After being charged with “racketeering, murder, attempted
murder, narcotics trafficking, firearms possession, and other violent acts”,
Melvin Colon moved to suppress evidence seized from his Facebook account. U.S. v. Meregildo, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2012
WL 3264501 (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 2012) (quoting U.S. Department of Justice Press Release).
As the district court judge explains in the opinion in which
he rules on Colon’s motion,
Facebook is a social networking service
and website that allows registered users -- among many things -- to create a
personal profile, add other registered users as `friends,’ join interest
groups, and `tag’ photographs with names and descriptions. The scope of
personal information that can be part of a registered user's personal profile
is virtually limitless -- including contact information, lists of personal
interests, photographs, and videos. Colon's registered Facebook profile is
`Mellymel Balla.’
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
As part of a federal grand jury investigation into Colon and
his associates, federal agents applied for a search warrant for the contents of
Colon's Facebook account. U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra. A U.S. Magistrate Judge “found
probable cause existed to obtain the contents of Colon's Facebook account and
issued the warrant.” U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
In his motion to suppress, Colon did “not contest the
Magistrate Judge's finding of probable cause” to issue the warrant. U.S. v. Meregildo, supra. Instead, he
attacks the propriety of the
Government's method of collecting evidence to support that probable cause
determination. More specifically, Colon presents a 4th Amendment challenge to the
Government's use of a cooperating witness who was one of Colon's Facebook
`friends’ and gave the Government access to Colon's Facebook profile.
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
In ruling on the motion, the district court judge who has
the case explained that the 4th Amendment guarantees that
the people shall be `secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’ . . . A person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy when they have both a subjective expectation of privacy
and that expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. See Katz
v. U.S., 389 U.S. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
Generally, people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of their home computers. . . .
But this expectation is not absolute, and may be extinguished when a computer
user transmits information over the Internet or by e-mail. . . .
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
The judge noted that Facebook and other social media
present novel questions regarding their
users' expectations of privacy. Facebook users may decide to keep their
profiles completely private, share them only with `friends’ or more expansively
with `friends of friends,’ or disseminate them to the public at large. . . . .
Whether the 4th Amendment precludes the
Government from viewing a Facebook user's profile absent a showing of probable
cause depends, inter alia, on the user's privacy settings.
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
He also explained that when “a social media user
disseminates his postings and information to the public, they are not protected
by the 5th Amendment” under Katz supra. U.S.
v. Meregildo, supra. But “postings using more secure privacy settings
reflect the user's intent to preserve information as private and may be
constitutionally protected” under the Katz
decision. U.S. v. Meregildo, supra.
As I’ve noted in earlier posts, the Katz standard is basically an assumption of risk standard, i.e., if
you knowingly expose information/evidence to others, you lose your 4th
Amendment expectation of privacy in it.
Conversely, if you seek to preserve it as private, then the 4th
Amendment protects it.
As to this case, the judge noted that
Colon maintained a Facebook profile in
which he permitted his Facebook `friends’ to view a list of all of his other
Facebook `friends,’ as well as messages and photographs that Colon and others
posted to Colon's profile. . . .
The Government viewed Colon's Facebook profile
through the Facebook account of one of Colon's `friends’ who was a cooperating
witness. . . .
By that means, the Government learned, inter alia, that Colon posted messages
regarding prior acts of violence, threatened new violence to rival gang
members, and sought to maintain the loyalties of other alleged members of
Colon's gang. . . .
Access to Colon's Facebook profile formed the core of the
Government's evidence of probable cause supporting its application for the
search warrant.
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
He then explained that when Facebook privacy settings
allow viewership of postings by
`friends,’ the Government may access them through a cooperating witness who is
a “friend” without violating the 4th Amendment. . . . While Colon
undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile would not be shared with law
enforcement, he had no justifiable expectation that his `friends’ would keep
his profile private. . . .
And the wider his circle of `friends,’
the more likely Colon's posts would be viewed by someone he never expected to
see them. Colon's legitimate expectation of privacy ended when he disseminated
posts to his `friends’ because those `friends’ were free to use the information
however they wanted -- including sharing it with the Government. . . .
When Colon posted to his Facebook
profile and then shared those posts with his `friends,’ he did so at his peril.
Because Colon surrendered his expectation of privacy, the Government did not
violate the 4th Amendment when it accessed Colon's Facebook profile through a
cooperating witness.
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
Colon also argued that the agents “did not employ any
minimization procedure”. U.S. v. Meregildo, supra. The requirement of minimization originated
with the interception of phone calls and applies to intercepting “wire, oral,
or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.Code § 2518(5). As this source explains,
Government wire interceptions must be
conducted in a manner to minimize interceptions of communications not subject
to interception. . . . Minimization embodies the constitutional requirement of
avoiding, to the greatest extent possible, seizure of conversations which have
no relation to the crimes being investigated or the purpose for which
electronic surveillance has been authorized. . . .
Law enforcement personnel must exhibit
a high regard for the right to privacy and do all they reasonably can to
minimize interceptions of non-pertinent conversations. . . .
Here, the judge rejected Colon’s argument that the agents
did not employ minimization procedures as “meritless.” U.S. v.
Meregildo, supra.
For instance, the Government sought to
seize information related to the scheduling of meetings among members of the
racketeering enterprise, drug trafficking activity, and weapons. . . . This
description was sufficiently particular to allow the Government to examine the
files it received from Facebook without violating the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. v. Meregildo,
supra.
The judge therefore denied Colon’s motion to suppress. U.S. v.
Meregildo, supra.
No comments:
Post a Comment