This post examines an opinion from the Appellate Court ofIllinois – Second District: People v. Gregory, 2016 WL 1254447
(2016). The Appellate Court, as
appellate courts usually do, begins the opinion by explaining how, and why, the
prosecution arose:
Defendant was indicted on one count of
threatening a public official and three counts of cyberstalking in connection
with e-mails sent to Brian LeClercq, the
president of the Village of Oswego; the Oswego police department; and Oswego
police officer Matthew Unger. The e-mails were sent by `John Doe’
with the e-mail address hoodbox@yahoo.com.
Four e-mails were sent to the Oswego
police department or Unger. The first e-mail was sent on January 31, 2012. The
subject line was `oswego policemen are faggot poices [sic ] of
shit.’ The body of the e-mail stated:
`did I just say that? want to hear a
story about a bunch of faggot bullies who picked on someone who wasn't a
criminal, kept to himself, and yet still got picked on by a bunch of pussies
hiding behind their badge, you are nothing but cowards. i'm so glad my lying ex
got away with stalking me, lying about me, and ruining my life. i prey [sic ]
something to happen to your families while you are at work. karma is a bitch
........... at least no one was home at my house when someone was inside of it
LOL’
The second e-mail was sent on February 14,
2012. The subject line was `dear occifer unger,’ and the body of the e-mail
stated: `how is stephanie unger doing? hmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.’
The third and fourth e-mails were sent
on February 15, 2012. The subject line of the third e-mail was `HI.’ The body
of the e-mail stated: `Do you think I'm going to let this go? First you losers
destroy the first part of my life just to turn around and help out doing it
again because some lying whore? Lock me up, find out how it doesn't go away
cause when i get out, i'll still do it.’
The fourth e-mail had the subject `HI
Unger.’ The body of the e-mail stated: `I will be letting this police
department as well as him know you are the reason why too. Don't think I don't
know what you did so I guess we'll see how well that turns out. All in all, I'm
just trying to help my own family out.’ Also on February 15, 2012, Unger
received a similar voice mail message.
Two e-mails were directed at LeClercq
and sent to the general e-mail address for the Village of Oswego. The first was
received on February 10, 2012, with the subject line `please forward this to
the mayor.’ The e-mail stated: `let him know i'll be coming for him at his
personal residence when i get back to town.’ The second e-mail was sent on
April 20, 2012, and stated:
`When the mayor's kids don't show up at
home, do you think he'll ignore that as well? Life's a bitch when it catches up
to you and since the police in Oswego think they have the right to trespass
onto private property and LIE, then I guess I am allowed to do whatever I want
to satisfy what I went through. You were asked to call me but chose not
to.’
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Appellate Court went on to explain that, before his
trial began, Gregory
moved in limine to bar
evidence of prior bad acts, including 10 handwritten letters he sent to the
Oswego police department and to the `Captain’ of the Oswego police department
from December 2012 through March 2013, while he was in jail following his
arrest.
The State also filed a motion in
limine, seeking to admit the letters. The letters were lengthy and
often contained profanity, which was sometimes in larger writing for emphasis.
They also contained large amounts of derogatory and homophobic language. The
letters referred to topics such as defendant's lack of friends, his belief that
his parents and others lied to him, and his depression. Although they were
often unclear, the general themes of the letters appeared to be defendant's
beliefs that the charges against him were baseless and that the police lied to
him or conspired against him, his intent to bring a lawsuit against them, and
his demands for a monetary settlement.
The letters also referred to other
crimes, bad acts, and facts that could place defendant in a bad light. For
example, there were references to allegations of domestic violence, including
defendant's pulling a knife on a woman; a restraining order obtained by
defendant's ex-girlfriend; a coworker's belief that defendant was a pedophile;
25 traffic tickets; defendant's being pulled over 50 times; his payment of
fines; his losing his driver's license; his losing jobs and dropping out of
college; accusations that defendant was a drug dealer and gun runner; and his
purposely failing a drug test to get some time off. In what appeared to
indicate an understanding that the letters could be viewed as threats like
those in the e-mails that he allegedly sent, defendant sometimes specifically
stated that the letters were not threats. He also repeatedly offered to take a
polygraph test.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The court also explained that
[a]t the hearing on the motions,
defense counsel argued that the letters were not relevant, as they dealt with
defendant's demands for a settlement from the Oswego police department and were
unrelated to the threats made to the victims in the case. Counsel further
argued that the letters were not relevant to show modus operandi, motive,
intent, or any other proper fact. Counsel then argued that, even if the letters
were relevant, they were more prejudicial than probative, because of the
inference of criminal propensity. The State primarily argued that the letters
were admissible as admissions of online activity and to show a continuous
course of conduct or modus operandi.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Appellate Court also explained that
[i]n a written order, the trial court
stated that it had reviewed the letters, that it had considered the probative
value and the prejudicial effect, and that it would admit the letters. The
court referred to 9 letters, but the record contains 10. The order does not
identify the purpose for which the court found the letters to be relevant; i.e., motive,
intent, identity, etc. The court excluded a number of other items that the
State sought to introduce.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The court then noted that the case went to a jury trial, at
which
Unger testified that, in July 2010, he
did a well-being check on defendant at defendant's parents' home in Oswego,
during which he convinced defendant to go to the hospital for a psychological
evaluation. A month later, he had a phone conversation with defendant, who was
upset because he was unable to pay his hospital bill. Unger called the hospital
to see if there were any programs that could help defendant pay the bill. In
2012, Unger was made aware of the e-mails that were sent to the police
department. He testified that the e-mail referencing his wife made him angry
and that he was extremely concerned for the safety of his wife and child after
reading it. The voice message also made him feel extremely concerned for his
family. LeClercq testified that the e-mails sent to him through the village
e-mail address made him pretty uncomfortable and very concerned.
The e-mails were put into evidence.
Other evidence showed that the hoodbox@yahoo.com
e-mail address listed scott_gregory@att.net under other identities. The billing address
for the account listed defendant at an address in Oswego that had utilities in
defendant's name from September 2007 until October 2012. Between January 15 and
February 15, 2012, the account was accessed exclusively from an IP address that
was registered to Stephen Gregory in North Carolina. When defendant was
arrested, he gave officers the North Carolina address, and his list of approved
visitors included his parents, Stephen and Lorraine Gregory, at the same
address.
Joe Gillespie, the deputy commander of
the corrections division of the Kendall County sheriff's office, testified
about the 10 letters that were the subject of the motions in limine, which
were marked as exhibits 13 through 21 and exhibit 33. He testified that letters
may be read by jail staff before they are sent and that any letters that raise
issues are copied before they are mailed. He said that defendant sent the 10
letters and that copies were made. Detective Terry Guisti of the Oswego police
department identified the letters and read aloud the following sentence from
exhibit 13: `I'm so glad you assholes were watching me online.’
Guisti believed this excerpt meant that
defendant was aware that the police were picking up information that he was
putting on the Internet. Guisti also read aloud the following portion of
exhibit 33: `The governor of this state whose name is attached to a bullshit
warrant is sure to vent his frustration through your department, the Kendall
County Sheriff's Office, through Eric Weis and probably the spineless mayor you
convinced to lie after violating my privacy rights and overstepping your
jurisdiction by observing my online activity.’ Guisti interpreted this to mean
that defendant was upset that the police were picking up information that he
was putting on the Internet. The 10 letters were admitted into evidence over
defendant's objection.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The opinion then explains that,
[d]uring closing argument, the State
referenced the letters and read from one the statement, `this is not a threat
at all, this is not going away. This will end in my terms. This anger isn't
going away. Find out how it doesn't go away ‘cause when I get out, I'll still
do it.’ It read from another: `I'm so glad I lost everything because of some
fat cop leaves some lying whore thrown out of my apartment.’ The State argued
that these statements were similar to those in the e-mail messages that
referred to a `lying whore’ and stated that the author was not going to let the
matter go.
Responding to the State's arguments,
defense counsel asked the jury to read the letters and see that they were
written by someone who was frustrated and believed that his rights had been
violated. Counsel argued that they were not evidence of the threats or harassment
contemplated by the charges against defendant. In rebuttal, the State again referenced
the letters, arguing, `defendant can't even help himself, he keeps writing
letters. And he keeps admitting following me online.’
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The court concluded this part of its opinion by explaining
what happened next:
After the case was submitted to the
jury, the parties discussed the evidence that would be sent to the jury during
deliberations. In regard to the 10 letters, the following colloquy occurred:
`THE COURT: 13 through 21 are all
letters. Do you want those to go back?
[THE STATE]: Yes. We are offering—I
know counsel is gonna have an objection.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I have my same
objection since the motion in limine, but no objection—
(overlapping conversation.)
THE COURT: Without waiving your prior
objections, I'll send them back.”
The court also referred to admitting
exhibit 33 over the “[s]ame objection previously stated.’
People
v. Gregory, supra.
The opinion then explained that
[t]he jury found defendant guilty.
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing in part that the court erred in
admitting the letters. That motion was denied, and defendant was sentenced to
three years' incarceration. He appeals.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Appellate Court then took up the arguments both sides
made on appeal:
Defendant contends that the trial court
erred in allowing the letters into evidence and sending them to the jury. The
State argues that defendant invited the error or forfeited his argument by
consenting to the admission of the letters in their entirety and failing to ask
for parts of them to be redacted, especially when the parties discussed the
items that would be sent to the jury. We disagree.
The State moved in limine to
offer the letters in their entirety, and defense counsel vigorously objected to
that throughout the entire process. When the letters were sent to the jury, the
court specifically stated that the defense was not waiving its previous
objections. Defense counsel then raised the issue again in the motion for a new
trial.
The State, as the proponent of the
evidence, had the burden to demonstrate the relevance of the letters. See Hawn
v. Fritcher, 301 Ill.App.3d 248, 254 (1998). To require the defense to
specifically ask for portions to be redacted when the State sought to introduce
the letters in their entirety would force counsel to concede that some portions
were admissible—something that would be counter to defense counsel's argument
that none of the material in the letters was relevant. It would also improperly
place the burden on defendant to assist the State in properly presenting its
evidence. See People v. Lampkin, 98 Ill.2d 418, 430 (1983) (stating
in another context that the State's Attorney's duty to safeguard the rights of
the people extends to one accused of a crime and that the failure to delete
prejudicial and improper matters from a statement is a violation of that duty).
Although defense counsel in closing
argument asked the jury to read the letters, that was after the court had ruled
that the letters were admissible and was in response to the State's arguments
about them. Given that defendant clearly objected to the admission of the
letters, and as the court was fully aware of the arguments as to why they
should not be admitted, defendant did not invite error or forfeit his argument.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The court then to up the propriety of the trial court’s
admitting the letters, noting that
the question is whether they were
relevant and, if so, whether they were more prejudicial than probative. `”Relevant
evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.’ Illinois Rules of Evidence 401 (eff.Jan.1,2011). To establish the relevance of a piece of evidence the proponent must:
(1) identify the fact that it is seeking to prove with the evidence; (2)
explain how that fact is of consequence; and (3) show how the evidence tends to
make the existence of this fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. People v. Maldonado, 402 Ill.App.3d 411, 418
(2010).
Defendant first argues that the letters
were not relevant to show anything other than a propensity to commit crimes or
behave badly. The State contends that the letters were relevant to show
identity and intent to harass. At trial, the State also argued that the letters
were relevant to show modus operandi and a general course of
conduct, but it has not argued those points in its brief on appeal.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Appellate Court then took up the issue of “other crimes
evidence”, explaining that
`Other-crimes evidence encompasses
misconduct or criminal acts that occurred either before or after the alleged
criminal conduct for which the defendant is standing trial.’ People v.
Johnson, 2013 IL App (2d) 110535, ¶ 61. `Other-crimes’ evidence does
not pertain solely to prior convictions; the term encompasses bad acts, and the
standard for the admissibility of such evidence is more than mere suspicion,
but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Colin, 344
Ill.App.3d 119, 126 n. 2 (2003).
Other-crimes evidence is admissible to
prove any material fact relevant to the case, but it is inadmissible if it is
relevant only to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal
activity. People v. Johnson, supra. `Such evidence may be
admissible when it is relevant to show, among other things, motive, intent,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, modus operandi, or
the existence of a common plan or design.’ People v. Johnson, supra; see Illinois
Rules of Evidence 404(b) (eff.Jan.1, 2011). `However, relevant
other-crimes evidence may yet be excluded if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value.’ People v. Johnson, supra.
`The admissibility of other-crimes
evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ People
v. Null, 2013 IL App (2d) 110189, ¶ 43. `An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where
no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ Id.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The court then found that the trial court erred in admitting
the letters:
The portions of the letters that Guisti
read out loud to the jury had some relevance to the issue of identity. The
statements indicating that defendant was aware that the police were monitoring
his online activity could be viewed as an admission that he engaged in
questionable activities online. During closing, the State referenced the
statement, `this is not a threat at all, this is not going away,’ and
referenced language that was similar to language in the e-mails and concerned a
similar topic. Taken together, these statements were relevant to show identity,
as they were circumstantial evidence that defendant sent the e-mails and knew
that they were being viewed as threats. Had that been the extent of the use of
the letters, there would not have been an abuse of discretion on the part of
the court in admitting them. The problem, however, is that the letters in their
entirety were admitted, and those letters contained large amounts of
other-crimes evidence that the State does not even argue was relevant.
When evidence of unrelated offenses is
contained in an otherwise competent statement, it must be deleted before the
statement is provided to the jury, unless to do so would seriously impair its
evidentiary value. People v. Moore, 2012 IL App (1st) 100857, ¶ 48.
Here, the deletion of the evidence of unrelated offenses would have done
nothing to interfere with the State's use of the letters. However, because that
use was so minimal, and because the evidence of unrelated offenses was so
voluminous and inflammatory, there was a great risk that the jury would find
defendant guilty of the charges in light of his propensity, or that it would
find defendant guilty not of the charges but instead of one of the uncharged
acts. In sum, the letters' prejudicial effect overwhelmed their probative
value. Thus, we find that the court erred in admitting the letters in their
entirety.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
Since the trial court erred, the next issue was whether the
error was “harmless” or was “reversible.” As Wikipedia explains, “[a] harmless error is a ruling by a trial judge that,
although mistaken, does not meet the burden for a losing party to reverse the
original decision of the trier of fact on appeal, or to warrant a new
trial.” And as Wikipedia also explains,
a “reversible error is an error by . . . the trier of fact (the jury or the
judge if it is a bench trial) . . . which results in an unfair trial.” Wikipedia’s
entry on reversible error also notes that “[i]f an appellate court determines
that reversible error occurred, it may reverse the judgment of the lower court
and order a new trial on such terms and conditions as are found to be just.”
Getting back to the Gregory
case, he argued on appeal that
the error was not harmless, because the
case was close concerning intent and whether a `true threat’ was made, such
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence could have tipped the balance on
the jury's determination of those matters.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Appellate Court agreed with Gregory, explaining that the
`improper admission of other-offenses
evidence is harmless error when a defendant is neither prejudiced nor denied a
fair trial because of its admission.” People v. Quintero, 394
Ill.App.3d 716, 728 (2009). `The State bears the burden of persuasion to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same without the
error.’ Id. In deciding whether the admission of other-crimes
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider whether the
other-crimes evidence was a material factor in the conviction such that without
the evidence the verdict likely would have been different. People v.
Clark, 2015 IL App (1st) 131678, ¶ 65. If the error is unlikely to
have influenced the jury, its admission will not warrant reversal. Id.
First, we observe that the State makes
no harmless-error argument in its brief. Given that the State bears the burden
of showing harmless error and has failed to make any such argument in its
brief, it has forfeited any harmless-error analysis. See People v.
Ceja, 381 Ill.App.3d 178, 183 (2008).
In any event, the error was not
harmless. There was no limiting instruction provided to the jury, which thus
was free to consider the letters in any manner that it saw fit, including as
evidence of propensity. `The erroneous admission of other offense evidence “carries
a high risk of prejudice and ordinarily calls for reversal.”’ People v.
Bedoya, 325 Ill.App.3d 926, 937–38 (2001) (quoting People
v. Lindgren, 79 Ill.2d 129, 140 (1980)). Given the nature of the
improper material, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the result
would have been the same without the error.
People v. Gregory,
supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore held that “the error was not
harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County is
reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.” People v. Gregory, supra.
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