This post examines an opinion from the Massachusetts SupremeJ udicial Court – Suffolk: Commonwealth v. Carter, 2016 WL 3554885
(2016). The court begins the opinion by
explaining that
[o]n February 6, 2015, the defendant,
Michelle Carter, was indicted as a youthful offender under [Massachusetts
General Laws] chapter 119, § 54, on a charge of involuntary manslaughter after
she, at the age of seventeen, encouraged Conrad Roy (the victim), then eighteen
years of age, to commit suicide. To indict a juvenile as a youthful offender,
the grand jury must hear evidence establishing probable cause that (1) the
juvenile is between the ages of fourteen and eighteen at the time of the
underlying offense; (2) the underlying offense, if committed by an adult, would
be punishable by imprisonment in State prison; and (3) the underlying offense
involves the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm. [Massachusetts General Laws] chapter 119, § 54.
The defendant moved in the Juvenile
Court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, arguing that the
Commonwealth failed to present the grand jury with sufficient evidence of
involuntary manslaughter and that the defendant's conduct did not involve the
infliction or threat of serious bodily harm. The motion was denied.
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
The court goes on to explain that the
principal question we consider in this
case is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the return of an
indictment for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's conduct did not
extend beyond words.
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
Since the issue was the sufficiency of the evidence to
justify the indictment, the court went on to describe the evidence that was
presented to the grand jury that returned the involuntary manslaughter
indictment. Commonwealth v. Carter, supra. It began by explaining that the grand jury
heard evidence from
four witnesses over the course of three
days. That evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass.
880, 906 N.E.2d 343 (2012), included the following:
On the afternoon of July 13, 2014, an
officer with the Fairhaven police department located the deceased in his truck,
parked in a store parking lot. The medical examiner concluded that the victim
had died after inhaling carbon monoxide that was produced by a gasoline powered
water pump located in the truck. The manner of death was suicide.
The victim had been receiving treatment
for mental health issues since 2011. In 2013, the victim attempted to commit
suicide by overdosing on acetaminophen. A friend saved his life by
contacting emergency services.
During the course of the investigation
into the victim's suicide, a police review of his recent electronic
communications caused them to further explore his relationship with the
defendant. The victim and the defendant met in 2011 and had been dating at
various times during that period, including at the time of the victim's death.
Because they did not live in the same town, the majority of their contact took
place through the exchange of voluminous text messages and
cellular telephone calls. The grand jury heard testimony and were
presented with transcripts concerning the content of those text messages in the minutes, days, weeks, and months leading up
to the defendant's suicide.
The messages revealed that the
defendant was aware of the victim's history of mental illness, and of his
previous suicide attempt, and that much of the communication between the
defendant and the victim focused on suicide. Specifically, the defendant encouraged
the victim to kill himself, instructed him as to when and how he
should kill himself, assuaged his concerns over killing
himself, and chastised him when he delayed doing so. The theme
of those text messages can be summed up in the
phrase used by the defendant four times between July 11 and July 12, 2014 (the
day on which the victim committed suicide): `You just [have] to do it.’
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[c]ellular telephone records that were
presented to the grand jury revealed that the victim and defendant also had two
cellular telephone conversations at the time during which police believe that
the victim was in his truck committing suicide. The content of those
cellular telephone conversations is only available as reported by the defendant
to her friend, Samantha Boardman. After the victim's death, the defendant sent a
text message to Boardman explaining that, at one point during the suicide, the
victim got out of his truck because he was `scared,’ and the defendant
commanded him to get back in.
It was apparent that the defendant
understood the repercussions of her role in the victim's death. Prior to his
suicide, the defendant sought (apparently unsuccessfully) to have the victim
delete the text messages between the two, and
after learning that the police were looking through the victim's cellular
telephone, the defendant sent the following text message to
Boardman: `Sam, [the police] read my messages with him I'm done. His family will
hate me and I can go to jail.’
During the investigation, and after
cross-referencing the text messages in
the defendant's cellular telephone and those in the victim's cellular
telephone, the police discovered that the defendant had erased certain text messages between her and the victim. The defendant also lied
to police about the content of her conversations with the victim. Finally, the
defendant acknowledged in a text message to Boardman that she
could have stopped the victim from committing suicide: `I helped ease him into
it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the phone when he did it I
coud have easily stopped him or called the police but I didn't.’
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
The court went on to point out that,
[b]ased on the foregoing evidence, the
Commonwealth successfully sought to indict the defendant for involuntary
manslaughter, as a youthful offender, asserting that the defendant's wanton or
reckless conduct was the cause of the victim's death. After a judge of the
Juvenile Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant filed a
petition for relief under [Massachusetts General Laws] chapter 211, § 3.
On February 1, 2016, a single justice of this court reserved and reported the
case to the full court.
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
The court then began its analysis of Carter’s argument by
explaining that
`[o]rdinarily, a “court will not
inquire into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand
jury.”’ Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 39, 11 N.E.3d 1060
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 2014) quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson,
373 Mass. 591, 592, 368 N.E.2d 1210 (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts 1977).
However, in Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts 1982), we recognized a limited exception for when the grand jury
`fail[ ] to hear any evidence of criminal activity by the defendant.’ `At the
very least, the grand jury must hear enough evidence to establish the identity
of the accused and to support a finding of probable cause to arrest the accused
for the offense charged’ (footnote omitted). Commonwealth v. Rex, supra.
`Probable cause requires sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in believing that an offense has been committed . . . ; this standard
requires considerably less than that which is required to warrant a finding of
guilt’. . . . Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 766 N.E.2d
50 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 2002).
Commonwealth v. Carter,
supra.
Next, the court outlined the legal standards governing a
charge of involuntary manslaughter:
Involuntary manslaughter can be proved
under two theories, either (1) wanton or reckless conduct or (2) wanton or
reckless failure to act. Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456
Mass. 826, 926 N.E.2d 206 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 2010). The
indictment was returned on the basis of the defendant's wanton or reckless
conduct.
Wanton or reckless conduct is
`intentional conduct . . . involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that
substantial harm will result to another.’ Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462
Mass. 482, 969 N.E.2d 672 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 2012),
quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55
N.E.2d 902 (1944).
Whether conduct is wanton or reckless is
`determined based either on the
defendant's specific knowledge or on what a reasonable person should have known
in the circumstances. . . . If based on the objective measure of recklessness,
the defendant's actions constitute wanton or reckless conduct . . . if an
ordinary normal [person] under the same circumstances would have realized the
gravity of the danger. . . . If based on the subjective measure, i.e., the
defendant's own knowledge, grave danger to others must have been apparent and
the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or her]
conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm’ (quotations
and citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Pugh, supra.
The court then
began its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, explaining,
initially, that the
Commonwealth bore the burden of
presenting the grand jury with sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional; (2)
was wanton or reckless; and (3) caused the victim's death. Commonwealth
v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,
supra.
The defendant argues that, because she
neither was physically present when the victim killed himself nor provided the
victim with the instrument with which he killed himself, she did not cause his
death by wanton or reckless conduct. She maintains that verbally
encouraging someone to commit suicide, no matter how forcefully, cannot
constitute wanton or reckless conduct. Effectively, the argument is that verbal
conduct can never overcome a person's willpower to live, and therefore cannot
be the cause of a suicide. We disagree.
We have never required in the return of
an indictment for involuntary manslaughter that a defendant commit a physical
act in perpetrating a victim's death. We also never have had
occasion to consider such an indictment against a defendant on the basis of
words alone. This is not, however, the first time that we have contemplated the
charge of involuntary manslaughter against a defendant where the death of the
victim is self-inflicted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345
Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (1963); Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343
Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961)
Commonwealth v. Pugh, supra.
The ourt went on to outline the issues involved in and the
approaches the court applied in both the Atencio
and Persampieri cases, in that order. It began by explaining that
[a]t issue in Atencio was
a `game’ of `Russian roulette’ played by the two defendants, Atencio and
Marshall, and the deceased. Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra. Marshall
took the gun first, pointed it at his own head, and pulled the trigger; nothing
happened. . . . . He passed the gun to Atencio, who also pointed the gun at his
own head and pulled the trigger, again with no result. Commonwealth v.
Atencio, supra. Atencio then passed the gun to the deceased; when he
pointed it at his own head and pulled the trigger, `[t]he cartridge exploded,
and he fell over dead.’ Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra.
In affirming the involuntary
manslaughter convictions against both defendants, we reasoned that `the
Commonwealth had an interest that the deceased should not be killed by the
wanton or reckless conduct of himself and others ” (emphasis added).
Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra. `Such conduct could be found in the
concerted action and cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about
the deceased's foolish act,’ . . .as `[i]t would not be necessary
that the defendants force the deceased to play or suggest that he play.' Commonwealth
v. Atencio, supra. We concluded that it did not matter that Atencio was the
one who handed the gun to the deceased, as opposed to Marshall, affirming both
defendants' convictions. Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra.
Indeed, had the deceased been the first
to participate in the `game,’ and killed himself before either Atencio or
Marshall touched the gun, his acts would still have been imputable to the
defendants. Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra. It was, instead, the
atmosphere created in the decision to play the `game’ that caused the deceased
to shoot himself, as there was `mutual encouragement’ to participate. Commonwealth
v. Atencio, supra.
Commonwealth v. Pugh, supra.
The opinion goes on
to explain that in the Persampieri case,
the defendant told his wife that he
intended to divorce her. She threatened to commit suicide. Persampieri
v. Commonwealth, supra. The defendant, knowing that the victim had already
attempted suicide twice, said she was `chicken—and wouldn't do it.’ Persampieri
v. Commonwealth, supra. When she retrieved a .22 caliber rifle, he helped
her to load it and handed it to her, noting that the safety was off. Persampieri
v. Commonwealth, supra.
With the gun barrel on the floor, the
victim struggled to pull the trigger. Persampieri v. Commonwealth,
supra. The defendant told her that if she took off her shoe she could reach
the trigger, at which point she successfully shot and killed herself. Persampieri
v. Commonwealth, supra. We concluded that the jury were warranted in
returning a verdict of involuntary manslaughter based on the theory of wanton
or reckless conduct, . . . noting that the defendant, `instead of
trying to bring [the victim] to her senses, taunted her, told her where the gun
was, loaded it for her, saw that the safety was off, and told her the means by
which she could pull the trigger. He thus showed a reckless disregard of his
wife's safety and the possible consequences of his conduct.’
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
The Court then
explained that the two cases above
elucidate that, because wanton or
reckless conduct requires a consideration of the likelihood of a result
occurring, the inquiry is by its nature entirely fact-specific. The
circumstances of the situation dictate whether the conduct is or is not wanton
or reckless. We need not—and indeed cannot—define where on the spectrum between
speech and physical acts involuntary manslaughter must fall. Instead, the
inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.
Here, the particular circumstances of
the defendant's relationship with the victim may have caused her verbal
communications with him in the last minutes of his life on July 12, 2014, to
carry more weight than mere words, overcoming any independent will to live he
might have had. It is in those final moments, when the victim had gotten out of
his truck, expressing doubts about killing himself, on which a verdict in this
case may ultimately turn. In that moment of equivocation, the victim could have
continued to delay his death, perhaps attempting suicide again at a later date,
or perhaps seeking treatment; or he could have gotten back into the truck and followed
through on his suicide. The grand jury heard that the victim, after the
defendant commanded him to `get back in,’ obeyed, returning to the truck,
closing the door, and succumbing to the carbon monoxide.
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
It went on to point out that,
[i]n our view, the coercive quality of
that final directive was sufficient in the specific circumstances of this case
to support a finding of probable cause. Those circumstances included the
defendant's virtual presence at the time of the suicide, the previous constant
pressure the defendant had put on the victim, and his already delicate mental
state. In sum, there was ample evidence to establish probable cause
that the defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless, under either a subjective
or an objective standard. The grand jury could have found that an ordinary
person under the circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger
posed by telling the victim, who was mentally fragile, predisposed to suicidal
inclinations, and in the process of killing himself, to get back in a truck filling
with carbon monoxide and `just do it.’ . . . And significantly, the grand jury
also could have found that the defendant—the victim's girl friend, with whom he
was in constant and perpetual contact—on a subjective basis knew that she had
some control over his actions.
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
The opinion then explains that the
defendant in this case argues that,
even if she was wanton or reckless, her words (spoken when she was miles away
from the victim) could not be the cause of the victim's death. Instead, it was
his decision to get back in the truck that resulted in his suicide. We are not
convinced.
Because there was evidence that the
defendant's actions overbore the victim's willpower, there was probable cause
to believe that the victim's return to the truck after the defendant told him
to do so was not `an independent or intervening act’ that, as a matter of law,
would preclude his action from being imputable to her See Commonwealth v. Atencio, supra. The text messages suggest that the victim had been delaying suicide
for weeks; to ignore the influence the defendant had over the victim would be
to oversimplify the circumstances surrounding his death. His delay of that
suicide and subsequent excuses for such delays were followed by his girl
friend's disappointment, frustration, and threats to seek unwanted treatment on
his behalf. In sum, we conclude that there was probable cause to show that the
coercive quality of the defendant's verbal conduct overwhelmed whatever
willpower the eighteen year old victim had to cope with his depression, and
that but for the defendant's admonishments, pressure, and instructions, the
victim would not have gotten back into the truck and poisoned himself to death.
Consequently, the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient for a finding
of probable cause that the defendant, by wanton or reckless conduct, caused the
victim's death.
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
The opinion then notes that
[i]t is important to articulate what
this case is not about. It is not about a person seeking to ameliorate the
anguish of someone coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value of
life. Nor is it about a person offering support, comfort, and even assistance
to a mature adult who, confronted with such circumstances, has decided to end
his or her life. These situations are easily distinguishable from the present
case, in which the grand jury heard evidence suggesting a systematic campaign
of coercion on which the virtually present defendant embarked—captured and
preserved through her text messages—that targeted the
equivocating young victim's insecurities and acted to subvert his willpower in
favor of her own. On the specific facts of this case, there was sufficient
evidence to support a probable cause finding that the defendant's command to
the victim in the final moments of his life to follow through on his suicide
attempt was a direct, causal link to his death.
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
The Court therefore held that the
grand jury were [sic] justified in
returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against the defendant.
Because involuntary manslaughter carries a potential punishment of
incarceration in State prison and is inherently a crime that involves the
infliction of serious bodily harm, and because the defendant was
seventeen years of age at the time of the offense, her indictment as a youthful
offender on the underlying involuntary manslaughter charge was also supported
by the evidence. The motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss
is affirmed.
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, supra.
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