After Lawrence Williams was “indicted for possessing a
firearm as a felon” in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 922(g)(1), he went to trial, the jury found him guilty and the U.S. District Court Judge who had the case “sentenced him to 66 months' imprisonment.” U.S. v.
Williams, 2015 WL 4666312 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). Williams appealed. U.S. v.
Williams, supra.
The Court of Appeals begins its opinion by explaining how
the prosecution arose:
On January 26, 2013, Officer Jennifer
Hendricks of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department was driving her
patrol car when its license plate recognition (`LPR’) system gave an alert
about a nearby car. The LPR system scans the license plates of cars that
are within range of cameras mounted on the patrol car and can generate an alert
if a scanned car is connected to a wanted person.
The alert showed Officer Hendricks that
a man named Otis Hicks was associated with a nearby car and was wanted by the
St. Louis County Police Department, a department that neighbors Hendricks's,
for first-degree domestic assault. The alert also said that Hicks may be armed
and dangerous. The LPR alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated
with the car.
After pulling the car over, Officer
Hendricks approached the driver's side and saw two men inside. She asked the
driver for his license, which identified him as Otis Hicks. Officer Hendricks
then waited for a second police officer to arrive.
Upon arrival, Officer David Christensen
asked the passenger, Williams, to get out of the car and present identification.
According to Officer Christensen, Williams patted his waistband two times while
getting out of the car and Williams's hands were shaking uncontrollably as he
retrieved his identification. Officer Christensen handcuffed Williams and
conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Officer Christensen felt what he
recognized to be a firearm and removed a handgun from Williams's waistband.
After finding the handgun, Officer Christensen found a bag containing `a dark
rock-like substance’ in Williams's pocket that was later identified as heroin.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The Court of Appeals goes on to explain that a
federal grand jury indicted Lawrence
Williams for one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. Before trial,
Williams moved to suppress the handgun and heroin. A magistrate judge held
an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from Officers Hendricks and
Christensen. The magistrate judge recommended the denial of Williams's motions.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's relevant proposed factual
findings and rulings.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the Government notified Williams that it would introduce his
prior firearm-possession convictions at trial. Williams submitted two motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm
as a felon, his 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable
firearm and unlawful use of a firearm, and his earlier conviction of
first-degree robbery. Williams also moved to exclude the heroin.
The district court denied Williams's
motions to exclude the heroin and the 2002 and 1995 convictions. However, the
court excluded the earlier robbery conviction because of, among other reasons,
`the age, when it was completed, the similarity of the offenses, and the fact
that we will already have two others that will be introduced into evidence.’
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
At Williams’ trial, his attorney attempted to cross-examine
Officer Hendricks about her motivation
for testifying that Williams had actual possession of the handgun. After
Williams's counsel asked Officer Hendricks if she had been frustrated with
prosecutors' past decisions regarding whether to bring firearm charges, the
Government objected, and the following colloquy took place at sidebar:
Counsel: Judge, it's my good faith
belief that the police officers in the city of St. Louis sometimes decide to
charge somebody with a gun that they found in the car even though the gun was
not found on the person, and that the person that they decide to charge is the
person in the car that has the worst record.
Court: Have you got some evidence of
this that you are going to present here?
Counsel: No, I want to ask her.
Court: Do you have some evidence of
that fact that you are prepared to present to me?
Counsel: No.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The opinion then explains that, after
the Government argued that this had
“nothing to do with the facts of this case,” the court asked Williams's counsel
about the foundation for this line of questions:
Court: I am just going to tell you,
[Counsel], absent some evidence to support some good faith belief that that
occurs or occurred here, I will not permit you to go down that road.
Counsel: Well, may I tell the Court
that my good faith belief is based on talking to a retired police officer about
this case?
Court: No. If you want to bring that
police officer in to testify here, then I will take his proffer and we can go
from there.
Counsel: All right.
Court: But I will not permit you on the
record that we have here to suggest that with respect to this witness.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
Next, after
Officer Hendricks finished testifying, Officer Christensen
took the stand. Before cross-examining Officer Christensen, Williams's counsel
asked the court if he would be barred from pursuing the same line of questions:
Counsel: I assume [the Government]
still wants to object and that you would make the same ruling, that I'm not
allowed at this time to go into questions about the relationship between the
police department and the warrant office at the [prosecutor's office].
Court: Not for the purpose and based
upon the record that you have made today, correct.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The District Court Judge then instructed the jury on “how it
should consider the evidence of Williams's 2002 and 1995 convictions.” U.S. v.
Williams, supra. After deliberating, the jury found Williams guilty and
this appeal followed. U.S. v. Williams, supra.
Williams made two arguments on appeal, but only one of them
implicates the 4th Amendment.
U.S. v. Williams, supra. In his other argument, Williams claimed that
the trial judge “abused” his discretion by admitting, “under Rule 404(b), evidence that Williams had twice been
convicted of illegal firearm possession.” U.S.
v. Williams, supra.
Williams’ first argument was that
Officer Hendricks lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop the car. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
According to Williams, because Officer Hendricks lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop the car, the handgun and heroin were fruits of an illegal stop and should
have been suppressed. See generally Wong Sun v. U.S., 371U.S. 471 (1963).
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The 4th Amendment creates a constitutional right
for individuals to be free from “unreasonable” searches and seizures. And as Wikipedia explains, a
brief, non-custodial traffic stop
is considered a `seizure’ for the purposes of the 4th Amendment and must
therefore be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The
investigating officer must weigh the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether sufficient objective facts exist to create reasonable suspicion that
the driver is engaged in criminal activity. If the investigating officer witnesses the
driver commit a traffic violation, then said violation generally constitutes
reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle. The officer may then
detain the driver and any passengers of the vehicle for long enough to confirm
and/or deny his or her suspicions.
If his or her suspicions are confirmed,
then there may be probable cause to either search the vehicle and/or
arrest its occupant(s), depending on the nature of the suspected violations. .
. . .
Getting back to the Williams
case, the Court of Appeals then analyzed Williams’ “reasonable suspicion”
argument:
We review the district court's factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. U.S. v.
Farnell, 701 F.3d 256 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).
`The 4th Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have
a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal
activity.’ U.S. v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860 (U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 8th Circuit 2007). If police have reasonable suspicion, they `may briefly
stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or
dispelling the suspicion.” U.S. v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2008).
`Reasonable suspicion must be supported
by more than a mere hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not
rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short
of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.’ U.S. v. Roberts, 787
F.3d 1204 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). . . . `We consider
the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an officer has a
particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing.’ U.S. v. Robinson, 670
F.3d 874 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then addressed whether there was
reasonable suspicion in this case:
We review the district court's factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. U.S. v.
Farnell, 701 F.3d 256 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).
`The 4th Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have
a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal
activity.’ U.S. v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860 (U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 8th Circuit 2007).
If police have reasonable suspicion,
they `may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at
confirming or dispelling the suspicion.’ U.S. v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2008).
`Reasonable suspicion must be supported by more than a mere hunch, but the
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance
of the evidence standard.’ U.S. v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204 (U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). . .
`We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether
an officer has a particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing.’ U.S.
v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
It went on to explain that, in this case,
Officer Hendricks relied upon the
notice from the LPR system that: (1) Hicks was associated with a nearby car,
(2) Hicks was wanted by the St. Louis County Police Department for first-degree
domestic assault, and (3) Hicks may have been armed and dangerous.
Williams nonetheless argues that
Officer Hendricks did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop
because a “police officer who receives an alert from the LPR system has no way
of knowing the extent of the person's relationship to the vehicle.’
Williams and the Government seem to
agree that there are no reported federal decisions that have specifically dealt
with the use of an LPR system in the 4th Amendment context. However, as we have
held, `if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an
offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check
identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person
briefly while attempting to obtain further information.’ U.S. v. Farnell, supra. . . (quoting U.S.
v. Smith, 648 F.3d 65 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit 2011). `Police officers may rely
upon notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted
in connection with the investigation of a felony “when making a Terry stop,
even if the notice omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion.’”
U.S. v. Smith, supra (quoting U.S.
v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904 (U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2004)).
We fail to see how the use of the LPR
system makes any difference in this case. Williams does not cite any precedent
holding that the mechanism through which an officer receives notice from another
department matters for 4th Amendment purposes. Indeed, the LPR system merely
automates what could otherwise be accomplished by checking the license-plate
number against a `hot sheet’ of numbers, inputting a given number into a patrol
car's computer, or `calling in’ the number to the police station. Thus, we
conclude that Officer Hendricks was entitled to `rely upon notice from another
police department’ she obtained by using a more automated process: the LPR system.
U.S. v. Jacobsen, supra. upholding a
police officer's reliance on a wanted notice he discovered by performing a
search on a license-plate number).
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
And, finally, Williams also argued that
Officer Hendricks's stop violated the 4th
Amendment “because she could not tell who was driving the car until after she
stopped it.” Williams asserts, without citation, that Officer Hendricks must `have
[had] some idea at least that there [was] a black male driving the car’ before
making the traffic stop. Officer Hendricks testified that she was unable to see
who was inside the car until after she stopped it. Common sense dictates that
police officers will often be unable to confirm the race or gender of a driver
before initiating a traffic stop. Accordingly, we fail to see how Officer
Hendricks's decision to briefly stop the car and check the driver's
identification was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment
merely because she initially could not identify the driver's race or
gender. See U.S. v.
Farnell, supra.
Williams concedes that Hicks was
`perhaps associated with the car’ but nonetheless argues that the stop violated
the 4th Amendment because Officer Hendricks `had no information of the time
frame of when Hicks had been associated with the car.’
But our precedent makes clear that `officers
may rely upon notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is
wanted in connection with the investigation of a felony “when making a Terry stop,
even if the notice omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable
suspicion.”’ U.S. v. Smith, supra (internal alteration omitted)
(quoting U.S. v. Jacobsen, supra).
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Williams’ conviction. U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
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