After Gerald Strothers was convicted “of two counts of
promoting prostitution, one count of possession of criminal tools and one count
of the lesser included offense of attempted promoting of prostitution” and
sentenced to “one year of community control sanctions”, he appealed. State
v. Strothers, 2012 WL 4123398 (Ohio Court of Appeals 2012).
The case began when
East Cleveland Police Detective Antonio
Malone testified . . . received information from a confidential informant that
a house was being used to facilitate prostitution at 14019 Northfield Avenue in
East Cleveland, Ohio. The informant told police of a website, `Backpage.com,’
which advertised those services. Officer Malone and East Cleveland Police
Sergeant Randy Hicks began an investigation.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Hicks and Malone testified as to the results of the
investigation at Strothers’ trial:
Hicks stated that through an
investigation of postings on Backpage.com, he was able to discover a brothel
being run in East Cleveland that was called the `Chocolate Factory’ or
`Batcave.’ Hicks explained the web postings provided a phone number to which
text messages could be sent in order to become a `member’ of the Chocolate
Factory.
He was later able to confirm that the
phone number was assigned to Gerald Strothers and that phone number was posted
on his personal Facebook page. Hicks testified that he sent a text message to
the number provided on the advertisements (the same number on Strothers'
Facebook page) posing as a `John’ who was interested in the Chocolate Factory's
services.
He stated that in return he received
several messages that quoted prices, gave the address of the house and several
photographs of naked females were transmitted. The address that was provided
was the same as the one listed on Gerald Strothers' Facebook page.
Malone.
. . . [said] he then called Strothers posing as the `John.’ The telephone calls
were recorded, audio and video, and admitted into evidence. Strothers stated
during the telephone call that the price for `full service’ was $69.99.
Malone testified that in his experience
`full service’ meant `oral sex and regular sex, intercourse.’ Malone arranged
to arrive at the house on July 21, 2011, where he would meet with Shatori
Stallings.
After the phone call, Malone received a
text message again advising him of the address. This text was sent from another
telephone number Malone established as belonging to Strothers via Strothers'
Facebook page. A search warrant was obtained and executed on July 21, 2011, and
both Strothers and Stallings were arrested.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Stallings also testified. State v. Strothers, supra. Stallings said she met Strothers
a few months prior to the . . . arrest. She
had been to [his] house on at least two occasions prior to the date of the
arrest. She [said] the first time she went to the house, she and Strothers
discussed his Backpage.com business to promote sex and he suggested that she
work for him with a 60/40 split. Stallings testified that . . . she agreed to
work for Strothers. . . .
[She said] that on July 21, 2011, [he] contacted
her and asked her to be a fill in because he was not sure if other girls were
available. When she was asked at trial as to what she would be filling in for,
she stated, `[h]aving sex for money.’
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Strothers’ first argument on appeal was that the trial judge
erred when he denied Strothers’ motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure. State
v. Strothers, supra. Under Rule
29(a), the trial judge must,
on motion of a defendant . . . after
the evidence on either side is closed, . . . order the entry of a judgment of
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or
complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such
offense or offenses.
State v. Strothers,
supra. The appellate court noted
that the question that arises when a defendant moves for acquittal is “`whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Strothers, supra (quoting State v. Jackson, 2006 Ohio 1938 (Ohio
Court of Appeals 2006).
It then outlined the elements of the three
crimes of which Strothers was convicted. State
v. Strothers, supra. The first one was
promoting prostitution by violating Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.22(A)(1) and (A)(4)
and the second, related charge, was attempting to violate Ohio Revised
Code § 2907.22(A)(2). State v. Strothers,
supra. Section 2907(A) states that
[n]o person shall knowingly: (1) Establish,
maintain, operate, manage, supervise, control, or have an interest in a
brothel; (2) Supervise, manage, or control the activities of a prostitute in
engaging in sexual activity for hire; . . . (4) For the purpose of violating or
facilitating a violation of this section, induce or procure another to engage
in sexual activity for hire.
State v. Strothers, supra.
The Court of Appeals explained that while the statute did not “define the
word `brothel’”,” it had, in an earlier case, defined a brothel as
`synonymous with the word “bordello,” which is defined as `a building in which
prostitutes are available’” State v.
Strothers, supra (quoting State v. Kiriazis,
2004–Ohio–502 (Ohio Court of Appeals 2004). It also noted that the Ohio attempt
statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2923.02, states that “`[n]o person . . . shall
engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the
offense’” the defendant allegedly sought to commit. State v. Strothers, supra.
The Court of Appeals found that the testimony presented at trial, “if
believed” by the jury, “does establish all the elements of the crimes for which
Strothers was convicted.” State v. Strothers, supra.
First, we examine promoting prostitution. The
testimony of the officers . . . establish that Strothers created a website to
promote the use of his home for members of the `Chocolate Factory’ to meet
women who were advertised under Backpage.com's escort section. These
advertisements had Strothers' phone numbers and address associated with them.
When Malone called the number to arrange a time to
come to the chocolate factory he spoke with Strothers, who quoted a price of
$69 .99 and instructed him to bring about $100–150 with him.
When these facts are taken in conjunction with the
testimony of Stallings . . ., it is clear that a trier of fact could find
Strothers was, in fact, promoting prostitution. Strothers was managing a `building
in which prostitutes were available.’ He procured Stallings for the purposes of
engaging in sex for hire, and the record is clear that he attempted to
supervise, manage, or control the activities of a prostitute in engaging in
sexual activity for hire. . . .
[A] rational trier of fact, looking at the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Strothers committed the crimes he was convicted of for promoting
prostitution.
State v. Strothers, supra.
Strothers was also convicted of possessing criminal tools by
violating Ohio Revised Code § 29.23.24(A), which states that “[n]o person shall possess or
have under the person's control any substance, device, instrument, or article,
with purpose to use it criminally.” State
v. Strothers, supra. The Court of
Appeals found the evidence was also sufficient to support Strothers’ conviction
for this crime. State v. Strothers,
supra.
Our analysis with respect to the crime
of promoting prostitution, in conjunction with the materials removed from the
house and bagged as evidence, establish that Strothers possessed devices or
instruments with purpose to use them criminally. Police confiscated cell phones
that rang when the numbers associated with both the `Chocolate Factory’ and
Strothers were called.
They confiscated two books titled `Sex
Secrets of Escorts’ and `A Blueprint for Escort Services.’ They also seized . .
. what was estimated to be about 20 condoms. The conduct Strothers was engaged
in leads a reasonable trier of fact to identify these items as those that would
be used by Strothers for a criminal purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Finally, Strothers claimed the trial judge erred “in
allowing Malone to provide testimony that amounted to opinion testimony” on
three occasions. State v. Strothers, supra.
The Court of Appeals noted that Ohio Rules of Evidence Rule 701 allows
“lay witnesses to present opinion testimony.”
State v. Strothers, supra. As this site notes, lay witnesses (i.e.,
witnesses who are not expert witnesses) are generally not allowed to give
opinion testimony. But Ohio Rule of
Evidence 701 says that if the witness
is not testifying as an expert, the
witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Strothers first argued that the trial judge erred when, as
noted above, he let Malone testify as to “the meaning of `full service.’” State v. Strothers, supra. The Court of Appeals found that the
opinion seems to be rationally based on
Malone's perception given all the information he discovered during his
investigation. Furthermore, it is helpful to determine a fact or issue in the
case. It does not amount to error on the court's part to allow this testimony;
it is in line with the allowances of lay person testimony under Ohio Rule
of Evidence 701.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Strothers also argued that the trial judge erred in allowing
Malone to testify “to the fact that brothels often have a door fee.” State v. Strothers, supra. The Court of Appeals found that the trial
judge did not err in admitting this testimony.
State v. Strothers, supra. It explained that it was relevant to issues involved
in the case
because the text messages received by
the police instructed them to bring a case of bottled water or beer as a
substitute for the door fee. Malone stated he learned of this practice while
researching brothels.
State v. Strothers,
supra.
Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed Strothers’ argument
that the trial judge erred in allowing Malone to testify that “criminals do not
like to talk about prices on the phone.”
State v. Strothers, supra. The court found this testimony was
relevant because during the second
recorded telephone call, Strothers stated that he did not want to discuss
prices over the phone, even though he did so during the first conversation. The
Ohio Supreme Court stated, `Rule 701 contemplates that the opinion
testimony of the lay witness will be helpful.’
Undoubtedly, the trial judge thought that that was the case. Admission of such testimony was not required, but it was not an abuse of discretion to hear it.
Undoubtedly, the trial judge thought that that was the case. Admission of such testimony was not required, but it was not an abuse of discretion to hear it.
The testimony provided was that of a
police detective who researched the practice of brothels utilizing door fees
and who had extensive experience as to how criminals speak on the telephone.
Malone stated he had investigated about 400 drug cases and 15 to 20
prostitution cases.
State v. Strothers,
supra. So the Court of Appeals
rejected all three of Strothers’ arguments about Malone’s testimony, finding
that the trial judge did not err in admitting it. State
v. Strothers, supra. It s therefore affirmed his conviction and
sentence. State v. Strothers, supra.
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