This post examines a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals
of Washington: State v. Williams, 2017
WL 2255816 (2017). As courts usually do, this court began the opinion by
explaining what Williams was charged with and how the prosecution arose. State v. Williams, supra. As the opinion explains, the
prosecution of Lelbert Williams arose from
a series of furtive behavior by Williams. In May 2014, the Spokane Police
Department received calls complaining of a man stalking through backyards in a
west Spokane neighborhood. On May 6, 2014, one caller, Brad Dawson, observed
the man carrying two sports duffel bags and possibly a screwdriver. Also on May
6, 2014, someone burglarized the home of David and Joan Nelson. Joan Nelson's
brother, John Johnston, drove through the neighborhood in an attempt to
apprehend the burglar. After inspecting five homes, Johnston espied a kneeling
gentleman, with two duffels bags astride, employing a screwdriver to pry open a
lock on a storage facility. The man fled when Johnston yelled. Johnston called
911 and tracked the fleer as the fleer scattered from yard to yard and hid in
changing locations. Johnston kept contact on his cellphone with Spokane police.
Spokane police officers arrived and
apprehended the burglar, Lelbert Williams. Law enforcement officers found a
duffle bag, a Bluetooth speaker, a laptop, running shoes, a jacket, and two
rings belonging to Adam Macomber in the possession of Williams. Days earlier
Macomber had discovered the property missing from his apartment.
State v. Williams,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that the
State of Washington charged Lelbert
Williams with five crimes: (1) residential burglary, (2) second degree
burglary, (3) attempted second degree burglary, (4) attempted theft of a motor
vehicle, and (5) possession of stolen property in the second degree. The State
added the final charge near the date of trial.
State v. Williams,
supra. This site provides an overview
of burglary law in the state of Washington.
The opinion then explains that, during Williams’ trial,
Adam Macomber identified those items
missing from his apartment. The State then asked Macomber to value his stolen
property:
Q. Show the jury again. Were you able
to assess a value of an amount that all that property was worth at the time it
was taken?
A. I could give a rough estimate.
Q. And I know that you stated there was
a laptop computer.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. A mobile hotspot.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And number of other items including
your rings, the Bluetooth speaker, and the miscellaneous items you work out in,
including your tennis shoes there.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. What value would you total your loss
at being?
A. I would say roughly $800.
State v. Williams,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[t]he State presented no other
testimony of the value of stolen goods. The trial court denied a request by
Lelbert Williams for a lesser included offense instruction with regard to
second degree possession of stolen property. The jury found Williams guilty of first degree criminal
trespass, attempted second degree burglary, vehicle prowling, and second degree
possession of stolen property. The jury acquitted Williams of residential
burglary. Our appeal concerns the possession of stolen property conviction.
At sentencing, Lelbert Williams
requested a DOSA. He claimed he committed his last violent offense over ten
years earlier. The trial court denied the DOSA on the basis that the court
lacked any information of Lelbert Williams abusing controlled substances. The
trial court sentenced Williams to the standard range for his crimes and ran the
sentences for all crimes concurrently. Our appeal also addresses the denial of
a DOSA sentence.
State v. Williams,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the legal
issues involved in the appeal, noting, initially, that
Lelbert Williams challenges his
conviction for second degree possession of stolen property. We agree that the
State presented insufficient evidence to convict Williams of second degree
possession and thus reverse this conviction.
Evidence suffices for a conviction if a
rational trier of fact could find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628
(1980). Both direct and indirect evidence may support the jury's verdict. State
v. Brooks, 45 Wash.App. 824, 826, 727 P.2d 988 (1986). This court
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Partin, 88
Wash.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977). Only the trier of fact weighs the
evidence and judges the credibility of witnesses. State v. Carver, 113
Wash.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308, 789 P.2d 306 (1989).
The State charged Lelbert Williams with
second degree possession of stolen property under [Revised Code of
Washington §] 9A.56.140 and .160. The former statute defines possessing
stolen property. The latter statute reads, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of possessing
stolen property in the second degree if:
(a) He or she possesses stolen
property, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor
vehicle, which exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars in value
but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value;
(Emphasis added.) Revised Code of
Washington §] 9A.56.010(21) defines
`value] for purposes of the crime, as: (a) `Value’ means the market value of
the property or services at the time and in the approximate area of the
criminal act.
State v. Williams,
supra.
The opinion continues, explaining that the
key words of witness Adam Macomber were
“I could give a rough estimate.” RP at 278. “I would say roughly $800.” RP at
278. We find this testimony fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt the value
of stolen property to exceed $750.
`Value’ for the purposes of theft means
the market value of the property at the time and in the approximate area of the
theft. `Market value’ is the price which a well-informed buyer would pay to a
well-informed seller, when neither is obliged to enter into the transaction. State
v. Clark, 13 Wash.App. 782, 787, 537 P.2d 820 (1975). In a
prosecution, value need not be proved by direct evidence. State v.
Hermann, 138 Wash.App. 596, 602, 158 P.3d 96 (2007). Rather, the jury
may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, including changes in the
condition of the property that affect its value. State v. Melrose, 2
Wash.App. 824, 831, 470 P.2d 552 (1970). In determining the value of an item,
evidence of price paid is entitled to great weight. State v. Hermann, 138
Wash.App. at 602, 158 P.3d 96 (2007).
The State may suggest that, since
Lelbert Williams did not object to Adam Macomber's valuation testimony or since
Williams presented no competing testimony, Macomber's testimony suffices to
convict. We disagree. The trial court reasonably would have overruled any
objection, since Adam Macomber could testify to a value of the stolen property
as its owner. The owner of a chattel may testify to its market value without
being qualified as an expert on valuation. McCurdy v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 68 Wash.2d 457, 468, 413 P.2d 617 (1966); State
v. Hammond, 6 Wash.App. 459, 461, 493 P.2d 1249 (1972). This principle
does not end our inquiry, however. The State still bears the burden of
establishing each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
W.R., 181 Wash.2d 757, 762, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).
State v. Williams,
supra.
The Court of Appeals went on to explain that the
parties rely on two Washington
decisions, both of which assist Lelbert Williams: State v. Hammond, 6
Wash.App. 459, 493 P.2d 1249, and State v. Ehrhardt, 167
Wash.App. 934, 276 P.3d 332 (2012). State v. Hammond addressed
the admissibility of an owner's valuation testimony concerning the worth of a
diamond ring and whether the jury could consider such testimony when
determining if the stolen items had a combined value exceeding $75. The State
charged the defendant with grand larceny for having stolen five rings in excess
of $75. All of the rings were introduced into evidence as exhibits and were
before the jury for their consideration. Victim McDaniels was the only witness
to testify concerning the value of the five rings. She testified that three
rings were `cheap junk jewelry,’ worth only a few dollars. State v.
Hammond, 6 Wash.App. at 460, 493 P.2d 1249. She added that she paid
approximately $25 to $29 in 1968 for a sapphire ring, the fourth ring.
Appellant Dale Hammond challenged the
admissibility of testimony concerning the fifth ring, a diamond. The victim
testified she had owned the ring for thirty years. During direct examination,
the following exchange took place:
Q [By the prosecutor] Now, again, I
understand that you are not trying to sell the rings, but do you have an idea
as to the approximate fair market value of them?
A [By the owner-witness] Well, I am
well satisfied that you couldn't buy a ring like this—
[Defense counsel] I object.
THE COURT: She may answer.
Q [By the prosecutor] Go ahead, Mrs.—
A [By the owner-witness] For $600, I
know.
State v. Hammond, 6 Wash.App.
at 460, 493 P.2d 1249 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). The trial
court ruled the testimony admissible on the ground that the jury could attach
such weight to the testimony as it deems proper.
State v. Williams,
supra.
After briefly reviewing other opinions that analyzed the
value of property that had been stolen, and then took up a related issue. State v. Williams, supra. The court noted that the dissenting judge
suggests that, since the law qualifies the
owner of the personal property to testify to the value of the property, the
owner's testimony suffices to convict no 6 Wash.App. at 461, 493 P.2d 1249
(1972), may suggest such to be the rule, no Washington decision has directly
established such a proposition. No case stands for the proposition that, because
the State offered admissible evidence relevant to the charge, the State
necessarily proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the charge. If the
dissent's proposition holds true, this court wrongly decided State v. Ehrhardt, 167
Wash.App. 934, 276 P.3d 332 (2012). If the dissent's reasoning proves correct,
sufficiency of evidence questions would transfigure into mere evidentiary
questions. The dissent's reasoning ignores the need to convict beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State v. Williams,
supra.
The opinion then took up and examined a series of other cases,
as well as pointing out that
[i]n reaching our conclusion in this appeal,
we emphasize that the State asked the victim, Adam Macomber, to testify to a
`value’ of the property, not to a “market value” or “fair market value” of the
property. Macomber did not testify to the basis of his opinion of value. For
all we know, he used the purchase price of the goods, the replacement cost of
the goods, or some intrinsic value to himself.
Adam Macomber testified to a `rough estimate’
value of the stolen goods to be $800, a figure close to the minimum amount
required to convict of $750. Macomber listed the property taken from him, but
did not describe the condition of the property when stolen. He did not disclose
the purchase date or the purchase price of each item.
We hold the remedy for the insufficiency of
evidence to be a remand for dismissal of charge for possession of stolen
property in the second degree. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on
the lesser included offense of third degree possession. This court lacks
authority to direct the entry of judgment of the lesser included offense if the
jury was not instructed on that offense. In re Personal Restraint of
Heidari, 174 Wash.2d 288, 294, 274 P.3d 366 (2012).
State v. Williams,
supra.
A majority of the court therefore reversed
Lelbert Williams' conviction for second
degree possession of stolen property. We therefore remand for resentencing
based on the vacation of this one conviction. We deny the State an award of
costs against Lelbert Williams since he prevailed on a major claim on appeal.
State v. Williams,
supra.
1 comment:
Good stuff!
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