Monday, July 01, 2013

The Bait Car, the Laptop and the Tracking Device


After a jury convicted him of “felony stealing” in violation of Missouri Revised  Statutes § 570.030, Reginald Williams appealed.  State v. Williams, __ S.W.3d __ 2013 WL 3190103 (Missouri Court of Appeals 2013). Since the judge found Williams was  “a prior and persistent offender”, which raised his potential sentence, the judge sentenced him to ten years in a Missouri prison.  Appellant’s Brief, State v. Williams, 2013 WL 489700.



According to this opinion, the case arose on January 18, 2011, when Detective Rodney Hickman



set up a bait car at 1401 Chestnut Street in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Hickman placed a black bag containing a laptop computer and an electronic tracking device in the front seat of the vehicle. Hickman also notified other officers in the department of the existence of the bait car and tracking mechanism. 

On January 23, 2011, the tracking device activated, indicating that the laptop had been removed from the bait car.



At the same time, St. Louis Police Officers Willie Haymore and James Zwilling were patrolling . . . and received a notification from their dispatcher that the tracking device on the laptop had been activated. Haymore had received Hickman's notification of the bait car and tracking mechanism, and understood the activation of the tracking beacon meant that someone had removed the laptop bag from the bait car.



The officers immediately began following the signal from their location in order to pursue the suspect they believed was in the act of stealing the laptop and tracking device. Following the tracking device signal, the officers pursued Williams from the City of St. Louis, Missouri to the MetroLink station in East St. Louis, Illinois.



As the officers approached the MetroLink platform, they heard another officer shout `laptop bag,’ and saw Williams with the laptop. After a brief struggle, Haymore forced Williams to the ground and handcuffed him. Williams informed the officers that he found the laptop on the train. Approximately 15 minutes elapsed between the time the tracking beacon activated, and Williams's arrest.



State v. Williams, supra.



At Williams’ trial, the jury heard the testimony of Kenneth McCaster, who was



nearby at the time of Williams's arrest, and heard Williams tell Haymore [he] found the laptop bag. McCaster informed a nearby officer that [he] had been on the MetroLink with Williams and had seen Williams board the MetroLink with the laptop in his possession at a station in the City of St. Louis.



McCaster [said] Williams initially offered to pay him to `hack the code’ of the computer. McCaster also informed the officer that after McCaster refused to help him activate the laptop computer, Williams attempted to sell the computer to McCaster for $100, which McCaster also refused.



State v. Williams, supra.



On appeal, Williams argued, first, that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the laptop and tracking device because “admission of the evidence was improper because the items were retrieved outside of the officers' jurisdiction, and therefore constituted an unlawful search and seizure.”  State v. Williams, supra. His second argument was that “the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because insufficient evidence exists in the record to support a verdict that Williams committed felony stealing.”  State v. Williams, supra.



The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Williams’ first argument by noting that the



validity of the search and seizure at issue . . . depends on the validity of the underlying arrest. This case involves the pursuit of a suspect from Missouri into Illinois. Under both Missouri and Illinois law, the validity of a warrantless arrest is determined by the law of the state in which the arrest occurred. State v. Morris, 522 S.W.2d 93 (Missouri Court of Appeals 1975); People v. Clark, 46 Ill.App.3d 240, 360 N.E.2d 1160 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1977). Williams was arrested in Illinois, and, therefore, the validity of his arrest is determined by Illinois law.



State v. Williams, supra.



It then explained that under Illinois law, as codified in Illinois Compiled Statutes 725 ICSA 5/107–4(b),



[a]ny peace officer of another State who enters this State in fresh pursuit and continues within this State in fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he has committed an offense in the other State has the same authority to arrest and hold the person in custody as peace officers of this State have to arrest and hold a person in custody on the ground that he has committed an offense in this State.



State v. Williams, supra.  The court also noted that section 725 ICSA 5/107–4(a)(3) defines “fresh pursuit” as “the immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest.”  State v. Williams, supra.  It then explained that the first requirement under this statute is that the officers must be



pursuing a person in order to arrest that person on grounds that the suspect committed an offense in the other state, in this case Missouri. 725 ICSA 5/107–4(b). The relevant inquiry under the first element is whether the officers were properly in pursuit of Williams given the fact that the officers did not observe him commit any crime, and did not have a warrant for his arrest.



State v. Williams, supra. 



The Court of Appeals then pointed out that, in this case, the officers



did not see the person who removed the laptop from the bait car, and did not have visual contact with the individual possessing the laptop as the officers pursued that person into East St. Louis, Illinois. Instead, the officers pursued the suspect by following the electronic signal of the device in the suspect's possession. While this factual scenario is somewhat different from the fresh pursuit cases we have reviewed, we find this factual distinction immaterial to our analysis.



State v. Williams, supra.  The court also noted that under Illinois law, an officer can



`perform a warrantless arrest when the officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense.’” People v. Lee, 214 I11.2d 476  (Illinois Supreme Court 2005) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/107–2(1)(c)). Where officers are working together, the sum total of the knowledge of all involved officers is used to determine whether probable cause existed. People v. Long, 369 Ill.App.3d 860, 861 N.E.2d 335 (Illinois Court of Appeals 2007).



State v. Williams, supra. 



The Court of Appeals then found that in this case,



although the officers were following the tracking signal being sent from the laptop, the tracking device on the laptop was the means of following a suspect, not the object of the chase. The record reflects that the laptop was part of a bait car sting, and the officers received a radio notification that the laptop had been stolen. 

The fact the laptop bag was reported stolen gave the arresting officers reasonable grounds to believe that the individual found in possession of the bag, regardless of that person's identity, would be guilty of felony stealing or, in the alternative receipt of stolen property, as Williams was initially charged.



The officers had every reason to believe they were in pursuit of a person suspected of committing a felony. The officers' reasonable belief that they were in pursuit of a suspect who had, just moments before committed a felony, is a sufficient basis for the officers to pursue and arrest the suspect in possession of the laptop. People v. Long, supra. See also People v. Schaefer, 343 Ill.App.3d 159, 796 N.E.2d 686 (Illinois Court of Appeals 2003) (725 ICSA 5/107–4(a–3)(1) `imposes no requirement that an officer must conclusively know an offense has been committed before the officer may follow a driver outside the officer's jurisdiction and arrest the driver for offenses that occurred within the officer's jurisdiction. Rather, the statute specifically provides that an officer may make an arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction if the officer is investigating whether an offense occurred within the officer's jurisdiction.’) (emphasis in original).



State v. Williams, supra. 



The court then addressed the second element:  “that the pursuit must be immediate.”  State v. Williams, supra.  It found that



[a]lthough Williams does not challenge the trial court's ruling on this point, we also find that the officers immediately began their pursuit. Prior to the pursuit, the officers were informed of the existence and location of the bait car, and were informed that the laptop and tracking device had been taken from the vehicle. 

The record reflects that immediately upon being notified of the movement of the tracking device, and while still within the City of St. Louis, the officers began a continuous pursuit of the suspect via the tracking signal until they located Williams in Illinois with the laptop and tracking device. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to conclude that the officers' pursuit of Williams was immediately undertaken within the meaning of 725 ICSA 5/107–4.



State v. Williams, supra. 



Finally, it took up the third and final factor, noting Williams argued that the evidence was



unlawfully obtained on the ground that . . . Williams was not endeavoring to avoid arrest within the meaning of 725 ICSA 5/107–4. Williams principally argues . . . that the officers were not engaged in fresh pursuit because the record does not contain any evidence Williams was aware of the pursuit. Williams contends that because he was unaware that officers were chasing him, by definition he could not have been `endeavoring to avoid arrest’ under 725 ICSA 5/107–4(a)(3).



State v. Williams, supra.  



The Court of Appeals found



no support in Illinois law for the proposition that a suspect must have actual knowledge that he or she is being chased by specific police officers in order to be `endeavoring to avoid arrest.’ To the contrary, in People v. Wolfbrandt the court explained:



`While the Illinois fresh pursuit statute is not applicable to this case, even if it were, we believe that the phrase “endeavoring to avoid arrest” does not mean that a person must be consciously aware of the pursuit, but rather that a person is fleeing the scene of the crime to avoid arrest.’


State v. Williams, supra (quoting People v. Wolfbrandt, 127 Ill.App.3d 836, 469 N.E.2d 305 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1984)).   


The court also noted that “the absence of any requirement that the suspect must have actual knowledge of the fresh pursuit is consistent with Illinois courts' construction of Missouri law.”  State v. Williams, supra (citing People v. Clark, 46 Ill.App.3d 240, 360 N.E.2d 1160 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1977). In Clark, the Illinois court “focused on the immediacy with which the officers pursued the suspect, and did not impose a requirement that the suspects have any actual knowledge that they were being pursued by the officers at the time they, or the arresting officers, traversed into Missouri.”  State v. Williams, supra. 



The Court of Appeals then applied this law to the facts of the case, explaining that it found 



ample evidence in the record to conclude that Williams was endeavoring to avoid arrest under 725 ICSA 5/107–4(a)(3). Williams initially removed the laptop computer from a vehicle at 1401 Chestnut Street in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. [He] then left the parking garage, boarded a MetroLink train, and traveled to East St. Louis, Illinois. Williams immediately left the area once the laptop was removed from the bait car, strongly suggesting [he] fled the area with the purpose of avoiding arrest.



Second, almost immediately upon boarding MetroLink, Williams attempted to sell the laptop computer. McCaster testified that Williams asked him to `crack the code’ of the computer, and, when McCaster refused, Williams offered to sell him the computer for $100. Williams's attempt to immediately sell the computer at a marginal price is strongly corroborative of the conclusion that Williams was attempting to dispose of evidence of his crime in order to avoid arrest.



These facts provide compelling evidence that Williams was endeavoring to avoid arrest at the time the officers pursued him into Illinois. Under Illinois law, it is of no consequence that [he] was unaware of the pursuit at the time he took actions designed to evade the arresting officers. . . .



State v. Williams, supra. 



It held that the “officers’ pursuit and arrest of Williams” complied with Illinois law’s requirements for fresh pursuit, which meant both were lawful . . . which meant the evidence . . . did not need to be suppressed.  State v. Williams, supra. 



As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Williams argued, in part, that it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “he was the individual who stole the laptop and tracking device”.  State v. Williams, supra.  More precisely, he argued that because “no one saw him take the laptop bag from the car, the record lacks evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that he stole the laptop.”  State v. Williams, supra.



The Court of Appeals did not agree, explaining that the evidence at trial included



testimony from police officers and an eyewitness that Williams had possession of the laptop shortly after it was taken from the bait car, and offered to sell it for $100 to a nearby stranger after first asking the stranger to `hack the code’ of the computer. The entire episode lasted only about 15 minutes. . . .



[T]he testimony at trial also established that Williams attempted to resist arrest upon being found with the laptop. This testimony provides a sufficient foundation for the jury to infer that Williams was the person who removed the laptop and tracking device from the bait car. The fact no one saw Williams remove the laptop bag does not bar the jury from drawing such an inference. See State v. Evans, 740 S.W.2d 364 (Missouri Court of Appeals 1987) (circumstantial evidence may be used to prove every element of the offense of stealing).



State v. Williams, supra. 

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