This post examines a recent opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit: United States v. Broca-Martinez, 2017 WL 1521492 (2017). As Wikipedia explains, this court is one of
several U.S. Courts of Appeals which have jurisdiction over federal cases in
the territory their Circuit encompasses.
The court, like most
courts, begins the opinion by explaining how and why the prosecution arose:
Defendant–Appellant
Cecilio Broca-Martinez appeals the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress. While on patrol in December 2015, Officer Juan Leal began following
Broca-Martinez's vehicle because it matched a description Homeland Security
agents had provided the Laredo Police Department (`LPD’). Officer Leal stopped
Broca-Martinez after a computer search indicated the vehicle's insurance status
was `unconfirmed.’ The stop led to the discovery that Broca-Martinez was in the
country illegally and that he was harboring undocumented immigrants at his
residence. Broca-Martinez entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of conspiracy to transport undocumented aliens in violation of 8U.S. Code § 1324. On appeal, he contends that there was no reasonable suspicion
justifying the initial stop.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
For an overview of
the vehicle insurance requirements of the U.S. states, check out this Wikipedia entry.
The Court of Appeals
goes on to explain, in some detail, how the prosecution arose:
On
December 2, 2015, Broca-Martinez was stopped by Officer Leal in Laredo, Texas.
That day, Homeland Security Investigations (`HIS’) received a tip that
undocumented immigrants were being housed at a residence on Zacatecas Avenue in
Laredo. While surveilling the residence, HSI agents saw two men leave and enter
a gray Nissan Altima. HSI subsequently notified the LPD to have its officers
`be on the lookout’ for the vehicle. After receiving a radio transmission to
`be on the lookout’ for this vehicle, Officer Leal saw an Altima that matched
the description. He followed the vehicle and entered its license plate number into
an `in-vehicle computer’ database designed to return vehicle information such
as insurance status.
The
computer indicated the insurance status was `unconfirmed.’ Based on his
experience using this system, Officer Leal concluded that the vehicle was
likely uninsured—a violation of Texas's driver financial responsibility law.
Official Leal then stopped the vehicle. After being stopped, Broca-Martinez
gave his name to Officer Leal and admitted he was in the United States
illegally. While they waited for HSI agents to arrive, Officer Leal issued
Broca-Martinez a citation for violating the insurance requirement and driving
without a license.
When
HSI agents arrived, they interviewed Broca-Martinez. The agents obtained verbal
consent from Broca-Martinez to search the Zacatecas Avenue residence, where
fourteen undocumented immigrants were being sheltered. On December 22, 2015,
Broca-Martinez was indicted by a grand jury on three counts of conspiring to
harbor illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Broca-Martinez
filed a motion to suppress evidence on January 25, 2016. He argued there was no
reasonable suspicion justifying the initial stop and that the exclusionary rule
barred all evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
Officer
Leal testified to the following at a hearing on the motion to suppress: At the
time of the stop, Leal knew the radio-transmission instruction involved a
Homeland Security investigation but was unaware of any details. Upon seeing a
vehicle that matched the given description, he ran the `license plates through
what is called the NCIC/TCIC system, which gives a return on the vehicle, make,
model, [and] year’ as well as “a VIN number” and “a confirmation to see if the
vehicle is insured.’ Officer Leal has in the past `performed multiple traffic
stops for vehicles not having insurance’ and was familiar with the Texas law
requiring drivers to have liability insurance. Leal did not stop the vehicle
because of Broca-Martinez's undocumented status—a fact he did not know—but
because he believed Broca-Martinez was uninsured. He explained that when he
types a license plate number into the NCIC/TCIC system, it will either report
`insurance confirmed’ or `unconfirmed,’ and after getting a response he knows,
`with the knowledge and experience of working,’ whether the vehicle is
uninsured.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The Court of Appeals
goes on to explain that
During
the stop, Officer Leal did not ask for proof of insurance. He stated that he `already
knew that the vehicle wasn't insured’ based on the `unconfirmed’ status generated
by the computer. However, the district court questioned why Officer Leal did
not seek to confirm the computer's report, asking specifically whether `reports
are sometimes inaccurate.’ Leal responded: `For the most part, no.’ Later,
Broca-Martinez's attorney pressed Officer Leal on the `unconfirmed’ status:
`Q:
Officer Leal, you said that the information you got on the insurance is that it
was unconfirmed?
A:
Yes.
Q:
So, in other words, he could have or not have insurance, correct?
A:
No.
Q:
It's unconfirmed?
A:
Yes.’
The
district court denied Broca-Martinez's motion to suppress. Broca-Martinez
entered a conditional plea to one count of conspiracy to transport undocumented
aliens in violation of 8 U.S. Code § 1324. Broca-Martinez preserved his
right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. On June
8, 2016, Broca-Martinez was sentenced to twelve months and one day
imprisonment. He timely appealed.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The Court of Appeals then takes up its analysis of the
issues in the case, explaining that
`[i]n reviewing a district court's
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact
for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.’ United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2005). `Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to support a stop is
treated as a question of law.’ United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d
361, 364 (5th Cir. 2015). Nonetheless, this Court views the evidence `in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party in the district court—in this
case, the Government.’ Id. The district court had jurisdiction
under 18 U.S. Code § 3231, and this Court has appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1291.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the issues,
and the arguments, in the case:
Under Texas law, `[a] person may not
operate a motor vehicle in [Texas] unless financial responsibility is established
for that vehicle through’ either a `motor vehicle liability insurance policy’
or other means such a surety bond, a deposit, or self-insurance. Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 601.051. Violating this statute is a misdemeanor. Id. §
601.191. At issue in this case is whether Officer Leal had reasonable suspicion
that Broca-Martinez was in violation of this statute.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra. In a footnote appended to the last sentence
above, the court explains that
Broca-Martinez
acknowledges that the only reason for the stop was a traffic violation and that
Officer Leal `had no information regarding any suspicion of any criminal
activity by the passengers’ in the vehicle.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The opinion goes on
to take up the Fourth Amendment issue, explaining that the amendment
protects individuals against
warrantless searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. It `applies to
seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of
the vehicle here.’ United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417(1981). When a vehicle is stopped, the officer `must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.’ Id. at 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690. This `reasonable
suspicion’ exists `when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
the search and seizure. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430. And while
the officer must have more than a `mere hunch’ that the person stopped is
engaged in illegal activity, `reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level
of probable cause.’ Id. Indeed, it requires only `”some
minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop.” Castillo,
804 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)).
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The Court of Appeals
then took up the issue in controversy in this case, explaining that
[w]e
have not yet addressed whether a state computer database indication of
insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion. However, several other
circuits have found that such information may give rise to reasonable suspicion
as long as there is either some evidence suggesting the database is reliable or
at least an absence of evidence that it is unreliable.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The opinion then goes
on to explain that
[i]n United
States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit
encountered similar facts and affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Id. at
1204. In that case, a Drug Enforcement Agency agent stopped a vehicle after
inputting its license plate information into a computer database and receiving
the following notification: `INSURED/Not Found: AS OF/9/30/2005 Recommend
request proof of insurance.’ Id. The court found this
information was `particularized and objective’ and `suggestive of a traffic
violation.’ Id. at 1206. While acknowledging that the message
`did not as definitively indicate criminal activity as a `no’ response,’ it
also did not `equate to an `exculpatory “yes,”’ and the suggestive ambiguity of
the particularized and objective information [the officer] had at hand
justified his decision to warrant a brief traffic stop. Id. Like
Broca-Martinez, the defendant in Cortez-Galaviz argued that
the stop was not justified because there were alternative means of complying
with the state insurance law. Id. at 1207. But the Tenth
Circuit found that argument `overstate[d] the requirements for reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.’ Id; see also United
States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (`Reasonable
suspicion ... does not require the officer to rule out all innocent
explanations of what he sees.’). Additionally, although the defendant in Cortez-Galaviz
challenged the reliability of the computer database, the court found
limited evidence of unreliability, especially when viewed in the light most
favorable to the government. 495 F.3d at 1208.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
And it went on to explain
that
[b]y
contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion in United
States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013), where there was evidence
the database was unreliable. In that case, a Colorado state trooper stopped a
vehicle after inquiring into the validity of its temporary registration tag. Id. at
1234. Even though the tag `looked genuine,’ the trooper `called in the tag
number to a dispatcher who soon replied “that's a negatory on record, not
returning.”’ Id. The trooper stopped the vehicle solely based
on that information and found illegal drugs after obtaining consent for a
search. Id. at 1234–35. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found
this case distinguishable from Cortez-Galaviz and other cases
in which `the record suggested no reason to worry about the database's
reliability.’ Id. at 1235. Here, the dispatcher provided
critical testimony that `Colorado temp tags usually don't return,’ which
the court regarded as `a piece of evidence our cases haven't confronted before:
evidence admitted by a district court suggesting that the database on which the
officer relied to justify his stop might bear a real problem.’ Id. (emphasis
in original).
Cases
from the Seventh, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits confronting similar fact patterns
are generally consistent with the reasoning in Cortez-Galaviz and Esquivel-Rios. See Miranda-Sotolongo,
827 F.3d at 671 (finding reasonable suspicion established when the
database showed no vehicle registration record, `at least in the absence of
evidence that [the officer] could not reasonably rely on the absence of a
registration record to support an investigative stop’); United States
v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding there
was reasonable suspicion for a stop when license plate check three weeks prior
had indicated the driver was driving without a valid license); United
States v. Stephens, 350 F.3d 778, 779 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
when database check showed license plates were `not on file,’ there was
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle).
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The court went on to address another issue, explaining that
Broca-Martinez relies only on state
court cases to support his argument. See Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 306
S.W.3d 893, 896–97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd) (finding database
information insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because there was no
`evidence developing the source of the information comprising the database,
explaining what was meant when insurance information was unavailable, . . .
[or] illustrating the accuracy of the database’); State v. Daniel,
446 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); Contraras v.
State, 309 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd). But
although states may `impos[e] more stringent constraints on police conduct than
does the Federal Constitution,’ this does not dictate our Fourth Amendment
analysis. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988). Even so,
Broca-Martinez's case is distinguishable from Gonzalez-Gilando;
here, there was testimony regarding Officer Leal's experience with the database
and suggesting the system was reliable.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra. As this Wikipedia entry on precedent in U.S.
and other common law countries explains, the decisions of a particular court
are usually binding on that court, and may serve as persuasive precedent with
regard to other courts. So, it is usual for litigators before a particular
court to rely on that court’s precedent, as much as possible.
The Court of Appeals then began the process of enunciating
its “holding” – its decision in the case:
[w]e agree with the other circuits that
have confronted this question. A state computer database indication of
insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is
familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable. If that is
the case, a seemingly inconclusive report such as “unconfirmed” will be a
specific and articulable fact that supports a traffic stop. Lopez-Moreno,
420 F.3d at 430. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Officer
Leal's testimony provides sufficient support for the reliability of the
database. Officer Leal explained the process for inputting license plate
information, described how records in the database are kept, and noted that he
was familiar with these records. He explained that `with the knowledge and
experience of working,’ he knows the vehicle is uninsured when an `unconfirmed’
status appears because the computer system will either return an `insurance
confirmed’ or `unconfirmed’ response. When Broca-Martinez's attorney questioned
the system's reliability, Officer Leal confirmed that it was usually accurate.
(`Q: So, in other words, he could have or not have insurance, correct? A: No.’)
(`Q: You asked him for his insurance? A: Not that I recall. I already knew that
the vehicle wasn't insured.’) (`Q: I mean reports are sometimes inaccurate, right?
A: For the most part, no.’).
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
It went on to point out that
[e]ven if Officer Leal was not positive
Broca-Martinez was uninsured, he cleared the bar for reasonable suspicion. An
officer does not have to be certain a violation has recurred. See Castillo,
804 F.3d at 366. `This would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far
above probable cause or even a preponderance of the evidence, in contravention
of the Supreme Court's instructions.’ Id.
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
The court therefore held that “[f]or the foregoing reasons,
we AFFIRM the denial of Broca-Martinez's motion to suppress and AFFIRM
Broca-Martinez's conviction and sentence.”
United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.
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