This post examines a recent decision from the Court of Appeals of Utah: State of Utah v. Beagles,
2017 WL 2492792 (2017). The court begins the opinion by explaining that
[Bradley Keith] Beagles and his
then-wife were clients of an accounting firm that prepared their joint tax
returns. As clients of the firm, they could access the firm's online portal to
view their tax returns. After the couple divorced, his ex-wife continued as a
client of the firm, but Beagles did not. The firm thus terminated his access to
the online portal. A few months later, Beagles accessed the online portal three
times by using his ex-wife's email address as the login name and correctly
guessing the answers to her security questions. He then changed her password.
He also sent emails to the accounting firm with screenshots of the online
portal containing confidential information about his ex-wife and his former
business partners.
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
Beagles was charged with three counts
of computer crimes,
third degree felonies. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(1)(e) (LexisNexis
2012). Beagles pleaded guilty to
three counts of the reduced charge of attempted computer crimes, class A
misdemeanors. See id. § 76-6-703(1)(b). The district
court sentenced Beagles to three consecutive one-year jail sentences. The court
then suspended the sentences and placed Beagles on probation for 36 months with
conditions. One condition was that Beagles serve a 60-day jail term. Beagles challenges
that condition.
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then explained that
Beagles contends that the district court
`abused its discretion in imposing a jail term on [him].’ Because we
traditionally afford a sentencing court wide latitude and discretion, we will
reverse a sentencing decision `only if it is an abuse of the judge's
discretion.’ State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 34, 282 P.3d 985 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion
when the district court `fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or . .
. the sentence imposed is clearly excessive.’ LeBeau v. State, 2014
UT 39, ¶ 16, 337 P.3d 254 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We will find an abuse of discretion only if no reasonable person would take the
view adopted by the sentencing court. State v. Monzon, 2016 UT App
1, ¶ 8, 365 P.3d 1234.
A defendant is not entitled to
probation; rather, `the court is empowered to place the defendant on probation
if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with
the public interest.’ State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). The `”granting or withholding of probation involves considering
intangibles of character, personality and attitude, of which the cold record
gives little inkling.”’ State v. Cline, 2017 UT App 50, ¶ 7 (quoting State
v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957)). And `as a condition of
probation, the court may require that the defendant ... serve a period of
time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail.’ Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8)(a)(v) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
Beagles presents two arguments in
support of his contention that the district court abused its discretion in
ordering 60 days jail time as a condition of probation. First, he argues that
the district court `gave inadequate reasons for imposing a jail term.’ He claims
that his hacking was not `fairly brazen,’ as described by the district court,
and points to alleged errors in the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI).
Second, he argues that the district court `did not give sufficient weight to
the mitigating circumstances in this case.’ He lists several mitigating
factors, including that his conduct `was a product of mental illness and
substance abuse’; that he received treatment at a psychiatric hospital and
medication; that he did not commit new crimes for 18 months prior to
sentencing; that he has strong family support; and that he has a history of
successfully completing probation.
We generally presume that the
sentencing court `made all the necessary considerations when making a
sentencing decision.’ Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 35. `Although courts must
consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing decision, not all
aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, and one factor in
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite
scale.’ State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 59, 191 P.3d 17 (brackets,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other
grounds as recognized by State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 24.
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then began an analysis of a similar,
earlier case, explaining that
[w]e recently addressed a challenge
similar to this one in State v. Cline, 2017 UT App 50. There Cline
argued that `the district court did not adequately consider his character, attitude,
and rehabilitative needs’ in its sentencing decision. Id. ¶ 8
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the precise nature of Cline's
argument was unclear, we rejected any challenge that the court `failed to
consider [mitigating] factors’ and that it `improperly weighed the aggravating
and mitigating factors.’ See id. First, we concluded that,
because the mitigating factors were discussed at the sentencing hearing, `[t]o
the extent Cline argues the court did not consider these factors, this is
inaccurate.’ Id. ¶ 9. Second, we noted that any argument `that
the district court improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors’
appeared to be a `disagreement with the court's balancing efforts.’ Id. ¶
10. We then concluded that `the court acted well within its discretion’ when it
`gave more weight to the aggravating factors presented during the sentencing
hearing.’ See id. ¶¶ 10–11. We held that `[b]ecause the
court adequately considered all the relevant factors, the sentence imposed was
not an abuse of discretion.’ Id. ¶ 11.
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[l]ike Cline, Beagles argues that the district
court either failed to consider or improperly weighed aggravating and
mitigating factors. See id. ¶
8. The district court noted several aggravating factors at the sentencing
hearing. The court determined that Beagles's offenses were `fairly aggravated
by the brazen attempts of hacking,’ in that `he tried to hack [the online
portal] a couple of times’ and `was successful hacking a couple of times.’ The
court also concluded that Beagles was at a `high risk to reoffend’ given his
belief that he had done nothing wrong and that he had the right to do whatever
he wanted to his ex-wife. Lastly, the court noted the likely effect of Beagles's
crime on the victim: `knowing that he's using her security questions . . . to access her information . . .
would be pretty distressing.’ The court thus balanced the aggravating and mitigating
factors and ultimately `gave more weight to the aggravating factors.’ See id. ¶ 10.
Beagles also notes on appeal that the PSI contained
factual errors. At sentencing, he asked the court to `consider’—not
correct—these alleged errors. The court took these errors into consideration in
weighing the sentencing factors. See id. ¶
9. Beagles does not contend on appeal that the district court erred in failing
to resolve his objections to the PSI as required by Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016) (requiring the
district court to `make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record’
of alleged inaccuracies in the PSI); see also State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶¶ 41–45, 973 P.2d 404 (remanding to the district court for
it to resolve objections to the PSI). Because Beagles does not argue on appeal
that the court failed to make necessary findings on the record in resolving his
objections to the PSI, we do not address the issue of compliance with section 77-18-1(6)(a).
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
The Court of Appeals concluded the opinion with the
following:
The district court's decision to grant
Beagles probation on condition that he serve 60 days in jail falls well within
the court's considerable discretion. We cannot say that no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the district court. See State v.
Monzon, 2016 UT App 1, ¶ 8, 365 P.3d 1234.
The judgment
of the district court is affirmed.
State of Utah v. Beagles,
supra.
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