As I have noted in prior posts, and as Wikipedia explains,
cyberstalking (like stalking) is a criminal offense. This post is about a case in which one
neighbor (Amie Brown) complained about being stalked by another (Pamela A.
Slone).
The case is Slone v.
Brown, ___ P.3d ___, 2012 WL 5258952 (Utah Court of Appeals 2012), and,
according to the opinion, this is how it began:
The Brown and Slone residences are
separated by a pasture in which Slone sometimes kept her family's dog. On March
19, 2011, the dog escaped from confinement and Brown believed it was acting
aggressively toward her children. The incident resulted in a confrontation
between Brown and Slone, as well as subsequent events that Slone considered
threatening and harassing.
On
April 1, 2011, Slone filed a Request for a Civil Stalking Injunction against
Brown. . . . The Request states that Brown `came over to [Slone's] house . . .,
chased [the] dog with mace and yelled at [Slone] saying she was going to shoot
[the] dog and string him up in her garage.’ It also alleges that Brown
threatened to `kick [Slone's] ass,’ and that Brown `later approached [Slone's]
house with a loaded shotgun.’
In addition, the Request claims Brown
made a hand signal directed at Slone that mimicked pointing a gun at her and
pulling the trigger. Finally, Slone indicates that Brown engaged in `harassing
[Slone's] landlords’ for the purpose of getting rid of the dog and having Slone
evicted.
Slone v. Brown, supra. (A footnote says that “[a]s a result of
Brown's threats to sue Slone's landlords, [they] required Slone to give up the
dog.” Slone v. Brown, supra.)
We will come back to the facts later. First, I need to explain what Slone needed to
do to obtain the injunction she sought. Slone
v. Brown, supra. The Court of
Appeals explains that to “obtain a civil stalking injunction, the petitioner must
establish the elements necessary to meet the definition of stalking provided in
the criminal code. See Utah Code § 77–3a–101(1).” Slone v. Brown, supra. It also noted that the Utah legislature has
defined criminal stalking as follows:
A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or
knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and
knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable
person: (a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third
person; or (b) to suffer other emotional distress.
Slone v. Brown, supra (quoting
Utah Code § 76–5–106.5(2)).
Another section of § 76-5-106.5 defines “course of conduct” as
two or more acts directed at or toward
a specific person, including:
(i) acts in which the actor . . .
threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with a person's
property: (A) directly, [or] indirectly . . .; and (B) by any action, method,
device, or means; or
(ii) when the actor engages in any of
the following acts . . . (C) . . . contacts a person's neighbors . . .; (D)
sends material by any means for the purpose of . . . disseminating information
about . . . the person to a . . . friend, or associate of the person; . . . or
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other electronic
means to commit an act that is a part of the course of conduct.
After Slone filed her request for a civil stalking
injunction, the trial judge granted a temporary injunction against Brown. Slone
v. Brown, supra. Brown then asked
for a hearing on the matter, which the judge held. Slone
v. Brown, supra. At the hearing,
both sides presented further evidence, after which the judge ruled that Slone
had met
her burden of establishing that she was
entitled to a three-year civil stalking injunction against Brown. The [judge] concluded that there were
three incidents of stalking directed at Slone: (1) the threats against Slone
made by Brown on March 19, 2011; (2) Brown's internet postings from March
19–23, 2011 (the blog), which included `threats which
if reviewed and perceived by a reasonable person could reasonably cause
emotional distress or cause an individual to be fearful of [her] personal
safety or the safety of an immediate family member, spouse, sibling or child’;
and (3) Brown's contacts with Slone's landlords, which the [judge] ruled were
directed at Slone and caused her `reasonably to be concerned about the personal
safety of herself or members of her family.’
Although the [judge] also found Brown
had used a weapon, it determined that the weapon was directed at the dog and
not at Slone. As a result, [he] declined to find that Brown had `used or
intended to’ use a weapon against Slone. Brown filed a timely appeal.
Slone v. Brown, supra.
Brown appealed. Slone v. Brown, supra. On appeal, she
concede[d] that her confrontation with
Slone on March 19, 2011 constitutes one instance of a course of conduct under
the statutes. She challenges the trial court's consideration of either
the blog or
her communications with Slone's landlords as a second qualifying incident.
Slone v. Brown, supra.
Brown’s first argument in support of her appeal was that her
blog entries and the
actions described in them were not
`directed at’ Slone. In particular, she relies on the fact that Slone did not
learn until reading the blog a week later that after the initial incident, Brown had
armed herself with a loaded shotgun and started toward Slone's house intending
to shoot the dog. However, Brown admits that she assumed
Slone's landlords alerted Slone to the blog entry titled `Kill Time,’
thereby strongly suggesting that Brown knew that the landlords were familiar
with the site.
It is also apparent that other
neighbors were aware of the blog because Slone indicated she learned of it from `some
other neighbors.’ Thus, Brown's use of the internet can constitute a course of
conduct under the statute, even though not sent to Slone. See UtahCode § 76–5–106.5(1)(b)(ii)(C) (defining course of conduct to include `contact[ing]
a person's neighbors’); § 76–5–106.5(1)(b)(ii)(D) (defining course
of conduct to include `send[ing] material by any means . . . for the purpose of
. . . disseminating information about . . . the person to a . . . friend, or associate
of the person’).
Nor are we persuaded by Brown's
argument that the comments were not directed at Slone because she did not use
Slone's name in the postings. Notwithstanding Brown's references to Slone in
her blog as
`the lady,’ the details of the encounter were specific enough that Slone's
neighbors identified her as the target of the threats and directed her to the
site.
Under these circumstances, we agree
with the trial court that the comments in the blog were directed at Slone.
Slone v. Brown, supra.
(A footnote in the opinion says Brown conceded that her blog entry “accurately
reflects that she grabbed a loaded shotgun and left her house with the intent
to return to Slone's house and shoot the dog”, but “her husband intervened and
persuaded her to desist.” Slone v. Brown, supra.)
Brown also claimed she “did not have `the requisite intent
to engage in a course of conduct that . . . she knows or should know would
cause a reasonable person to fear or suffer emotional distress.’” Slone v. Brown, supra (quoting Bott v. Osburn, 257 P.3d 1022 (Utah
Court of Appeals 2011)). The Court of
Appeals did not agree, either with her interpretation of the intent required to
commit the crime or her having displayed such intent. As to the first issue, it explained that
under the stalking statute,
`it is not a defense that the actor ...
did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress.’ Utah
Code § 76–5–106.5(4). Rather, if the conduct `would cause a reasonable person .
. . to fear for that person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or .
. . to suffer other emotional distress,’ it can constitute part of a course of conduct. Utah Code § 76–5–106.5(2). In reviewing the
court's determination, we consider the distress or fear caused from the
perspective of a reasonable person under all of the circumstances. . . .
Slone v. Brown, supra.
The Court of Appeals also found that the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial judge’s entry of the civil stalking injunction:
Brown admits that she `definitely
yelled at [Slone] at the top of [her] lungs,’ threatened to give Slone an `ass
kicking,’ and also threatened to kill the dog. She further acknowledges that
she made calls to Slone's landlords complaining about the dog and threatening
to sue.
Although Brown denied in court that she
had pretended to shoot Slone with her finger while the police were present, she
admitted posting an entry in her blog that states, `I sort of
threatened [Slone] in front of the Sheriff which wasn't the best either.’ With
that history, Slone read entries in Brown's blog that include the following
statements, `I grabbed my 20 gauge, loaded it and put three shells in my pocket
for good luck’; `I had a 20 gauge with one in the chamber, I had sprayed mace
twice, and I was going to kill the dog, I had threatened the dog owner with
physical bodily harm, was still possibly . . . going to kick the owner's ass’;
`I am not afraid to fight in the middle of the street with witnesses, or to
fight dirty in secret’; `[My husband] said I would be in jail right now based
on the events and the fact that I openly threatened and had a shotgun, loaded
and with one in the chamber, with the safety off’; and `I promised [my husband]
I would stay out of trouble but I was having fantasy thoughts of black leather
gloves with the steel shot in the knuckles.’
Under these circumstances, we are not
persuaded that the trial court erred in concluding that Brown should have known
that the entries in her blog would cause a reasonable person to be frightened and
distressed. Indeed, even Brown
acknowledged that she could `see how Ms. Slone was upset by it.’ Thus, the trial court did not err in entering a
civil stalking injunction against Brown.
Slone v. Brown, supra. (The opinion explains, in a footnote, that at
the hearing on the injunction “Slone explained that she and her children are
frightened of Brown and that Brown's internet postings are `very disturbing.’” Slone
v. Brown, supra.)
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