After a California Highway Patrol officer “issued him a
traffic citation for violating [California] Vehicle Code § 23123(a)”, Steven
Spriggs “contested the citation.” People v. Spriggs, 2014 WL 783865
(California Court of Appeals 2014). As
the opinion explains,
[a]t the trial held before a Fresno County Superior Court traffic commissioner, both Spriggs and the California
Highway Patrol officer who issued the citation testified that Spriggs was cited
for looking at a map on his cellular telephone while holding the telephone in
his hand and driving. The traffic court commissioner subsequently found Spriggs
guilty of violating section 23123(a) and ordered him to pay a $165
fine.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
Spriggs then appealed the citation and the fine to the
Superior Court – Appellate Division. People
v. Spriggs, supra.
There he argued the only use of a
wireless telephone section 23123(a) prohibits is listening and talking on
the telephone if the telephone is being used in a manner that requires the
driver to hold the telephone in his or her hand. Spriggs asserted the conduct
for which he was cited was not a violation of section
23123(a) because he was not listening and talking on the telephone.
People v. Spriggs,
supra. The prosecution did not “file a brief or otherwise appear” in that
appeal. People v. Spriggs, supra.
The Superior Court – Appellate Division
affirmed Spriggs's conviction in People
v. Spriggs, 215 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883 (2013). The
appellate division concluded, after reviewing the statute's plain language as
well as its legislative history, that the statute was not `designed to prohibit
hands-on use of a wireless telephone for conversation only,’ but instead was `specifically
designed to prevent a driver from using a wireless telephone while driving
unless the device is being used in a hands-free manner[,]’ and `outlawed all
“hands-on” use of a wireless telephone while driving.’ (People v. Spriggs, 215
Cal.App. 4th at p. Supp. 5, 6–7, 154 Cal.Rptr. 3d 883, supra.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
Spriggs asked the appellate division to transfer his appeal
to the Court of Appeals and it agreed, which is how this opinion came
about. People v. Spriggs, supra. In accepting the case, the Court of
Appeals “specifically asked the parties to address the following issue: `whether
a person driving a motor vehicle, while holding a wireless telephone and
looking at or checking a map application on the wireless telephone,
violates Vehicle Code section 23123.’”
People v. Spriggs, supra. That is the issue the court addresses in this
opinion.
The Court of Appeals begins its analysis of his appeal by
explaining that the Highway Patrol officer issued Spriggs a citation for
violating Vehicle Code § 23123(a),
which prohibits drivers from `using a wireless telephone unless that telephone
is specifically designed and configured to allow hands-free listening and
talking, and is used in that manner while driving.’ Spriggs contends he did not
violate the statute because he was not talking on the telephone.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
In the appeals, Spriggs claimed the
answer is no, as he was not `using’ the
wireless telephone within the meaning of the statute because the statute
applies only if a driver is listening and talking on a wireless telephone that
is not being used in a hands-free mode. The People contend the statute is much
broader and applies to all uses of a wireless telephone unless the telephone is
used in a hands-free manner.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
The court began its analysis by noting that the issue it was
required to “decide, as an issue of first impression, is whether a person
violates section 23123(a) by holding a wireless telephone in his or her
hand and looking at a map application while driving.” People v. Spriggs, supra. It
explained that this involved “statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.” People v. Spriggs, supra. It
also noted that the principles of
statutory construction are clearly
established. `Our task is to discern the Legislature's intent. The statutory
language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute's
words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in
context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature
meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs.
On the other hand, if the language
allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such aids as the
legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. In
cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a
particular interpretation, including its impact on public policy.’ (Wells v.
One2One Learning Foundation (California Supreme Court 2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d
108, 141 P.3d 225; People v. Smith, (California Supreme Court 2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 11
Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 86 P.3d 348.)
Moreover, `[r]eviewing courts may turn to the legislative history behind even unambiguous statutes when it confirms or bolsters their interpretation.’ In re Gilbert R. (California Court of Appeals 2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 608.)
Moreover, `[r]eviewing courts may turn to the legislative history behind even unambiguous statutes when it confirms or bolsters their interpretation.’ In re Gilbert R. (California Court of Appeals 2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 608.)
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
The Court of Appeals found that § 23123(a) “is reasonably
construed as only prohibiting a driver from holding a wireless telephone while
conversing on it.” People v. Spriggs, supra. On
appeal, Spriggs had argued that the statute was clear, in that it “`applies if
a person is listening or talking on a wireless telephone while driving and
while the wireless telephone is not being used in hands-free mode.”’” People v. Spriggs, supra.
Spriggs claimed this “interpretation is bolstered by the words `telephone’ and `hands-free listening and talking[,]’ which demonstrate the focus of the statute is on talking on the wireless telephone and not some other use of the telephone, such as looking at a map application.” People v. Spriggs, supra.
Spriggs claimed this “interpretation is bolstered by the words `telephone’ and `hands-free listening and talking[,]’ which demonstrate the focus of the statute is on talking on the wireless telephone and not some other use of the telephone, such as looking at a map application.” People v. Spriggs, supra.
The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that § 23123(a)
clearly prohibits the act of `using a
wireless telephone’ while driving and, since the word `using’ is not ambiguous,
it encompasses all uses of the telephone. According to the People, the statute
`allows “using” a wireless “telephone while driving if the telephone is
specifically designed and configured to allow hands-free listening and talking,
and is used in that manner while driving.” Otherwise, using a wireless telephone
while driving is prohibited.’
The People reason that, because under §23123(a) a
`driver may not use a cell phone unless it is used in a
hands-free manner[,]’ that section is violated when a driver holds a wireless
telephone and looks at a map application while driving.
While the statute may be interpreted,
on its face, as the People assert, we agree with Spriggs that [it] is
reasonably construed as only prohibiting engaging in a conversation on a
wireless telephone while driving and holding the telephone in one's hand. This
is because the statute specifically states the telephone must be used in a manner
that allows for `hands-free listening and talking.’ (§ 23123(a).) It does not
state that it must be used in a manner that allows for hands-free looking,
hands-free operation or hands-free use, or anything other than listening and
talking.
Had the Legislature intended to
prohibit drivers from holding the telephone and using it for all purposes, it
would not have limited the telephone's required design and configuration to `hands-free
listening and talking,’ but would have used broader language, such as
`hands-free operation’ or `hands-free use.’ To interpret § 23123(a) as
applying to any use of a wireless telephone renders the `listening and talking’
element nonsensical, as not all uses of a wireless telephone involve listening
and talking, including looking at a map application.
The appellate division
interpreted § 23123(a) as prohibiting all `hands-on use’ of a
wireless telephone based on its finding that the statute's plain language
showed the `primary evil’ the Legislature sought to avoid was `the distraction
the driver faces when using his or her hands to operate the phone[,]’ and `if
the Legislature had intended to limit the application of the statute to “conversing”
or “listening and talking,” as [Spriggs] maintains, it could have done so.’ (People
v. Spriggs, supra.)
While the statute certainly could have been written more clearly, we
believe the inclusion of the phrase `hands-free listening and talking’ does in
fact limit the statute's prohibition to engaging in a conversation while
holding a wireless telephone.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
In reaching this result, the court examined the relevant
legislative history and noted that both the California Senate and the
California Assembly versions of the legislation that eventually became §
23123(a) focused on the fact that
two distractions arise when one uses a
cell phone while driving: (1) `the physical distraction a motorist encounters
when picking up the phone, punching the number keypad, holding the phone up to
his or her ear to converse, or pushing a button to end a call’; and (2) `the
mental distraction which results from the ongoing conversation carried on
between the motorist and the person on the other end of the line.’ (Sen. Com.
on Transportation and Housing, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1613 (2005–2006 Reg.
Sess.) version Feb. 24, 2006, pp.1–2; Assem. Com. on Transportation, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1613 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) (as amended Jun. 20, 2006, p.
2.)
According to these analyses, the bill
addresses the first distraction, i.e. the physical distraction of placing a
telephone call and holding the phone to one's ear to converse. (Sen. Com. on
Transportation and Housing, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1613 (2005–2006 Reg.
Sess.) version Feb. 24, 2006, pp.1–2; Assem. Com. on Transportation, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1613 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 20, 2006, p.
2.) There is no mention in the legislative history of
trying to prevent distractions that arise from other uses of a wireless
telephone when driving, such as looking at a map application while holding the
telephone.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
The Court of Appeals also found that the prosecution’s
interpretation
of § 23123(a) -- that the statute
bans all hand-held use of wireless telephones-- would lead to absurd results
and is opposed to the legislative intent. (In re J.B., 178 Cal. App. 4th 751, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679
(California Court of Appeals 2009) [`Absurd or unjust results will
never be ascribed to the Legislature, and a literal construction of a statute
will not be followed if it is opposed to its legislative intent.’].)
If the phrase `using a wireless
telephone’ includes all conceivable uses, then it would be a statutory
violation for a driver to merely look at the telephone's display if the
telephone was not designed and configured to allow hands-free listening and
talking. It would also be a violation to hold the telephone in one's hand, even
if configured for hands-free listening and talking, and look at the time or
even merely move it for use as a paperweight. The People do not point to
anything in the legislative history to suggest the Legislature intended such a
broad prohibition.
The People assert the statute would not
be violated if a driver looked at a map application as long as the wireless
telephone was mounted and the application was `activated using the phone's
hand[s]-free capability.’ However, as Spriggs points out, under this scenario
the statute could still be violated merely by looking at the map application on
the wireless telephone if the telephone was not designed and configured to
allow hands-free listening and talking.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
The court again pointed out that
[w]hen the legislative history of §
23123 is considered in conjunction with § 23123(a)'s language, it is
apparent that the Legislature both understood and intended the statute be
limited to only prohibit a driver from holding a wireless telephone while
conversing on it.
It did not intend to extend the prohibition to other uses of
a wireless telephone and most certainly did not intend to prohibit the use at
issue here, namely looking at a map application while holding the telephone and
driving.
People v. Spriggs,
supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore reversed Spriggs’ conviction
and the fine that came with it. People v. Spriggs, supra.
If you are interested, you can read more about how the case
arose and about law enforcement’s reaction to this decision in the story you
can find here.
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