This post examines a recent decision from a federal District
Court Judge who sits in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, 2017 WL 1489099. The judge begins the opinion by explaining
that “Plaintiff Jason Steven Molthan has filed this pro se action
under 42 U.S. Code § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional
rights.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[h]aving granted Plaintiff leave to
pursue this suit without paying the filing fee, the Court must conduct an
initial review of the complaint under 28 U.S. Code § 1915(e)(2) and
dismiss it or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim for which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. If an action is filed IFP, `the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action
. . .fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.’ 28 U.S. Code § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In assessing whether a complaint states a claim on which
relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as construed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). `Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s]
the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’ Williams
v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). `[P]leadings that . . .are no more than conclusions[ ] are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3 (`Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of
providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds'
on which the claim rests.’).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The court’s opinion goes on to explain that
`Pro se complaints are to be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should
therefore be liberally construed.' Williams,
631 F.3d at 383 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro se
litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). It is the plaintiff, not the court, who must
set forth a coherent cause of action. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608,
613 (6th Cir. 2011) (`[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff]
has not spelled out in his pleading’) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73
Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) and stating, `[n]either this court nor the district court is
required to create Payne's claim for her’); cf. Plyler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (`District
judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.’); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 Fed.Appx. 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (`[W]e decline to
affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on
behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for
a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the
rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising
litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.’).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The District Court Judge then summarized the “factual
allegations” that the plaintiff alleged supported his cause of action:
Plaintiff alleges that at 10:30 p.m. on
April 5, 2016, he was conducting research in the computer lab in the Sarratt
Student Center on Vanderbilt University's campus, which is open to the general
public until 11 p.m. (Doc. No. 1, at 6, 8.) Plaintiff was approached at 10:30
by three Vanderbilt University police officers who said that a Vanderbilt
employee had recognized him from local news media reports. The officers asked
to see Plaintiff's identification, then asked him to gather his belongings and
step outside, where they searched his belongings and questioned him about the
news coverage. (Id. at 6.) Despite Plaintiff's explanation that the
media coverage was `defamatory’ and that he had not been `convicted of the felony,’ at
10:55 p.m. the officers told Plaintiff to leave the Vanderbilt campus and never
return. Plaintiff began to leave, but before he could, the officers ordered him
to stop and arrested him for criminal trespassing. (Id. at 6–7.) On
April 11, 2016, Plaintiff pleaded not guilty in General Sessions Court; the charge was dismissed,
and Plaintiff was released from jail at approximately 8 p.m. (Id. at
7–8.) Since that incident, Plaintiff alleges that Vanderbilt police officers
have intimidated him in areas near the Vanderbilt campus and have threatened
him with arrest `if he does not find another area of town to frequent.’ (Id. at
8.)
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The District Court Judge then begins her analysis of the
facts and legal issues in the case, explaining, which she divides into two
parts: “Claims Related to Plainitff’s Arrest” and “Claims Related to
Post-Release Events.” Molthan, v.
Vanderbilt University, supra.
She begins her analysis of the claims related to Molthan’s
arrest by explaining that
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are
liable for false arrest/imprisonment in violation of his federal constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who,
acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones–Kelley, 675 F.3d
580, 583 (6th Circuit 2012). Thus, to state a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that `the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law.’ Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of initial review, the Court
accepts Plaintiff's allegation that the Vanderbilt University police officers
were acting under color of state law and finds that Plaintiff has stated a
nonfrivolous claim for false arrest/imprisonment. See Mettetal v.
Vanderbilt Univ., Legal Dep't, 147 Fed. Appx. 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing
dismissal of § 1983 claim against Vanderbilt police department on
statute of limitation grounds). The Court also finds, again solely for the
purpose of initial review, that Plaintiff's allegation that he was not
arraigned until April 11, 2016, makes his April 10, 2017 Complaint for false arrest/imprisonment
under the Fourth Amendment timely. See Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (holding that plaintiff's federal
false arrest/imprisonment claim accrued, and statute of limitations began to
run, on the date that his false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff appeared
in court and was bound over for trial); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28–3–104(a)(1) (setting
one-year statute of limitations for actions for false imprisonment and for
actions brought under the federal civil rights statutes).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The Judge goes on to explain that in Wallace, supra,
the petitioner claimed that his
confession to murder was the product of his unlawful arrest, which occurred on
January 19, 1994. 549 U.S. at 386. The state court agreed on direct appeal
following his conviction, finding the petitioner's arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. The state
appellate court ultimately remanded the case for a new trial, but rather than
retrying the petitioner, the prosecution dropped the charges against him on
April 10, 2002. Id. On
April 2, 2003, the petitioner filed a § 1983 claim seeking damages
for the unlawful arrest. Id. The
petitioner argued that his claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), until the charges against
him were dropped, and that his lawsuit filed within one year of that event was
therefore timely. Id. at
392. The Supreme Court held, however, that Heck only bars cases that would invalidate an `extant
conviction,’ and that while it would warrant staying a § 1983 claim
through the course of a plaintiff's prosecution, it did not delay the accrual
of a Fourth Amendment claim or commencement of the limitations period. Id. at 392–97.
Instead, the Court held that the
limitations period on a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest begins to run
on the day that the false arrest/imprisonment ends, e.g. when continued
confinement becomes lawful pursuant to legal process, when the defendant
appears in court and is bound over for trial. Id. at 389–91.
Accordingly, from the face of the complaint, it appears that the limitations
period for Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim began to run, not on April 5 when
he was arrested, but on April 11, 2016, when the charge against him was
dismissed and he was released after his initial court appearance.
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The Judge, though, goes on to explain that
[h]owever, the rule of delayed
limitations-period commencement announced in Wallace for federal
false arrest claims is a `distinctive rule’ that arises from `the common law's
distinctive treatment of the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment,’ and
does not apply to other state or federal claims arising out of the
arrest. Wallace, 549 U.S. at
388–89; Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d
227, 233, 235 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that despite delayed accrual under Wallace for false arrest
claim, `claim for excessive force in effectuating an arrest accrues at the time
of arrest,’ and affirming dismissal of state law claim for assault and battery
as untimely). Accordingly, with the exception of his Fourth Amendment claim for
false arrest, all of Plaintiff's state and federal claims arising from
Defendants' actions on the date of his arrest—including his claims for
conspiracy, official oppression, fraud, entrapment, extortion, assault and
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—are untimely.
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The judge then took up the “claimes related to Post-Release
Events”, noting that
Plaintiff's claim for harassment
appears to relate to events occurring since his release. That claim, and any
other claims that could be liberally construed to relate to the alleged
harassment he has experienced since his release, are timely but fail to state
any claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff bases his claims for
conspiracy, official oppression, fraud, entrapment, extortion, assault and
battery, and harassment on state criminal statutes that define crimes and their
defenses; they do not create private causes of action. (See Doc. No. 1, at
10–12 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§
39–12–103, 39–16–403, 39–11–106, 39–11–505, 39–14–112, 39–13–101 and
102, 39–17–308, 39–17–315)); Dirks
v. Tudors, No. E200801384COAR3CV, 2009 WL 1372180, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 18, 2009) (`[W]ith respect to the plaintiff's claim based upon
official oppression, the applicable statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §
39–16–403 (2006) does not indicate, in any way, that a private cause of
action for official oppression was contemplated by the legislature when the
statute was enacted.’).
Plaintiff also cites 42 U.S.C. §1985 among his grounds for filing suit. (Doc. No. 1, at 1.) However, any
claim for conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) fails because he has not alleged that such
conspiracy was based on his race or other `inherent personal characteristics.’ Webb
v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 672 (6th Cir. 2015) (`The Supreme Court
requires that § 1985 claims contain allegations of `class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.’ Griffin v.Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). The class must be based upon race or
other `inherent personal characteristics.’ Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).”).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The Judge goes on to explain that, to
the extent that the claims for
which Plaintiff has relied upon criminal statutes actually exist as civil
claims under state law, Plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the elements of
those claims. For example, the mere fact that Vanderbilt has banned Plaintiff
from campus despite maintaining open hours for the general public does not
state a claim for fraud. See Grant
v. Tucker, 57 F. Supp. 3d 852, 858 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (`Under Tennessee
law, a plaintiff must establish four elements to prove fraud: (1) an
intentional misrepresentation with regard to a material fact; (2) knowledge of
the representation's falsity (i.e., it was made ‘knowingly’ or ‘without belief
in its truth,’ or ‘recklessly’ without regard to its truth or falsity); (3) the
plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation and suffered damage; and
(4) the misrepresentation relates to an existing or past fact, or, if the claim
is based on promissory fraud, the misrepresentation ‘must embody a promise of
future action without the present intention to carry out the promise.’). And
the verbal harassment Plaintiff has allegedly experienced in the Vanderbilt
vicinity since his release is clearly not shocking enough to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Davis v. Covenant
Presbyterian Church, No. M2013–02273–COA–R3CV, 2014 WL 2895898, at *6–7
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2014) (`A claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires a showing that “the defendant's conduct was (1)
intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous that it is not tolerated by
civilized society, and (3) resulted in serious mental injury to the plaintiff”’...The
cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct
has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has
acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' ”); see also Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa,
357 F.3d 539, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that harassment and verbal
abuse, no matter how `shameful and utterly unprofessional,’ do not violate the
Constitution).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The Judge went on to explain that
[a]nd finally, Plaintiff's reliance on
`personal injury’ merely invokes a legal connection between certain torts, such
as negligence or assault, and a right to relief. `Personal injury' itself is
not an independent cause of action upon which Plaintiff can proceed. Rather, it
is a ‘blanket assertion of entitlement to relief,’ which fails to state a
claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
The judge went on to conclude the opinion with these
comments:
For the reasons set forth above, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a nonfrivolous claim for false arrest
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and § 1983, and process shall issue on
those claims. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
An appropriate Order will enter.
-->
Molthan, v. Vanderbilt
University, supra.
