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 303, which
provides, `[a]n act is negligent if the actor intends to affect, or realizes or
should realize that it is likely to affect, the conduct of a third person in
such a manner as to create a duty not to interfere with the driver's
operation,’ applies to the facts present here.
In opposition, Cratsley argues that the
Plaintiff's argument stands in stark contrast to established precedent in New
York. Cratsley maintains that she had no duty to control the conduct of the
Decedent when he was driving. While undoubtedly there are certain circumstances
that would establish a third-party duty, Cratsley argues that those facts do
not exist here. Cratsley submits that New York law does not place a legal duty
upon an individual who lacks control over the third party's actions. Pulka
v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019 (1976).
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The court goes on to point out that in
Pulka, Plaintiffs sued not
only the driver who struck a pedestrian, but also the owners of a parking
garage. Plaintiffs argued that the garage owners owed a special duty to
surrounding pedestrians. The Court of Appeals found that the garage operators
owed no duty for an accident that occurred when a patron exited and struck a
pedestrian. Pulka stands for the well-settled principle held
that before causation could be examined, a legal duty first must be
established.
The Court of Appeals addressed the
question of whether owners of the garage owed a duty to pedestrians. The Court
of Appeals held that the owners did not owe such a duty, and refused to hold a
garage operator liable for the acts of its patrons. Further, the Court of
Appeals held that there needed to exist a duty, wherein the garage operator
owed a special obligation to a pedestrian from one of its patrons, before
liability could be established. Again, the Court held that there existed no
special duty.
In fact, the Court held that because of
the lack of any special duty between the garage operator and its patrons or
between the garage operator and pedestrians, and the lack of any reasonable
expectation that the garage operator could control or prevent the negligent
conduct of its patrons, no legal duty existed. Id. at 785–786,
390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019. Here, the Decedent, his estate and his
father simply maintain that `a defendant generally has no duty to control the
conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others, even where
as a practical matter defendant can exercise such control.’ D'Amico v.
Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896 (1987).
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The court then began the process of articulating its holding
in the case, explaining that
[t]he argument advanced by the
Plaintiff is unique in New York when considering the established body of
precedent on the issues of proximate cause, foreseeability, and duty. While
states such as New Jersey, as memorialized in Kubert, advance
a different standard, courts in New York have either been reluctant to broaden
the principle of negligence law or simply refused to do so.
The principle of negligence law is that
in order to impose liability for a negligent act, the act must be the proximate
cause of the injury that resulted therefrom. NY Jur.2d, Negligence §
47. In a motor vehicle accident, `an act or omission is a proximate
cause of an accident if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the
accident. That means if it had such an effect in producing the accident that
reasonable men or women would regard it as a cause of the accident.’ Rubin
v. Percoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2nd Dept.1988). The
injuries or the damages complained of must have been those which might have
been foreseen by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, although not
necessarily in the precise form in which they occurred. Kellogg v.
Church Charity Foundation of Long Island, 203 N.Y. 191, 96 N.E. 406
(1911).
The Plaintiff wishes to re-examine the
long-standing doctrine of negligence law established in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad, supra. Palsgraf has been hailed as `perhaps the
most celebrated of all torts cases and one of the best-known American common
law cases of all time.’ William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
Mich. L.Rev. 1, 1 (1953). Although familiar to the bench and bar, the facts of
Palsgraf deserve mention. In Palsgraf, a man who was carrying
a package ran to board a departing train. One of the railroad guards noticed
the man and attempted to pull him onboard the train. At the same time, another
guard pushed him from behind. In doing so, the man dropped a package containing
fireworks to the ground. Willis W. Hagen II, Accountants Common Law
Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988 Colum. Bus. L.Rev. 181
(1988). `An explosion which occurred caused a scale at the other end of the
platform to fall on [Palsgraf], who sued the railroad for damages.’ Id. at
201, 96 N.E. 406.
In his majority opinion, Judge Cardozo
wrote that the Long Island Railroad was not liable to Palsgraf because it did
not owe a duty of care to her. In order to find negligence, the injury to the
plaintiff must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Palsgraf, 248
N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99. As memorialized by Judge Cardozo,
[i]n every instance, before negligence
can be predicated of a given act, the act must be sought and found a duty to
the individuals complaining, the observance of which would have averted the
injury. Thus, where the injury to the particular plaintiff is not reasonably
foreseeable, the defendant does not have an obligation to refrain from
negligent conduct. Since the defendant does not have a duty to exercise
ordinary care toward unforeseeable persons, liability for negligence does not
result. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. 99.
Palsgraf, supra.
Cardozo held that the defendant could not be liable as he
could not have reasonably foreseen a risk of injury to the Plaintiff. As
such, the defendant's duty of care did not extend to the Plaintiff. In Palsgraf, the
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that the plaintiff, who was
standing at the other end of the platform, would be injured as a result of an
explosion caused by a falling package that occurred on the opposite end of the
platform. As such, because it was not reasonably foreseeable, no duty of care
was owed. Vega v. Crane, supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[h]ere, Plaintiff asks to modify this
standard to broaden the scope of duty from what should be reasonably
foreseeable. In particular, Plaintiff is asking that a party texting a person
who could be driving should be held liable for the foreseeable risk that might
result from this conduct. Although New Jersey may wish to employ such a
departure, this Court declines to do so.
The Plaintiff's approach longs to have
this Court adopt a standard that is a significant retreat from established law
in this area. While Plaintiff offers a detailed analysis suggesting that there
already exists a pad from which to launch this undertaking, much of the
precedent cited by Plaintiff can be distinguished and does not support her
sweeping conclusion.
Relying on Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 305, Plaintiff suggests that New York law could be construed to impose
liability on an individual who could or should have known that their conduct
might result in harm to an unrelated third party. Referencing Sartori v.Gregoire, Plaintiff maintains that a passenger may be liable for verbally or
physically distracting a driver immediately prior to a collision. 259 A.D.2d
1004 (4th Dept.1999). The facts of Sartori are quite different from not only
those present here, but from the standard for which Sartori imposes on
similarly situated defendants.In Sartori, `the defendant commenced a
third-party action against a passenger in her vehicle, alleging that his unwanted
sexual advances towards her immediately before she started her vehicle caused
her to forget to turn on the vehicle's headlights.’ Id.
The Fourth Department held that
[w]hile a passenger in a car may be
liable if he distracted the driver while operating the vehicle immediately
prior to the accident, (see, e.g., Collins v. McGinley, 158 A.D.2d 151, 153,
558 N.Y.S.2d 979, appeal dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 902, 78 N.Y.2d 1002; Whalen v.
Daugherty, 30 A.D.2d 604, 290 N.Y.S.2d 3, lv denied 22 N.Y.2d 647, 295 N.Y.S.2d
1029, 242 N.E.2d 495) it is undisputed that the third-party defendant had no
verbal or physical contact with defendant once she started her vehicle and
drove out of the parking lot onto the main road where the accident occurred.
Thus, third-party defendant's conduct cannot be deemed a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. Id.
Here, Cratsley was not in the vehicle
with the decedent as was the case in Sartori, thus depriving her of the
first-hand knowledge the defendant in Sartori enjoyed. Therefore, the holding
in Sartori is misplaced. Second, Sartori does not address the issue as to
whether a third party, who has no knowledge whether a defendant was driving,
owes any duty to others. Clearly there is a greater nexus between a driver and
a passenger than the scenario that exists here.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The court also used another case to demonstrate how earlier
courts had dealt with similar issues, noting that
[i]n Purdy v. Public Administrator of Westchester County, a resident of a local nursing home,
who apparently had use of a vehicle, caused an accident resulting in
injury. 72 N.Y.2d 1, 530 N.Y.S.2d 513, 526 N.E.2d 4 (1988). The resident
had a medical condition that left her susceptible to fainting spells and
blackouts. The plaintiff in Purdy argued that the nursing home
and its resident physician owed a duty to prevent the resident from driving or
to at the very least warn her of the dangers of driving given her condition to
not only the Plaintiff, but an unidentified member of the public. The Court of
Appeals recognized that `there exist special circumstances in which there is a
sufficient authority and ability to control the conduct of third persons that
[have given rise to] a duty to do so.’ Id. at 8, 530 N.Y.S.2d
513, 526 N.E.2d 4. Notwithstanding that, the Court of Appeals declined to find
the existence of a special relationship between the defendant and the resident
that would require the defendant to govern their conduct for the benefit of the
plaintiff. The Court held that neither the nursing home nor the doctor had the
`authority or ability to exercise such control over [the resident's] conduct so
as to give rise to a duty on their part to protect [the] plaintiff—a member of
the general public.’ Id. at 8–9, 530 N.Y.S.2d 513, 526 N.E.2d
4.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
The court went on to explain that
[i]f the theory advanced by the Plaintiff here
is adopted, the expansion of liability to individuals who text message would be
exponential. Should a Court accept the Plaintiff proposition, a party texting
another, regardless of any specific knowledge, could be liable for an injury
caused by the party receiving the text messages simply by virtue of the text
being sent. In this day and age, where texts are routinely sent to, for
example, advise the public of breaking news, that prescriptions are ready for
pick up, or to advise that a bill is to be paid, the sender would be
responsible for any injuries that could be caused should a driver become
distracted by their receipt. With texting being as profligate, the potential
expansion as contemplated by the Plaintiff is astronomical.
This Court is not ignorant of the many steps
taken by not only this state, but others in the nation, to protect against
motorists from texting while driving. While that certainly is not the only
issue presented for consideration, this Court does not believe it is the
province of a Court to establish a precedent for want of a statute that
otherwise has not been considered, let alone approved, by a legislative body.
Though many would prefer a Court simply to make law where either a legislative
body or executive has failed to do so, this Court does not believe that is its
role. It is not the role of the judiciary to sit on high and promulgate what it
believes should have been a policy determination made elsewhere. Instead, the
courts have deferred to the wisdom, or absence of it, of the legislature in
defining what is actionable and what is not. Rosenfeld v. Isaacs, 79 A.D.2d 630, 433 N.Y.S.2d 623 (2nd Dept.1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978). In short,
courts are not free to decide what should be founded in statutory authority. This is the realm of the legislature.
Simply put, if the legislature wishes to make actionable a third-party's
texting to a motorist, notwithstanding their lack of knowledge that the person
to whom they are texting is driving, they should do so. This Court refuses to
establish this cause of action by judicial fiat.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment
made by Defendant, Taylor Cratsley, is hereby GRANTED. Defendant shall submit
an Order on notice.
Vega v. Crane, supra.
No comments:
Post a Comment