This post examines a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals of Ohio – 11th District:
State v. Skaggs, 2016 WL
1090816. The court begins by explaining
that Jason Skaggs (“the appellant”)
appeals from the February 10, 2015
judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him for receiving stolen property following a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The court, as courts usually do, then summarized the facts
that let to the charge and the conviction:
On February 7, 2014, appellant [“Skaggs”]
was indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury on one count of receiving stolen
property, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of [Ohio Revised Code] 2913.51(A). Appellant pleaded not guilty and a jury trial commenced on
January 20, 2015. The following facts were adduced at trial.
Jake Falter, a student at The Ohio
State University in Columbus, testified that he purchased a MacBook Pro laptop
computer in 2012 for $1,100.00 on Apple's website and that he used the computer
primarily for school and had various notes and papers saved onto the computer's
hard drive. After a year of use, the `T’ button became unattached and was no
longer fixed onto the computer's keyboard.
On October 11, 2013, Falter left his
laptop in the living room of the townhouse where he lived with three other
roommates before leaving to go out with friends. He did not notice that his
computer was missing until the following Sunday, October 13, when he needed it
to work on homework for class. While Falter did not have a password on his
computer, he did install a program, `Prey’, that sends a report via electronic
mail that gives the location, I.P. address, and other information of a
registered device once it is reported stolen on the program's website. When
Falter received the report, it indicated that the laptop was located at an
address assigned to MicroLink Computer Outlet, a store located in Mentor, Ohio.
He contacted the Mentor Police Department that evening, who advised him that he
would first have to file a report with the Columbus Police Department, which he
did the following day, Monday, October 14, 2015. Falter also provided the
police with the computer's serial number, which was labeled on the box the
computer came in.
Falter further testified that his
father purchased the laptop back from MicroLink a few days later for $275.00.
When he was able to look it over after it came back into his possession, there
was a different user name on the computer, `Dave Dietz’, but it did not have a
password. Some of the documents he had saved onto the computer were also
missing.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The court went on to explain that
Officer Curt Davis of the Mentor Police Department testified that he spoke with Falter on the evening of October 14,
2014. After writing down the information provided by Falter, Officer Davis
travelled to MicroLink and spoke with the owner, Ziad Ibrahim. Ibrahim stated
that he had purchased the laptop from an individual the previous day at
approximately 1:00 in the afternoon that he was able to identify as
appellant. Officer Turek, an evidence tech who arrived at the location
shortly thereafter, took photos of the computer with the matching serial
number. In addition, Officer Davis was provided with all of the business
records kept by Ibrahim from his purchasing the laptop from appellant as well
as the surveillance footage that had recorded the transaction as it took place.
Ziad Ibrahim testified appellant
entered his store and stated that he was interested in selling the MacBook Pro
he was holding because he had purchased a new one. After he turned the laptop
on to inspect it, appellant entered the password to log on. Ultimately, Ibrahim
concluded that the computer was in nice condition and offered to purchase it
from Skaggs for $275.00, which he accepted. As per his usual business practice,
Ibrahim entered appellant's driver's license information into his computer as
well as a description of the MacBook computer. Ibrahim further remarked that,
while he did find it unusual that appellant's license indicated that he had a
Columbus address, appellant informed him that he had just moved to Cleveland
with his girlfriend on Abbey Rd., which Ibrahim notated in his records.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The opinion goes on to summarize the testimony of several
other witnesses:
Sebastian Cassius testified next for
the state and identified himself as a Geek Squad manager at Best Buy who
oversees various departments within the store. He indicated that Falter did own
an Apple MacBook Pro based on information previously provided to him and that,
based on the computer's model number, it still had a selling price of $1,099.99
as of January 16, 2015.
Detective Mike Malainy of the Mentor
Police Department testified he was approached by Officer Davis in the detective
bureau on the evening of October 14, 2013 and was asked if he could assist him
in recording a phone call. From the information collected by Officer Davis,
Detective Malainy called the number and left a message with appellant's
girlfriend for him to call back, which appellant did a few minutes later.
Detective Malainy informed appellant that their conversation was being recorded
and asked him about how he came across the MacBook Pro computer.
On the recording, appellant informed
Detective Malainy that he purchased the laptop from an individual on Saturday
morning outside a hotel near Ohio State Route 161 in Columbus for $150.00.
Appellant indicated the individual knew the password for the computer and that
he was selling the computer in order to buy a new one. Appellant also asked if
the laptop was stolen prior to purchasing it, which the individual denied.
Appellant explained to Detective Malainy
that, while he had all intentions of keeping the computer, the brakes on his
vehicle were starting to fail while travelling to visit a friend in Euclid. As
he did not have the money to get the brakes repaired, he sold the computer to
MicroLink and used the money from the sale to purchase the parts. Appellant
also told the detective he was with two friends who may have witnessed the
transaction between him and the other individual at the hotel, but appellant
did not provide him with their contact information. And appellant did not
provide Detective Malainy with any sales receipts for car parts.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The opinion then explains that
[w]hen the state rested, the defense
made a [Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure] Rule 29 motion for acquittal,
which was denied. A second motion was requested prior to closing arguments,
which was also denied. A short time after being released for deliberations, the
jury returned a guilty verdict on the sole count in the indictment; it further
found that, per the instructions, the property at issue was worth at least
$1,000, but no more than $7,500.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The Court of Appeals goes on to explain that
[a]t appellant's sentencing hearing,
the state presented several factors that showed that recidivism would be likely
for appellant: he committed the offense at issue a month after being released
on bond for a separate criminal case in Franklin County; had a history of
juvenile adjudications in addition to having been found guilty for nearly a
dozen other offenses as an adult, including possession of stolen property; and
had been convicted of drug possession, possession of drug abuse instruments,
and paraphernalia since committing this offense. The state also noted appellant
was currently serving his sixth prison sentence and recommended that appellant
be sentenced to twelve months to be served consecutively to the prison sentence
he was currently serving.
Appellant was ultimately sentenced to
eleven months, to be served consecutively to his current prison sentence, and
restitution in the amount of $275.00, the amount Falter had to pay to get his
computer back.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
Skaggs made three arguments on appeal but this post only
examines one, which essentially incorporates Skaggs’ claim that the jury erred
when it “returned a verdict of guilty against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” State v. Skaggs, supra. In other words, Skaggs claimed the evidence
did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Skaggs’ argument
by explaining that he was
convicted of receiving stolen property,
in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2913.51(A) which required the state to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, he `receive[d], retaine[d], or dispose[d] of
property [belonging to Jake Falter] knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that the property ha[d] been obtained through [the] commission of a
theft offense.’
There was no dispute that Falter's
computer had been stolen. It was also undisputed that appellant received,
retained, and/or disposed of the computer. Appellant's arguments therefore
concentrate on whether he had `reasonable cause to believe’ the computer was
stolen. Appellant offers various benign explanations relating to the circumstances
of his purchase to rebut the state's circumstantial case. In particular, he
maintains his purchase of the computer in a `shady’ location, for
less than it was worth, with a lack of accessories does not necessarily imply
he should be on reasonable notice that it was stolen.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The Court of Appeals went on to explain that
[c]ircumstantial evidence involves
evidence not grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts
in controversy, but of other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing
indirectly the facts sought to be established. State v. Nicely, 39
Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (Ohio Supreme Court 1988). An inference is `a conclusion
which, by means of data founded upon common experience, natural reason draws
from facts which are proven.’ State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263 (Ohio
Supreme Court 1947).
It therefore follows that when
circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, that evidence must
establish collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence of
primary facts may be rationally inferred according to common experience. State
v. Windle, 2011 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-033, 2011-Ohio-4171. Circumstantial evidence is accorded the same probative
value as direct evidence. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (Ohio
Supreme Court 1991), paragraph one of the syllabus.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The Court of Appeals then analyzed the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at Skaggs’ trial:
The jury heard appellant's rebuttal
arguments to the state's evidence at trial. The jury, as the sole judge of the
weight of the evidence, was free to accept or reject appellant's version of
events. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 11th Dist. Ashtabula
No. 93–A–1796, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2655, *5 (Ohio Court of Appeals June 17,
1994). With this in mind, the `shady’ location of the purchase, the lack of
accessories, and the relatively-low purchase price provided the jury with a
rational and persuasive foundation to support the conclusion appellant had
reasonable cause to believe the computer was stolen.
Appellant, however, underscores he
performed the same inquiries as Ibrahim to ascertain whether the computer was
stolen; to wit, he notes he asked the seller if it was stolen, who purportedly
responded in the negative. And, when the seller produced the password, he felt
satisfied the computer was not stolen. In the abstract, these factors provide
some basis for the conclusion that one could reasonably purchase the computer
without serious suspicion or doubt that it was obtained through theft. When
considered in light of other surrounding circumstances, however, they do not
negate the inference that appellant had reasonable cause to believe the
computer was obtained through theft.
First of all, the circumstances surrounding
appellant's purchase of the computer and Ibrahim's purchase were different.
Appellant purportedly paid only $150 for the computer and the transaction took
place, by appellant's admission, in a `shady’ part of a large city. Ibrahim, a
business owner who purchases and sells computers, paid $275 after researching
what similar models are being sold for on Ebay. He further obtained appellant's
identification and recorded his personal information pursuant to his business
protocol. Although appellant, like Ibrahim, may have asked his seller whether
the computer was stolen, other salient features of the purchases were entirely
different.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The Court of Appeals then began the process of announcing
its decision in the case:
And, in any event, the similarities
between the inquiries posed by appellant and Ibrahim do not serve to exculpate
appellant or undermine the inference that appellant had reasonable cause to
believe the computer was stolen. Simply because Ibrahim was not charged in the
case does not support the inference that appellant had no reasonable basis to
believe the machine was obtained by theft.
Furthermore, there was evidence
presented that the computer, while in Falter's possession, was not `password
protected.’ There was also evidence adduced at trial that installing a password
is not difficult and can be accomplished without any specialized computer
training. These points, taken in conjunction with the circumstantial evidence
discussed above, demonstrate the evidence militated in favor of and not against
a conviction.
Given the circumstances of this case,
we conclude there was sufficient, persuasive evidence to support appellant's
conviction for receiving stolen property.
State v. Skaggs, supra.
The court therefore affirmed Skaggs’
conviction. State v. Skaggs, supra.
It did, though, remand the case for resentencing because the
trial judge “failed to make the necessary findings at the sentencing hearing.” State v. Skaggs, supra. The Court of Appeals
therefore remanded the case to the trial judge for resentencing. State v. Skaggs, supra.
No comments:
Post a Comment