The Software, County Land Records and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

This post examines an opinion the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit issued recently in a civil case:  Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 258632 (2016).  The Court of Appeals begins the opinion by explaining that

Fidlar Technologies (`Fidlar’) brings this action against LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc. (`LPS’) for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (`CFAA’) and the Illinois Computer CrimePrevention Law (`CCPL’). Fidlar claims LPS improperly downloaded county land records provided through Fidlar's services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LPS. It held that Fidlar failed to show that LPS acted with intent to defraud under CFAA § 1030(a)(4) or that LPS caused `damage’ under § 1030(a)(5)(A). The court also rejected Fidlar's argument that LPS knew or had reason to know that it might cause loss as required by the CCPL. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

As courts usually do, the Court of Appeals began the substantive part of its opinion by explaining how, and why, the lawsuit arose:

Fidlar is a technology company that develops software for county offices to manage public land records. Fidlar's software allows counties to digitize and index land records. Fidlar licenses its software to the counties, and the individual counties contract with users who want access to these land records.

One of Fidlar's software products, Laredo, provides users with remote internet access to county records. The `Laredo system,’ as Fidlar describes it, consists of three components: the county databases, the `Laredo client’ (or just `the client’), and the `middle tier.’ The county databases store county land records and index data. The `Laredo client’ is a user-interface that allows users to remotely access these land records and related data. Finally, the `middle tier’ facilitates the communication between the Laredo client and a specific county database. Fidlar offers its county customers the option of whether to host the county database and middle tier components on the county's own servers or on Fidlar's servers. The client is stored on the user's own computer.

In order to use the client, a user must accept Fidlar's End–User License Agreement (`EULA’). In relevant part, the EULA provides that a user may `use . . . any portion of the software for any purpose,’ but it also provides that a user may `not . . . copy the software covered by this Agreement in any manner.’ Importantly, the EULA specifies that it does not grant access to any county information. The authority to grant access to records remains with the relevant county.

When a user inputs a record search into the Laredo client, the client sends a request to the middle tier via the internet. The middle tier then retrieves the appropriate record from the county database and `streams’ this record to the user through the Laredo client. In other words, the user can view an image of the record in the client, but cannot download or save it for later viewing. However, the client gives the user an option to `print’ an image of the record, either on paper or to a PDF file.

The client communicates with the middle tier through a technology called Simple Object Access Protocol (`SOAP calls’). The Laredo client sends SOAP calls unencrypted over the internet. In order to access a particular record, the client generates the appropriate SOAP call and sends it to the middle tier. After analyzing the SOAP call, the middle tier retrieves the matching record and sends it back to the client for viewing. Each Laredo user has a unique username and password for each county with which it has an agreement. Accordingly, each SOAP call is coded with a corresponding unique identifier.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The opinion followed the general information outlined above with a recitation of the facts and events that led to the litigation:

Fidlar tracks access to county records in order to facilitate billing by the individual counties. Each county develops its own subscription plan for access to its records. All the subscription plans charge a monthly fee set by the county based on time spent accessing records. Some—but not all—counties also charge a separate `print fee’ (or `copy fee’) for each record a user prints using the client. Fidlar also uses SOAP calls to track access and printing. For example, if a user prints a record from the client, the client generates and sends a SOAP call of the print request to the middle tier where it is logged for billing purposes.

LPS is a real estate data analytics company that used Laredo to gather real property data. LPS's business requires a continuous acquisition of land records and data. It currently has agreements for access to public land records with approximately 2,600 counties nationwide. However, LPS is not interested in the land records themselves, but rather the data in these records.

To further its data collection efforts, in 2010, LPS contracted with 82 of Fidlar's county customers to gain access to their land records. For each of these 82 counties, LPS agreed to pay the monthly fee for unlimited access to the county's records. For those counties that charged separate print fees, LPS's unlimited subscription did not include printing—if LPS printed a record from the client, it was still charged the applicable print fee. Fidlar was not a party to any of the contracts between LPS and the individual counties.

In 2011, LPS designed a `web-harvester,’ a computer program to download county records en masse. To create the web-harvester, LPS ran a number of standard record searches and used a `traffic analyzer’ to view the SOAP calls sent from the client to the middle tier. LPS then identified the SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records and developed its own client, the web-harvester, to emulate those SOAP calls and send them to the middle tier. LPS's web-harvester only sent the SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records; it did not send other SOAP calls, such as those that track a user's activity. But every SOAP call did include LPS's unique identifier assigned by each county.

Like the Laredo client, the web-harvester allowed LPS to search for and retrieve any record from the county databases it subscribed to. However, LPS's web-harvester had three major differences from Fidlar's Laredo client. First, the web-harvester allowed LPS to acquire records en masse rather than viewing or printing them one at a time. Second, the web-harvester allowed LPS to download or save records, an option not available in the Laredo client. Third, LPS's web-harvester did not send any tracking data at all and did not register any print fees, even if LPS downloaded or saved a record.

LPS used its web-harvester to obtain a large number of records from the 82 county databases it subscribed to over approximately two years. It downloaded the records in bulk onto its computers and then sent the records to India. There, select data from the records were `keyed,’ or entered, into LPS's database. Throughout this period, LPS continued to pay for unlimited subscriptions in all 82 counties but did not incur (or pay) print fees for all of the records it acquired through its web-harvester. Indeed, essentially none of LPS's activities were tracked during this period. Nonetheless, LPS's web-harvester did not disrupt Fidlar's services to other users or alter any content in the middle tier or county databases.

In 2012, Fidlar received a message from one of its county customers noting that LPS was paying subscription fees but was not logging any time used. In early 2013, Fidlar decided to investigate LPS. Based on server logs, Fidlar concluded that LPS was using a web-harvester instead of the Laredo client to obtain records.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

And that brings us to the suit:

On March 11, 2013, Fidlar filed this action in the Central District of Illinois alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [CFAA] and the Illinois Computer Crime Prevention Law, as well as trespass to chattels. LPS moved to dismiss, filed a counterclaim, and requested a TRO and preliminary injunction to prevent Fidlar from reporting LPS's activities to the counties and from upgrading Laredo to prevent web-harvesting. The district court denied LPS's motion to dismiss and its requests for injunctive relief. On December 1, 2014, LPS moved for summary judgment on all of Fidlar's claims. On March 5, 2015, the district court granted LPS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed LPS's counterclaim as moot. Fidlar appeals.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that

[w]e review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A `material fact’ is one that affects the outcome of the suit. Id. A `genuine issue’ exists as to any material fact when `the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’  Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., supra. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., supra.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis of LPS’ motion for summary judgment by explaining that

The CFAA, 18 U.S. Code § 1030, is primarily a criminal anti-hacking statute. However, § 1030(g) provides a civil remedy for any person who suffers damage or loss due to a violation of § 1030. § 1030(g). The district court held that Fidlar failed to demonstrate a violation of § 1030. On appeal, Fidlar argues that LPS violated § 1030(a)(4) and § 1030(a)(5)(A). We review each of these arguments in turn.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis with the issue of intent, noting that

18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(4) punishes anyone who:

`[K]nowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value. . . .’

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that the District Court held that

no reasonable jury could find that LPS acted with intent to defraud. Fidlar maintains that LPS's use of its web-harvester constituted an intentional scheme to avoid paying print fees, thus defrauding the counties.

Although this Court has not previously examined this element of § 1030, we have explained that in similar statutes `intent to defraud means that the defendant acted willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or causing financial loss to another.’ United States v. Pust, 798 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406 (7th Circuit 2000)). . . . Because direct evidence of intent is often unavailable, intent to defraud `may be established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn from examining the scheme itself which demonstrate that the scheme was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’ United States v. Pust, supra.

Additionally, the legislative history of § 1030(a)(4) indicates that Congress intended for this provision to reach cases of computer theft. S.Rep. No. 99–432, at 9, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2486–87 (`The new subsection 1030(a)(4) to be created by this bill is designed to penalize thefts of property via computer that occur as part of a scheme to defraud’). The intent to defraud element is meant to distinguish computer theft from mere trespass. Id. at 10 (`[T]here must be a clear distinction between computer theft, punishable as a felony, and computer trespass, punishable in the first instance as a misdemeanor. The element in the new paragraph (a)(4), requiring a showing of an intent to defraud, is meant to preserve that distinction. . . .’).

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the intent issue, noting, initially, that

this is not a case of theft. It is undisputed that LPS had authority to access the county records as a general matter, the question is whether the way in which it did so violated the statute.

Nonetheless, appealing to the broad nature of § 1030(a)(4)'s language, Fidlar argues that LPS's conduct supports an inference of an intent to defraud. By using its web-harvester, LPS obtained county records at no additional cost. Moreover, LPS knew that printing records through the client resulted in an additional fee in some counties. And LPS received invoices that did not reflect any downloads it made using its web-harvester, suggesting that LPS was aware that Fidlar and the counties were not tracking its activities. Assuming that LPS otherwise would have paid a print fee for the records it downloaded, LPS's web-harvester allowed it to avoid paying these fees. Therefore, Fidlar contends that LPS's `scheme’ appears consistent with an intent to defraud.

By contrast, LPS argues that its conduct is consistent with a legitimate, non-fraudulent intent. By using its web-harvester, LPS rapidly acquired records en masse, something it could not do with the Laredo client, even if it paid print fees. In other words, LPS could have been driven by a need to access documents more quickly, and not by an intent to defraud the counties by avoiding print fees. Indeed, if LPS just wanted to avoid print fees, it could have done so through simpler means such as copying the salient data by hand, taking pictures of the records on its computer screens with a digital camera, or simply keying the data directly from the Laredo client. Hence, LPS contends that its intent was to engage in efficient and legitimate business practices, not to `deceive or cheat’ the counties. United States v. Pust, supra.

Examining the `scheme’ itself, we conclude that no reasonable juror could infer that LPS had an intent to defraud. In other words, LPS's conduct was not `reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’ United States v. Pust, supra.  First, LPS used its web-harvester even in those counties that did not charge a print fee. If LPS's intent was to evade print fees, it would have only used its web-harvester in counties that did charge print fees. The fact that LPS used its web-harvester in all counties suggests that its goal was to accelerate its data acquisition efforts. Second, LPS continued to pay for unlimited subscriptions in all 82 counties, even though it was not logging any time by using its web-harvester. If LPS intended to defraud the counties, it could have selected a limited subscription for less money. Third, LPS did not conceal its use of a web-harvester.  In fact, each of LPS's SOAP requests contained its unique identifier. As a result, no reasonable jury could conclude that LPS had the requisite intent to defraud based only on the scheme itself.

Moreover, Fidlar failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that LPS intended to commit fraud, or even that LPS knew its actions were fraudulent. LPS maintains that it honestly believed that its conduct was permissible under the county agreements. Fidlar cannot demonstrate that LPS intended to commit fraud without evidence that LPS knew that its conduct was fraudulent. See United States v. Pust, supra (considering whether the defendant knew `the fraudulent nature of the scheme’ in assessing intent to defraud).

None of the circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of LPS employees, the agreements governing LPS's access to county records, and the Laredo technology itself, undermines LPS's claim that it believed it could permissibly download records through its web-harvester without paying print fees. First, LPS presented testimony from its employees indicating that they believed that although printing a record resulted in a fee, downloading a record did not. For example, LPS's former Senior Vice President Erick Marroquin stated that he believed that LPS was `entitled to download images from the Laredo program without incurring a print charge.’ LPS also offered evidence that it did not use a web-harvester to avoid print fees. The employee who oversaw development of the web-harvester, John McCabe, testified that in designing the web-harvester, `no part of [the process] was to avoid a print fee’ and that the purpose was `[e]fficiency, speed.’

Fidlar's own conduct, moreover, bolsters LPS's testimony on this point. LPS presented evidence that Fidlar knew that at least two of LPS's competitors used third party programs to acquire record data via Laredo. In particular, CoreLogic used a `screen-scraper’ to collect data from county records. Similarly, the First American Title Company used its own web-harvester to acquire records. Fidlar was aware of this conduct yet did not do anything to stop it. Indeed, in an internal e-mail, a Fidlar employee stated that Fidlar could make screen-scraping or web-harvesting illegal with a `simple disclaimer that states the information can't be scraped from the image.’ Taken together, this evidence suggests that even Fidlar itself did not believe that web-harvesting was impermissible.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra (emphasis in the original).

The court went on to explain that, 

[s]econd, the agreements between LPS and the counties did not prohibit LPS from using a web-harvester or require LPS to access the records through the Laredo client. Cf. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the1st Circuit 2003) (`[T]he public website provider can easily spell out explicitly what is forbidden. . . . If [the plaintiff] wants to ban [certain conduct], let it say so on the webpage or a link clearly marked as containing restrictions’). These agreements also did not prohibit LPS from downloading records or require LPS to pay a print fee for any records it downloaded. Yet, LPS derived its authority to access records entirely from these agreements. The agreement between LPS and Fidlar, the Laredo client EULA, stated that it does not grant access to any county information. So the EULA, by its own terms, did not limit—or even affect—LPS's access to county records.

Third, the Laredo client's technological limitations do not support an inference that LPS knew it could not download records. Fidlar contends that because the client was designed to prevent downloading records, LPS should have known that it was not authorized to do so. But the client's technological limitations only show that LPS knew that it could not download records through the Laredo client. We see no reason why LPS should have inferred that it could not download records through a completely different program that it designed. LPS's access to records was tied to the individual agreements with each county—agreements that did not require LPS to use the Laredo client and that Fidlar was not even party to. Further, the EULA, which was the only agreement between Fidlar and LPS, expressly provided that it did not grant access to records and that access could only be granted by the relevant county. In other words, if LPS believed that the county agreements granted it the authority to access records through its own software, the limitations on the Laredo client would seem to have no bearing on the permissible uses of that software.

Additionally, other characteristics of Fidlar's services suggested that downloading records through another program, like a web-harvester, was permissible. The middle tier did not impose any limitations on LPS's use of a web-harvester. Fidlar did not encrypt SOAP calls between the middle tier and the Laredo client. And the middle tier was accessible by means other than the Laredo client, including other Fidlar software products, such as Fidlar's Tapestry platform, as well as third-party applications. So while the option to download records was limited on the front-end by the client user-interface, it was completely open on the back-end by the middle tier's use of unsecured SOAP calls.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals then took up another, related issue, explaining that Fidlar

attempts to cast doubt on LPS's claim that it did not intend to defraud the counties. First, Fidlar argues that the county invoices, which did not indicate any of LPS's web-harvester activity, support an inference that LPS intended to defraud the counties. Even assuming that LPS knew its activities were not being tracked as a result of these invoices, the invoices do not undermine LPS's contention that it believed its conduct was permissible. LPS's access was governed by the county agreements and the invoices did not give LPS cause to change its understanding of these agreements. The fact that LPS was not being billed for downloading records would only reinforce LPS's belief that its conduct was permissible under its unlimited subscriptions. Similarly, the fact that the counties continued to accept LPS's unlimited subscription fees (and that Fidlar continued to provide LPS access) without any inquiry into the company's minimal activity might have further reinforced LPS's understanding of its arrangement. As a result, the invoices do not make an intent to defraud any more likely.

Second, Fidlar cites the testimony of Lynda Taylor. Taylor was a Senior Vice President at LPS until June 2010, prior to LPS's creation and use of its web-harvester. Taylor explained that during her tenure at LPS, her plan was to `pay selectively,’ `on an as-needed basis . . . because Laredo charged for time to be on the system and to look at the document images online, and then you paid extra if you wanted to actually get a copy of an image.’ She also stated that Laredo did not allow a user to `take control of the digital image’ of a record. Fidlar argues that this testimony shows that LPS knew it could either view a record in the client or pay to print a record from the client, but could not download or `take control’ of a record.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The court, though, found that 

Fidlar misreads Taylor's testimony. Taylor was only referring to the limitations of the Laredo client. She did not testify that LPS was prohibited from downloading records using a web-harvester or through other means. In fact, Taylor's tenure predates LPS's creation and use of the web-harvester. And individuals employed at LPS at that time consistently testified that they believed LPS's conduct to be permissible.

Third, Fidlar points to testimony from Michael Hall, LPS's Director of Data Acquisition, who stated that a hypothetical fee of $0.50 or more per page to print a record would have been `cost prohibitive' for LPS. This hypothetical fee is the same as the actual print fee charged by some of the 82 counties. Accordingly, Fidlar argues that Hall's testimony supports an inference that LPS was defrauding the counties of this fee.

But Fidlar's argument largely misses the mark. Undoubtedly, Hall's testimony shows that LPS had much to gain if it wanted to avoid print fees. But this is obvious; LPS does not dispute that acquiring records via a web-harvester was far less expensive than printing them via the Laredo client. The problem with Fidlar's argument is the fact that printing records via the client was more expensive, or even economically infeasible for LPS, does not demonstrate that LPS intentionally avoided this expense. Hall's testimony is entirely consistent with LPS's narrative that it was not trying to avoid print fees. Rather, the fees were simply inconsequential to LPS's data acquisition efforts. Hence, Hall's testimony does not support an inference of an intent to defraud.

In sum, Fidlar attempts to convert its failure to prohibit LPS's action by contract into an allegation of criminal conduct. Despite its extensive efforts to paint LPS's conduct as fraudulent in nature, Fidlar has not pointed to any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that LPS believed its conduct was fraudulent. Hence, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could conclude—based on this evidence alone—that LPS acted with an intent to defraud.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals then took up Fidlar’s argument that

LPS violated § 1030(a)(5)(A), which punishes anyone who:

`[K]nowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer. . . .’

The district court held that LPS did not violate this provision because it found that LPS did not cause any damage under the statute.

Under the CFAA, `damage’ is defined as `any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information. . . .’  § 1030(e)(8). Hence, `causes damage’ encompasses clearly destructive behavior such as using a virus or worm or deleting data. See, e.g., Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2006). But it may also include less obviously invasive conduct, such as flooding an email account. See, e.g., Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 648 F.3d 295  (U.S.Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 2011).

Fidlar claims LPS caused damage to a protected computer—the middle tier servers—by `stopp[ing] the flow of information, causing a diminution in the completeness or availability of data.’ However, Fidlar admits LPS did not alter any data or disrupt Fidlar's services in any way. LPS just avoided Fidlar's method of tracking user activity by not sending the necessary SOAP calls.

This interruption is not `damage’ as defined by the statute. LPS's web-harvester did not impair the integrity or availability of Fidlar's data or systems; it simply downloaded the data requested without leaving a trace. Put another way, the middle tier servers, including the logs, were unaltered after LPS used its web-harvester.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra. (For the CFAA's definition of "damage", see 18 U.S. Code 1030(e)(8).)

The opinion then goes on to explain that

Fidlar attempts to liken this case to United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2005), but the two are readily distinguishable. In Mitra, this Court held that a defendant caused damage by blocking emergency radio communications. United States v. Mitra, supra. Unlike in this case, the defendant in Mitra actually impaired the availability and integrity of a protected computer. His conduct prevented others from communicating through the public communication system. See United States v. Mitra, supra (noting that the defendant's conduct `prevented the computer from receiving, on the control channel, data essential to parcel traffic among the other 19 channels’ and that `[w]hen disturbances erupted, public safety departments were unable to coordinate their activities because the radio system was down’). By contrast, LPS did not prevent anyone from using the middle tier and county database servers nor did it alter any of the content on the servers.

Fidlar tries to sidestep this distinction by arguing that LPS caused damage to the entire `Laredo system’ because it prevented the tracking component from functioning as Fidlar intended. But the statute only protects against damage `to a protected computer,’ including to systems on such a computer. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A); 1030(e)(8). The Laredo system is not a `computer,’ but rather a description of Fidlar's multi-tier architecture. See § 1030(e)(1)(defining `computer’ as `an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device’). Hence, LPS cannot be liable for damaging the entire `Laredo system’ under this statute.

In reality, Fidlar's claim is trespassory in nature. LPS accessed the middle tier servers without following Fidlar's `rules’ (i.e., logging its activity or using the Laredo client). But by using the word `damage,’ and in light of the statutory definition, Congress intended this provision reach actual disruptions in service, not mere access, even if trespassory. See International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7^th Circuit 2006) (`Congress was concerned with both . . .  attacks by virus and worm writers, . . .  and attacks by disgruntled programmers who decide to trash the employer's data system on the way out. . . .’); cf.§ 1030(a)(2) (prohibiting unauthorized access to obtain information from a protected computer without requiring damage). Therefore, the district court was correct that no reasonable jury could conclude that LPS caused any damage within the meaning of the statute.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals then took up, and dismissed, Fidlar’s claim that LPS violated the Illinois Computer Crime Prevention Law:

Like the CFAA, the Illinois CCPL is a criminal statute with a civil suit provision. Section720 ILCS § 5/17–51(c) provides that `[w]hoever suffers loss by reason of a violation of subdivision (a)(4) of this Section may, in a civil action against the violator, obtain appropriate relief.’ Fidlar claims that LPS violated subdivision (a)(4)(C), which provides that:

(a)  A person commits computer tampering when he or she knowingly and without the authorization of a computer's owner or in excess of the authority granted to him or her: ... (4) Inserts or attempts to insert a program into a computer or computer program knowing or having reason to know that such program contains information or commands that will or may:... (C) cause loss to the users of that computer or the users of a computer which accesses or which is accessed by such program....

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that the District Court Judge held that LPS

had no reason to know that its use of a web-harvester would or might cause loss under the statute. The court reasoned that LPS never believed that the counties were entitled to print fees for its use of a web-harvester, and thus there was no loss to the counties that LPS knew or should have known it was causing.

In support of its position that LPS violated the CCPL, Fidlar incorporates the same argument it made under CFAA § 1030(a)(4): LPS intentionally defrauded, and consequently intended to cause loss to, the counties. Indeed, under Illinois law, Fidlar can establish knowledge by demonstrating that LPS acted intentionally. See 720 ILCS § 5/4–5 (`When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally’).

But as discussed above, Fidlar cannot show that LPS intended to defraud the counties. LPS demonstrated that its intent was to efficiently acquire records in a way it believed to be permissible under the governing agreements. Its intent was not to avoid print fees. Accordingly, LPS did not intend to cause loss to the counties.

For the same reason, Fidlar cannot show LPS knew or had reason to know that it might cause loss to the counties. LPS was aware that some counties imposed print fees and that the counties obtained revenue from these fees. But given that LPS believed that it was entitled to download records without incurring a fee, it follows that LPS did not know or have reason to know that it was causing a loss. The fact that LPS could have paid print fees but chose not to does not establish a loss to the counties because LPS was not printing records.

At a minimum, Fidlar must demonstrate that LPS had reason to know that the counties were entitled to the print fees they allegedly lost. However, from LPS's perspective, the counties were not entitled to anything beyond the unlimited subscription fees LPS was already paying. Therefore, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could conclude that LPS knew or had reason to know that it would or might cause a loss.

Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the judgment of the District Court Judge. Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., supra.

 Fidlar Fid

 Fidlar Fid

Resuming Posts

As you may (or may not) have noticed, I have not been adding new posts to this blog for a while.

I spent several days in the hospital, and was eventually given a diagnosis of low potassium in my blood . . . which Iearned is dangerous.

I was recently discharged and, while I'm not back to normal, I am going (absent some unforeseeable set-back), to resume posting three posts this week and, I hope, to continue my regular schedule.

Thank you for your interest.

Susan Brenner

Theft by Deception, the Motion to Dismiss and the Best Evidence Rule

This post examines a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals of Kansas:  State v. Gauger, 2016 WL 97343 (2016).  The opinion begins by explaining that

Robert Alfred Gauger, III, appeals his conviction for theft by deception. . . . [H]e argues that the district court erred by admitting three exhibits into evidence because they violated the best evidence rule.

State v. Gauger, supra.  Gauger was convicted in the Leavenworth District Court.  State v. Gauger, supra.  You can read more about that, and about the case, in the news stories you can find here and here. 

The Court of Appeals went on to explain how the prosecution arose:

Gauger began working for Linaweaver Construction in August 2012. His employment, however, ended on November 5, 2012. At some point after November 5, 2012, Gauger called Mark Linaweaver, the owner of Linaweaver Construction, and asked him for permission to purchase some car batteries on Linaweaver Construction's account at O'Reilly Auto Parts (O'Reilly). Mark denied this request.

In December 2012, Karen Moon, who was an administrative assistant for Linaweaver Construction at that time, was reviewing a monthly invoice from O'Reilly. Employees would sometimes purchase items at O'Reilly and charge the items to the company's account. Part of Moon's job was to match the receipts submitted by employees to the charges listed on the invoice. If there was a missing receipt, she would print an electronic copy of the receipt from O'Reilly's website. While reviewing the O'Reilly invoice, she noticed that there were missing receipts for the purchase of some batteries and a quart of oil. The charges had been signed for by a person named `Robert.’ Moon knew, however, that no one named Robert worked at Linaweaver Construction at the time the charges were made.

Moon took the invoice and printed receipts to Mark. He told her he believed Gauger was the person who had made the charges and that Gauger did not have authorization to do so. Moon then called the O'Reilly store where the purchases had been made, and the store credited the charges back to Linaweaver Construction.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The court then outlined the history of the prosecution, including the trial:

In May 2013, the State filed a complaint against Gauger charging him with one count of theft by deception. A jury trial was held on September 15, 2014. Sean Blanke, an employee at the Leavenworth O'Reilly store in November 2012, testified first at trial. He explained that he was familiar with Linaweaver Construction and stated that when the company ordered parts from O'Reilly an employee usually called for parts and had them delivered or would come in to the store and pick them up. Blanke knew that Gauger was an employee of Linaweaver Construction for a short time because Gauger would call and order parts for the company.

[At trial,] Blanke testified that sometime in November 2012 Gauger called and ordered a battery. Blanke asked if Gauger wanted it delivered, but Gauger said he would come in to pick it up. When Gauger came into the store, the order was charged to Linaweaver Construction. Blanke did not have a discussion with Gauger about whether he was authorized to charge the purchase to that account. Blanke testified that he completed a carbon-copy receipt. The store kept a copy and the other copy was given to Gauger.

The State was permitted to introduce into evidence a printed copy of the receipt from this transaction over an objection lodged by the defense based on the best evidence rule. The printed copy of the receipt showed that the transaction took place on November 16, 2012, and that the total charge for the battery was $124.53. There is an illegible signature on the bottom of the receipt, but right above the signature line is a typed copy of the name of the customer signing the receipt. The customer was identified on the printed copy as `Bob.’ Blanke recalled typing the name Bob because it is short for Robert.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The Court of Appeals also outlined the evidence presented at Gauger’s trial:

After Moon had her discussion with Mark, she called Blanke and asked him to print off electronic copies of some specific receipts so that she could verify the purchases. Blanke printed electronic copies of the receipts requested by Moon and had the printed copies hand delivered to her. In addition to the receipt discussed above dated November 16, 2012, Blanke testified that he also was instructed to print electronic copies of two other receipts for Moon relating to transactions about which he had no personal knowledge. Electronic copies of the receipts from these other two transactions also were introduced into evidence at trial over Gauger's objection based on the best evidence rule. One of the electronic receipts printed off by Blanke showed a charge to Linaweaver Construction of $119.12 for a battery purchased on November 13, 2012. The customer that signed the receipt was identified on the electronic copy of the receipt as `Robert.’ The other electronic receipt showed a $123.44 charge to Linaweaver Construction for a battery and a quart of motor oil. The electronic receipt reflected that this transaction occurred on November 14, 2012, and the customer again was identified as Robert.

During Moon's testimony, the State sought to introduce into evidence a copy of the monthly invoice reviewed by Moon that reflected the charges made to Linaweaver Construction's account at O'Reilly in November 2012.

The defense objected based on the best evidence rule. When questioned by the court, Moon explained that the original invoice was in her office and the exhibit offered at trial was a duplicate made from the original invoice. Moon explained that the only difference between the original and the copy was that the missing receipts on the original copy were highlighted with a yellow highlighter. Moon offered to bring in the original to show the judge but noted that she would need it back as it was a business record. The district court overruled the objection and allowed the State to introduce the printed invoice—without the yellow highlighting—into evidence. The printed invoice showed, among other things, dates, transaction numbers, some names, and the amount of each charge. The charges shown on the electronic copies of the receipts that already had been introduced into evidence appeared on the monthly invoice.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The opinion then explained that

Alan Arevalo, the manager of the Leavenworth O'Reilly store, also testified at trial. Gauger called Arevalo on two separate occasions to say that he would like to come into the store and “take care of” the purchases he had charged to Linaweaver Construction. Defense counsel objected to this testimony on grounds that neither Gauger nor counsel had ever been told that there was contact between Gauger and Arevalo. Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial, arguing Gauger would be prejudiced if the objection was not sustained because the defense did not have time to adequately prepare for cross-examination in response to Arevalo's testimony.

The prosecutor responded to the objection and motion for mistrial by noting that, as alleged by defense counsel, the police reports in the case did not mention any contact between Arevalo and Gauger. The district court denied the motion for a mistrial and thereafter instructed the jury, without objection by the State, to disregard any statements regarding a conversation between Arevalo and Gauger.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

And, finally, the Court of Appeals explains that

Detective Tesh St. John with the Leavenworth Police Department testified he created a photo lineup that included pictures of Gauger and five other individuals with similar characteristics. He showed this lineup to Blanke. Before St. John could even start talking, Blanke identified Gauger as the person who had purchased a battery from him at O'Reilly.

After the State rested, the defense informed the district court that it was not going to present any evidence. During the jury instruction conference, the State requested that the jury be instructed to consider only the transaction that occurred on November 16, 2012, when determining Gauger's guilt. There was no objection by the defense. The jury found Gauger guilty. The district court sentenced Gauger to a 12–month probation term with an underlying prison sentence of 10 months.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The Court of Appeals then took up the issue of the best evidence rule, noting that

Gauger argues that the district court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce several documents into evidence at trial over his objections based on the best evidence rule. We review best evidence challenges on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Robinson, 2015 WL 6829686 (November 6, 2015). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 296 P.3d 106, cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 162 (Kansas Supreme Court 2013).

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The opinion goes on to explain that,

[r]elying on the best evidence rule, Gauger lodged objections at trial to the introduction of two exhibits containing copies of three O'Reilly receipts and an exhibit containing a copy of a monthly invoice from O'Reilly. The best evidence rule is codified at [Kansas Statutes Annotated] 60–467 and states in part:

`(a) As tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence other than the writing itself is admissible, except as otherwise provided in these rules, unless the judge finds that: (1) If the writing is a telefacsimile communication as defined in subsection (d) and is used by the proponent or opponent as the writing itself, such telefacsimile communication shall be considered as the writing itself; (2)(A) the writing is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent, (B) the writing is outside the reach of the court's process and not procurable by the proponent, (C) the opponent, at a time when the writing was under the opponent's control has been notified, expressly or by implication from the pleadings, that it would be needed at the hearing, and on request at the hearing has failed to produce it, (D) the writing is not closely related to the controlling issues and it would be inexpedient to require its production, (E) the writing is an official record, or is a writing affecting property authorized to be recorded and actually recorded in the public records as described in exception (s) of [Kansas Statutes Annotated] 60–460 and amendments thereto or (F) calculations or summaries of content are called for as a result of an examination by a qualified witness of multiple or voluminous writings, which cannot be conveniently examined in court, but the adverse party shall have had a reasonable opportunity to examine such records before trial, and such writings are present in court for use in cross-examination, or the adverse party has waived their production, or the judge finds that their production is unnecessary.’

Based on his claim that the exhibits he challenged at trial were copies of original documents that did not fit into any of the exceptions listed in [Kansas Statutes Annotated] 60–467, Gauger argues the district court's decision to permit the State to introduce those exhibits into evidence was an error of law and, thus, an abuse of discretion and reversible. Gauger also argues he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because his conviction rested largely on exhibits that were improperly introduced into evidence.

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The Supreme Court began its analysis of Gauger’s best evidence rule argument by explaining that

[r]elevant to application of the best evidence rule in the context of an electronically stored document is the recent opinion filed by our Supreme Court holding, as a matter of first impression, that any printed version of an e-mail communication may be admitted as the original, provided there is no genuine dispute regarding authenticity. State v. Robinson, supra. The court's analysis of this issue is instructive:

`Robinson contends the trial court violated the best evidence rule by admitting numerous e-mails that were forwarded to police rather than printed from the victims' or witnesses' computers. Robinson also challenges exhibits containing e-mail strings rather than individual, segregated messages.’

`The best evidence rule provides that “[a]s tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence other than the writing itself is admissible, except as otherwise provided in these rules.” [Kansas Statutes Annotated] 60–467(a). A “writing” is defined broadly to include every means of recording, upon any tangible thing, any form of communication or representation. K.S.A. 60–401(m). Both parties presume the challenged e-mails constitute “writings” and were offered to prove their content. We assume, without deciding, the same. . . .’

`Generally the best evidence rule requires the original writing be introduced when available. See State v. Goodwin, 223 Kan. 257, 573 P.2d 999 (Kansas Supreme Court 1977) (original required, but secondary evidence admissible where original unavailable). However, when a writing is stored electronically, what constitutes an original and the practicalities of any production are not automatically clear. After all, “[p]roduction of a true original of an email or social networking page is not necessarily possible because both are always electronic.” Pannozzo, Uploading Guilt: Adding A Virtual Records Exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 Conn. L.Rev. 1695, 1708 (2012). K.S.A. 60–467(a) does not squarely address what constitutes an original for best evidence purposes when “the writing itself” is stored electronically, and we have not had occasion to address the subject previously.'

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The Court of Appeals explained that

[i]n the absence of controlling authority, the parties turn to the federal equivalent of our best evidence rule. Like [Kansas Statutes Annotated] 60–467, the federal rule contemplates that `[a]n original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content’ unless otherwise provided by rule or statute. [Federal Rules of Evidence] 1002. More importantly, the federal rule specifically contemplates that `f]or electronically stored information, “original” means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects the information.’ Federal Rules of Evidence 1001(d). This definition is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, which provides that ‘[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.’ A ‘duplicate’ is defined as ‘a counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original.’ [Federal Rules of Evidence] 1001(e). We regard the federal rule, along with similar state counterparts, as instructive, and we are persuaded by the authority interpreting these provisions. See Fredricks v. Foltz, 221 Kan. 28, 557 P.2d 1252 (Kansas Supreme Court 1976) (finding federal interpretations persuasive where state and federal rules similar). The federal version of the rule is consistent with our prior holdings allowing the use of duplicates or secondary evidence, barring genuine disputes as to fraud or alteration. See, e.g., State v. Goodwin, supra (defendant's best evidence challenge flawed where he never suggested contents of secondary evidence were less than the truth; absent proof of discrepancy, secondary evidence admissible). Likewise, by excluding printouts of electronically stored information or duplicates where the content is inaccurate, the federal rules further the underlying purpose of the best evidence rule—the prevention of fraud. See U.S. v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 1989) (purpose is to prevent fraud).

State v. Gauger, supra. 

The Court of Appeals noted that

`[b]ased on the federal definition of an “original” and “duplicate” writing, along with the underlying rule accepting both for best evidence purposes, any printed version of e-mail communications may be admitted as the original, provided there is no genuine dispute regarding authenticity. See New Image Painting, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2009 WL 4730891, at *2 (U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 2009) (copies of e-mails constitute duplicate originals under Federal Rules of Evidence 1003); Dirickson v. State, 104 Ark. App. 273, 291 S.W.3d 198 (Arkansas Court of Appeals 2009) (printouts of Internet conversations fall within definition of original); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 78 Mass.App. 671, 941 N.E.2d 1143 (2011) (Massachusetts Court of Appeals) (accepting printed e-mails as best evidence). Courts have found such printouts acceptable for best evidence purposes, even where the e-mails have been forwarded. Greco v. Velvet Cactus, LLC, 2014 WL 2943598, at *2–3 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 2014) (text messages converted to e-mail format and forwarded to counsel for printing constituted ‘original’ for best evidence purposes).’

State v. Gauger, supra.

The Court of Appeals therefore held that

[a]lthough the Robinson court analyzed the admissibility of electronically stored information under the best evidence rule in the context of an e-mail message, we believe the analysis in Robinson is equally applicable to the facts in the present case. Moon testified that she was able to print off any missing invoices from the O'Reilly website, evidence from which a reasonable inference can be made that the receipts were electronically stored. That the invoices were electronically stored is also supported by the testimony of sales associate Blanke, who stated that he was required as part of the sales process to type into the computer the name of the individual purchasing the goods. And it is reasonable to conclude from a review of the copies of the three O'Reilly receipts and the copy of the monthly invoice—which are included in the record on appeal—that all of these documents were printed copies of electronically stored documents. To that end, the invoice contained a note that said: `Need invoice copies? Go to www.oreillyauto.com/myaccount.’ Again, this strongly suggests the invoice is electronically stored.

Based on the federal definition of an `original’ and `duplicate’ writing, along with the underlying rule accepting both for best evidence purposes, we hold that the copies of the three O'Reilly electronically stored receipts and the one O'Reilly electronically stored monthly invoice were properly admitted as originals, given there was no genuine dispute regarding authenticity.

State v. Gauger, supra.

For these and other reasons, the court affirmed Gauger’s conviction. State v. Gauger, supra.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, SpoofCards and Habeas Corpus

This post examines a recent opinion from the Appellate Court of Connecticut:  Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, 2016 WL 305628 (2016).  The court begins the opinion by explaining what the appeal involved and who was bringing it:

Chandra Bozelko appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She claims the court erred in denying her claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to a failure to investigate effectively. She further argues that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner claims her counsel provided ineffective assistance in the course of defending her against charges of jury tampering. She pleaded guilty to and was convicted of making telephone calls to jurors during her criminal trial on certain otherwise unrelated prior charges. The habeas court recited the following facts with respect to the jury tampering: `On the evening of October 4, 2007, while the petitioner's criminal jury trial was underway, several jurors assigned to the case received telephone calls at their residences from a telephone number identified on their respective caller identification systems as originating from Kate's Paperie, a business establishment in Greenwich, Connecticut. A male caller asked the jurors questions regarding their status as jurors and instructed the jurors that they should not find the petitioner guilty of the pending charges. The petitioner submitted an affidavit to the court indicating that she received several calls from jurors at her residence on October 8, 2007.’

`The police conducted an extensive investigation and determined that the calls did not originate from Kate's Paperie or from the jurors' residences. The police determined that the caller identification information for these calls had been “spoofed,’ a process whereby the caller attaches false identity contact information to the communication. The police discovered that a ‘SpoofCard’ was purchased on April 12, 2007, with the computer located in the petitioner's residence and her mother's credit card. A SpoofCard allows the user to change caller identification information through the use of a computer service. A SpoofCard user also has the ability to change his or her voice to that of a male or female.’

`The call records showed that 123 calls were made with the [Spoof]card beginning on April 12, 2007, and ending on October 4, 2007. Ninety-four of the calls originated from the petitioner's father's fax machine phone number, nineteen of the calls originated from the petitioner's residential phone number and ten of the calls originated from a Tracfone phone number. The Trac-fone, a prepaid cell phone, was activated from the computer in the petitioner's residence. The SpoofCard and the Tracfone were used to place the phone calls to the jurors on October 4, 2007. The calls took place over the span of an hour and a half, beginning at 7:22 p.m. and ending at 8:52 p.m. All of the phone calls made using the SpoofCard were recorded.

`A second SpoofCard was purchased on October 8, 2007, with the computer located in the petitioner's residence and a prepaid credit card that was found in the petitioner's bedroom when the search warrant was executed. The second SpoofCard and the Tracfone were used to make calls to the petitioner's residence from phone numbers spoofed to appear as if the calls originated from the jurors' residences. There were no recordings made of these calls.’ The habeas court further explained that, in connection with this incident, `[t]he petitioner was charged with six counts of attempt to commit tampering with a juror in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2) and 53a–154 one count of false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 2007] § 53a–157b and one count of tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a–155(1). The petitioner was also charged with [crimes] arising from the same allegations in a separate case in the Stamford judicial district. The petitioner's exposure on these charges was approximately fifty years.’

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.  You can, if you are interested, read more about the case and the facts it arose from in the articles you can find here and here. 
The Appellate Court went on to outline the legal proceedings that led to this appeal:

Attorney Dean Popkin represented the petitioner. The petitioner entered a guilty plea, under the Alford doctrine, to three counts of attempt to commit tampering with a juror on March 30, 2010. On May 24, 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to twenty-seven months incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-seven months imprisonment. The state nolled the remaining charges against the petitioner in both this case and the Stamford case.

The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in August, 2010. . . . [S]he claimed her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation prior to the entry of her plea. She claimed he did not effectively investigate the petitioner's innocent use of another telephone line in the same time frame in which the telephone calls to the jurors were taking place, and he did not effectively investigate all of the telephone records. The court denied the petition and found the petitioner had failed to establish both deficient performance and prejudice. The habeas court denied her petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

The Appellate Court went on to explain that

[a]s a threshold matter, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying her petition for certification to appeal. `Faced with the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner's first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason . . . [the] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . .The required determination may be made on the basis of the record before the habeas court and applicable legal principles. . . .

In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner's substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification. Absent such a showing by the petitioner, the judgment of the habeas court must be affirmed.’ . . . Ham v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 212, 98 A.3d 81, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 932, 102 A.3d 83 (2014). Resolution of the petitioner's threshold claim that the court abused its discretion in denying her petition for certification to appeal requires an examination of her underlying claims, and, thus, we address these claims in turn.

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.  You can, if you are interested, read more about habeas procedure in the United States in the article you can find here.

The court then explained that in this proceeding Bozelko argued that the habeas corpus

court erred: (1) in finding that her counsel's performance was not deficient, and (2) in using an incorrect standard for determining prejudice. We are not persuaded.

`In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 510, 978 A.2d 1167 (2009).

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

The Appellate Court went on to explain that the

`governing legal principles in cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising in connection with guilty pleas are set forth in Strickland [v. Washington,466 U.S. 668 (1984)] and Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.52 (1985)]. [According to] Strickland, [an ineffective assistance of counsel] claim must be supported by evidence establishing that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance. . . .The first prong requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . Under . . . Hill . . .  which . . . modified the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for claims of ineffective assistance when the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the evidence must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ . . . Patterson v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn.App. 30, 89 A.3d 1018 (2014). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim `will succeed only if both prongs [of Strickland as modified by Hill ] are satisfied.’ . . . Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 77, 967 A.2d 41 (2009).

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

The Appellate Court then took up Bozelko’s argument that the habeas court judge

erred in determining that Popkin's performance was not deficient. She contends that he rendered deficient performance in that he failed to examine the telephone records provided by the state during discovery, which show telephone calls made on the night in question from the landline at her residence, and that he failed to interview one Willie Green, since deceased. Green, an employee at Kinsella Commons, a mental health and substance abuse treatment center, allegedly was the recipient of an innocent call from the landline at the residence on the night in question. The petitioner claims that Green could have provided useful information about the call. We disagree with the petitioner's claim in this regard.

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

The Appellate Court went on to explain that the

following additional findings of fact and conclusions of law were made by the habeas court. At trial, the petitioner introduced records from AT & T and Kinsella Commons to demonstrate what additional investigation by Attorney Popkin would have revealed. The AT & T phone records submitted into evidence indicate that several calls were made from the landline at the petitioner's residence on the evening of October 4, 2007. The first outgoing phone call was made at 7:24 p.m., and the last outgoing phone call was made at 10:01 p.m. The durations of the phone calls ranged from approximately one second to four and a half minutes. The petitioner testified that the outgoing calls were made to Kinsella Commons, [a patient at the facility], relatives of [the patient], and the petitioner's sisters. The notes submitted from Kinsella Commons, handwritten by Willie Green, a supervisor of the center's residents, state that Green received a phone call from the petitioner on the evening of October 4, 2007. Green's notes indicate that the call was received at 7:45 p.m., but they do not indicate how long the phone call lasted. The AT & T phone records indicate that one phone call was made from the petitioner's residence to Kinsella Commons at 7:48 p.m., and the call ended at 7:52 p.m.

Attorney Popkin hired an investigator in this case. The investigator attempted to contact individuals identified by the petitioner as having some involvement with the case, but they refused to speak with him. The investigator also arranged for a forensic review of the petitioner's hard drive, but the forensic examiner found more evidence on the computer that was detrimental to the petitioner than the state police had found. The court credits Attorney Popkin's testimony that he also requested the phone records to substantiate the petitioner's claimed theory of defense, but he did not find them to be helpful. The phone records did not prove that it was the petitioner making the phone calls. Moreover, Attorney Popkin determined that several brief phone calls to Kinsella Commons would not account for the hour and a half time frame during which the calls were made to the jurors.

Attorney Popkin wrote a letter to the petitioner, recommending that she plead guilty due to the strength of the state's case against her and her lack of a viable defense. While the voice on the tape recordings of the phone calls made to the jurors using the SpoofCard was disguised in a male voice, the voice on other phone calls recorded on the card was not disguised. Attorney Popkin determined that the petitioner's defense would require her to testify, and he believed that any jury that heard the tape recordings and the petitioner's voice would determine that it was her voice on those phone calls. Attorney Popkin testified that he reviewed the tapes with the petitioner, and that she decided to plead guilty after hearing the recordings. He believed that the plea deal was very favorable in light of the exposure she faced. The sentencing court, Rodriguez, J., thoroughly canvassed the petitioner regarding her plea.

`Pursuant to the foregoing, the court finds that the evidence submitted by the petitioner is insufficient to establish the existence of exculpatory information that should have been discovered had a proper investigation been conducted. Attorney Popkin's investigation was objectively reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and the petitioner has not met her burden of proving deficient performance for purposes of her ineffective assistance claim.’

The court did not err in concluding Popkin had not rendered deficient performance. He hired an investigator and examined the petitioner's defense that she was making telephone calls from the landline at her residence during the time in which the telephone calls to the jurors had been made. He found the telephone records that he had requested, in order to support the petitioner's defense theory, to be unhelpful. The records did not prove that the petitioner had made the telephone calls herself, and, because of the brief duration of the telephone calls from the landline, even if the petitioner had made those calls, she still had an hour and a half in which to telephone the jurors using the cell phone.

Popkin determined that not only were the additional telephone calls on the night in question of insufficient duration reasonably to eliminate the petitioner as the maker of the incriminating calls—for instance, the call to Green accounted for only approximately four minutes of the one and one half hour time frame in which the jurors were telephoned—but also that the jury would be able to match the voice on the tape recorded telephone calls to the petitioner's voice, which of course would be heard if she testified. Popkin testified that roughly twenty calls were made using the SpoofCard and that the caller's voice was disguised on some of the calls. He testified that other calls captured what Popkin believed to be the petitioner's real voice. He further testified that the petitioner decided to plead guilty after hearing the recordings of her voice. The court determined that Popkin's investigation was objectively reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

The petitioner argues, however, that Popkin was ineffective for not investigating the petitioner's defense further. `[C]ounsel need not track down each and every lead or personally investigate every evidentiary possibility before choosing a defense and developing it . . . [as][e]ffective assistance of counsel imposes an obligation [on] the attorney to investigate all surrounding circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues that may potentially lead to facts relevant to the defense of the case. . . . In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. . . .If counsel makes strategic decisions after thorough investigation, those decisions are virtually unchallengeable. . . .’ Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn.App. 537, 124 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 910, A.3d (2015). We conclude that the court did not err in concluding Popkin's performance was not constitutionally deficient.

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

Finally, the Appellate Court took up the issue as to whether her lawyer’s performance caused her “prejudice.”  Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.  It began its analysis of that issue by explaining that Bozelko

argues that the habeas court relied on the superseded prejudice standard enunciated in Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 662 A.2d 178 (Connecticut Supreme Court 1995), and examined only the strength of the state's case. The petitioner argues that the court failed to use the proper prejudice standard articulated in Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 594, 119 A.3d 1153 (Connecticut Supreme Court 2015). We disagree.

`For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the [prejudice] prong of the Strickland test to require that the petitioner produce evidence ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ Hill v. Lockhart, supra.’ Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 89, 111 A.3d 829 (Connecticut Supreme Court 2015). In Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, our Supreme Court interpreted Hill to require that to prove prejudice the petitioner must `demonstrate that [s]he would not have pleaded guilty, that [s]he would have insisted on going to trial, and that the evidence that had been undiscovered or the defenses [s]he claims should have been introduced were likely to have been successful at trial.’

In Carraway, our Supreme Court held that the prejudice standard enunciated in Copas had been overruled, sub silentio, by statements in more recent cases in which it `specifically disapproved of the petitioner's characterization of the prejudice prong as “a reasonable probability that the result of the trial court proceedings would have been different’ and instead stated that ‘[i]n the context of a guilty plea . . . to succeed on the prejudice prong the petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged ineffective performance, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial.”’ Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra. . . .

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.

The Appellate Court then enunciated its ruling on Bozelko’s appeal:

The habeas court used the proper prejudice standard under Carraway. In its introductory discussion of law, the court specifically stated the same standard as that enunciated in Carraway. The court later specifically found:

`The evidence submitted by the petitioner is insufficient to establish the existence of exculpatory information that would have changed the result in this case. The telephone records reveal that calls were made on the landline in the petitioner's residence; however, the telephone calls made to the jurors were placed on a Tracfone. The duration of the outgoing telephone calls do not amount to the time needed to attempt to tamper with the jurors. Furthermore, there is no evidence that it was the petitioner who was making the telephone calls. The only evidence of a telephone call made by the petitioner on October 4, 2007, is a four minute telephone call made to Green around 7:45 p.m. The petitioner pleaded guilty as a result of the strength of the state's case, particularly, the existence of the tape recordings featuring the petitioner's voice that the state intended to introduce into evidence, and the potential exposure that she faced if convicted. The court does not credit the petitioner's testimony that she would have gone to trial in light of these circumstances. The court finds that there is not a reasonable probability that this newly submitted evidence would have changed the petitioner's decision to plead guilty.’

The court clearly assessed whether the petitioner, but for counsel's alleged ineffective performance, would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial. The court discredited the petitioner's testimony that she would have gone to trial. The court analyzed the strength of the state's case, to be sure, as the strength of the state's case played a role in the petitioner's decision to plead guilty and in the court's determination of whether that decision would likely have changed if the `new’ evidence had been developed at the time of the plea. The court concluded that it was not reasonably probable that the new evidence would have changed the petitioner's mind to plead guilty. We conclude that the court used the proper standard in assessing prejudice.

After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the petitioner did not demonstrate that the issues she has raised in her petition for certification to appeal are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve those issues differently or that the questions raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying her petition for certification to appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

Bozelko v. Commissioner of Correction, supra.