Electromagnetic Sensitivity, W-Fi and the Lawsuit

This post examines an opinion the New Mexico Court ofAppeals recently issued in a civil suit:  Firstenberg v. Monribot, 2015 WL 993820 (2015). The court begins its opinion by explaining how and why the suit arose:

Arthur Firstenberg sued his neighbor, Raphaela Monribot, and Robin Leith, the owner-lessor of Monribot's residence, for injunctive relief and monetary damages under the theories of nuisance and prima facie tort. In his complaint, Firstenberg alleged that because he suffers from a condition called electromagnetic sensitivity (EMS) that renders him acutely sensitive to electromagnetic radiation, his health was adversely affected by Monribot's use, within her own residence, of various electronic devices that generate electromagnetic radiation, including a cell phone, a Wi–Fi modem, dimmer switches, and a microcell.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted that the

parties, the witnesses, and the district court variously refer to Firstenberg's condition as electromagnetic hypersensitivity, electromagnetic sensitivity, and idiopathic environmental intolerance attributed to electromagnetic fields. For ease of reference, we use the acronym EMS throughout this Opinion in reference to Firstenberg's condition.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

In the Complaint Firstenberg filed to initiate the suit, he alleged that because he

suffers from a condition called electromagnetic sensitivity (EMS) that renders him acutely sensitive to electromagnetic radiation, his health was adversely affected by Monribot's use, within her own residence, of various electronic devices that generate electromagnetic radiation, including a cell phone, a Wi–Fi modem, dimmer switches, and a microcell. After nearly three years of litigation, having held an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, the district court determined that Firstenberg lacked admissible evidence of general causation and, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of Monribot and Leith (Defendants). Firstenberg appeals from the court's summary judgment order. 

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  The opinion says Monribot lived in the house next to Firstenberg’s until she “went to Europe for four months.”  Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  When she came back, she sold the house to Firstenberg and moved into a house Leith owned that was “next door to” Firstenberg’s house. Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  The opinion says that the “after Monribot moved in next door to him, Firstenberg became so ill he thought he `could die[,]’ and his symptoms recurred every time he returned to his house.”  Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

Monribot refused Firstenberg's requests to replace her dimmer switches with regular switches, use a land-line instead of a cell phone, to turn off her Wi–Fi, and to unplug her computer at night; she later refused [his] offer of $10,000 to comply with his requests. Firstenberg stated that because Monribot would not comply with these requests, he was unable to use his house for more than a few minutes at a time without suffering EMS symptoms that were caused by radiation from Monribot's electronic devices `entering’ and `leak[ing]’ into his house.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  The court then explains the basis of Firstenberg’s claims against the defendants:

His complaint for prima facie tort was founded on allegations that . . . Monribot, who knew of Firstenberg's EMS, `bombard[ed Firstenberg's] residence with electromagnetic radiation, which she knew would injure [him]’; that she did so intentionally, with the certainty that injury would necessarily result to Firstenberg; that her use of electronic devices `rendered [his] home extremely difficult to inhabit and have caused him years of inconvenience and acute and chronic pain and suffering’; and that Monribot's conduct `had no valid purpose and was unjustifiable” because she could use a land-line, cable instead of Wi–Fi, and engage in “other simple practices that would not cause her undue expense or inconvenience.’

Firstenberg's claim of nuisance was based . . . on his allegations that Monribot's use of electronic devices interfered with his normal residential activities and his private use and enjoyment of his home and his land; Monribot's actions were intentional and unreasonable; she knew or should have known that `bombarding [his] home with electromagnetic radiation interfered with [his] use and enjoyment of his land’; and that her actions caused Firstenberg `years of inconvenience and acute and chronic pain and suffering.’ Firstenberg's complaint sought damages totaling 1.43 million dollars and injunctive relief prohibiting Monribot from operating equipment that emits electromagnetic radiation.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

As Wikipedia notes, in a tort case, causation is an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim:

Proximate cause means that you must be able to show that the harm was caused by the tort you are suing for. . . . A common situation where a prior cause becomes an issue is the personal injury car accident, where the person re-injures an old injury. For example someone who has a bad back is injured in the back in a car accident. Years later he is still in pain. He must prove the pain is caused by the car accident, and not the natural progression of the previous problem with the back. 

Leith and Monribot responded to Firstenberg’s suit by filing a motion for summary judgment in their favor. Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  As Wikipedia explains, in

American legal practice summary judgment can be awarded by the court before trial, effectively holding that no trial will be necessary. Issuance of summary judgment can be based only upon the court's finding that: there are no disputes of `material’ fact requiring a trial to resolve, and in applying the law to the undisputed facts, one party is clearly entitled to judgment

That brings us back to the summary judgment entered in this case:

Owing to the nature of Firstenberg's claims in this case, both Defendants and Firstenberg obtained experts on the issue of the cause of [his] symptoms. Firstenberg sought to prove that his EMS symptoms were caused by Monribot's use of electronic devices by relying on the expert testimony of Dr. Erica Elliott, M.D., Firstenberg's treating physician, and Dr. Raymond Singer, Ph.D, a neurotoxicologist. Defendants sought to prove, through the testimony of psychologist, Dr. Herman Staudenmayer, Ph.D, that Mr. Firstenberg's EMS symptoms were psychological, caused by an undifferentiated somatoform disorder.

Each party filed motions seeking to exclude the other's expert on the ground that the proffered expert testimony was inadmissible pursuant to the standards by which the admissibility of scientific expert testimony is measured. Defendants filed an amended version of their motion to exclude the testimony of Drs. Elliott and Singer, and relying on their memorandum in support thereof, [they] simultaneously filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that, because Firstenberg's proffered experts as to causation were not qualified to provide expert scientific testimony, Firstenberg could not prove causation.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

As noted above, the County District Court Judge who had the case granted summary judgment for Monribot and Leith based on

Firstenberg's failure to demonstrate that admissible scientific evidence supported his theory of general causation, that is, that exposure to electromagnetic fields causes, or is capable of causing, the injuries that Firstenberg complains of, namely, adverse health affects from EMS. 

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  The issue on appeal was whether the District Court Judge erred in granting summary judgment, i.e., whether she improperly found that Firstenberg could not prove causation.  Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court judge held an

evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in Firstenberg's and Defendants' respective motions to exclude expert witnesses and on Defendants' amended motion for summary judgment. All three proposed experts, Drs. Staudenmayer, Elliott, and Singer, testified at the evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the parties filed written arguments.

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  After the hearing,

 [h]aving heard the testimony and considered the parties' written arguments, the district court concluded that the testimony of Drs. Elliott and Singer on the issue of general causation was inadmissible under the standard set forth in State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192 (New Mexico Supreme Court 1993), for evaluating the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. See State v. Alberico, supra (relying on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to enumerate some of the factors that courts should consider in assessing the admissibility of expert scientific testimony under [New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11–702).

Firstenberg's failure to demonstrate that admissible scientific evidence supported his theory of general causation led the court to grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor on the ground that, in the absence of admissible evidence of general causation, Firstenberg could not prevail in his claims of nuisance and prima facie tort. . . .

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

In his appeal, Firstenberg argued that the District Court Judge erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants.  Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  The Court of Appeals began its analysis of his argument by noting that it reviews a court’s

decision to admit or exclude scientific expert testimony under Rule 11–702 for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Alberico, supra. The abuse of discretion standard allows the reviewing court to reverse a district court's discretionary decision when the decision was `obviously erroneous, arbitrary, or unwarranted’ or where it was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. See State v. Alberico, supra.  The party seeking to admit expert testimony bears the burden of showing that the expert is qualified, that the expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact, and that the expert will `testify only as to scientific, technical[,] or other specialized knowledge with a reliable basis.’ Rule 11–702; State v. Anderson, 118 N.M. 284, 881 P.2d 29 (New Mexico Supreme Court 1994); Parkhill v. Alderman–Cave Milling & Grain Co. of N.M., 149 N.M. 140, 245 P.3d 585 (New Mexico Supreme Court).

Firstenberg v. Monribot, supra.  

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that a District Court Judge should consider these factors in deciding “whether scientific evidence has a reliable basis”:

(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known potential rate of error in using a particular scientific technique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; . . . (4) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted in the particular scientific field[;] . . . [ (5) ] whether the scientific technique is based upon well-recognized scientific principle[;] and [ (6) ] whether it is capable of supporting opinions based upon reasonable probability rather than conjecture.

State v. Anderson, supra.

The court then applied these standards to this case, noting that it was Firstenberg’s

burden in the district court, to show that his experts, including his treating physician, Dr. Elliott, were qualified to present scientific expert testimony as to the cause of his EMS symptoms. See Parkhill v. Alderman–Cave Milling & Grain Co. of N.M., supra (a treating physician must be qualified pursuant to the [above] factors in order to present scientific expert testimony as to the external causation of the patient's symptoms. . . .

The district court, having reviewed the parties' briefs, authorities, exhibits, reports, expert affidavits, and testimony, concluded that Firstenberg did not meet that burden. Having reviewed the testimony of Drs. Elliott and Singer, we conclude that the record fully supports the district court's conclusion that they were not qualified to present expert scientific testimony on the issue of general causation. Firstenberg's vague and generalized arguments to the contrary provide no basis for reversal. . . .

State v. Anderson, supra.

The Court of Appeals also explained that Firstenberg’s

repeated references to the ninety-three studies upon which his experts relied in forming their conclusions and his argument that the district court erred by failing to familiarize itself with those studies demonstrate a misunderstanding of the law. The studies and articles, standing alone, do not constitute admissible evidence; rather, they constitute inadmissible hearsay. See  [New Mexico Rule of Evidence 801(A), (C)(2); [New Mexico Rule of Evidence] 802 (providing that a written statement that is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay). Therefore, the district court was under no obligation to independently evaluate the articles and studies upon which Mr. Firstenberg's experts relied in reaching their conclusions. . . .

State v. Anderson, supra.

Finally, the Court of Appeals explained that “to the extent” Firstenberg

wished to rely upon the contents of the articles and studies to demonstrate general causation, it was incumbent upon him to establish, via his experts, that the articles constituted reliable scientific authority. See Baerwald v. Flores, 122 N.M. 679, 930 P.2d 816 (New Mexico Supreme Court 1997) (recognizing that an `expert may rely on an article because it is the expert who determines, based on study and experience, whether the article is reliable’). . . .

Had Firstenberg established that his experts relied on the articles and studies in forming their opinions and that these items were reliable scientific authority, the content of the articles and studies may have been admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception.  See New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-803(18)(b) (governing the hearsay exception related to statements in learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets).

Having failed to demonstrate through his experts that the studies and articles upon which they relied were admissible as reliable scientific authority showing causation,  Firstenberg cannot argue that the district court erred by failing to consider them.

State v. Anderson, supra.

The Court of Appeals therefore held that, “[h]aving concluded that Firstenberg's arguments regarding the court's expert witness rulings provide no basis for reversal, we further conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Firstenberg's nuisance and prima facie tort claims.” State v. Anderson, supra.  For these and other reasons, it “affirm[ed] the district court's summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Mr. Firstenberg's claims of prima facie tort and nuisance.”  State v. Anderson, supra.

If you are interested in reading more about this opinion, and this case, check out the news storied you can find here, here and here.

Nudity, Privacy and the Prostitute

After a jury convicted Charles Adams “of capturing a representation that depicts nudity without the knowledge or consent of the person who is depicted nude in violation of Wisconsin Statutes § 942.09(am)1,” he appealed.  State v. Adams, 2015 WL 1034741 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 2005).  

More precisely, Adams was convicted of “videotaping his sexual activity with a prostitute.”  State v. Adams, supra.

The Court of Appeals begins its opinion by explaining how, and why, Adams came to be charged with this offense:

Adams relies on the facts set forth in the amended criminal complaint. Police executed a search warrant of Adams's truck and found numerous electronic video recordings of Adams engaging in sexual activity with various women. In the video that is the subject of Adams's conviction, police recognized the location as a hotel at which Adams had stayed between October 26, 2010, and November 25, 2010.

Police had a tip regarding the identity of the woman in the video, and when police met with her she identified Adams as a man who had hired her for sexual activity in November 2010 at that same hotel. The video shows the woman nude and involved in sexual activity with Adams.

It appears that the activity was captured via a laptop computer that was on a desk or dresser. The woman did not consent to the recording.

State v. Adams, supra.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Adams’ arguments on appeal by noting that

Wisconsin Statutes§ 942.09(2)(am)1 prohibits anyone from (1) video recording a person in the nude, (2) without that person's knowledge or consent, (3) in circumstances where the nude person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (4) when `the defendant knew or had reason to know that the nude person did not know of and did not consent to the recording.’ State v. Jahnke, 2009 WI App 4 316 Wis.2d 324, 762 N.W.2d 696 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 2008). Application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law we review without deference to the circuit court. State v. Jahnke, supra.  

Additionally, statutory interpretation presents a question of law we review de novo. See State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶ 18, 294 Wis.2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 2006).

State v. Adams, supra.

The first argument Adams made in his appeal was that “the woman did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while nude in the hotel room with him because she was a prostitute and Adams was paying her to engage in sexual activity.” State v. Adams, supra. Unfortunately for him the Court of Appeals did not buy his argument:

Permission to be viewed in the nude does not mean permission to be recorded in the nude, see State v. Jahnke, supra, and permission to engage in sexual acts with someone does not mean permission to record that person in the nude.

`By placing limits on the ability of others to record, the statute protects a person's interest in limiting, as to time, place, and persons, the viewing of his or her nude body. It follows that the pertinent privacy element question is whether the person depicted nude had a reasonable expectation, under the circumstances, that he or she would not be recorded in the nude.

State v. Jahnke, supra. That Adams and the woman were engaged in the crime of prostitution does not mean that the woman relinquished her reasonable expectation of privacy under Wisconsin Statutes § 942.09(2)(am)1.

State v. Adams, supra.  In a footnote, the Court of Appeals pointed out that

[a]lthough a person who engages in commercial sexual activity has no constitutional right to privacy to shield their activities from government intrusion, City of Madison v. Schultz, 98 Wis.2d 188, 295 N.W.2d 798 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 1980), the statute does not incorporate the constitutional right to privacy, but rather a right to privacy as commonly understood by its terms, State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, 54, 294 Wis.2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 2006).  

We need not balance the government's interest in law enforcement against a person's right to privacy because it is not the government that is invading that right. State v. Nelson, supra.

State v. Adams, supra. 

In other words, the Court of Appeals is explaining that there is a difference between the 4^th Amendment right to privacy, which protects citizens’ privacy from unjustified intrusions by law enforcement or other government agents, and the common law or statutory right to privacy that arises under state statutes and that protects citizens’ privacy from invasion by other citizens.  For more on that, check out Wikipedia’s entry on privacy law in the United States.

Next, Adams argued that

he was justified in videotaping the woman without her consent because she was a prostitute and might, during their illegal sexual encounter, overdose on illegal drugs or accuse him of battery. Adams contends he needed the videotape to defend himself against a potential false accusation of abuse or an appearance of involvement in a drug overdose.

In effect, Adams argues that there is an exception or defense to the reasonable expectation of privacy prong of the statute when an offender has a legitimate reason to videotape a nude person without that person's consent. See State v. Nelson, supra.

State v. Adams, supra. 

The Court of Appeals goes on to explain that

Adams's reliance on the `legitimate reason’ language in State v. Nelson, supra, is misplaced. The Nelson court said that the evident purpose of Wisconsin Statutes § 942.09 is to penalize those who invade the privacy of persons who are depicted nude `when the offenders have no legitimate reason for doing so.’ State v. Nelson, supra.

But the court quickly added that `the legislature has already made the judgment that, in the circumstances described in the statute, the offender does not have a legitimate interest in capturing representations depicting nudity.’ State v. Nelson, supra.

Nelson did not add a `legitimate reason’ exception to the reasonable expectation of privacy prong of the statute. And Adams's reasons do not provide factual or legal support for any such defense. It is no defense to prosecution for a crime that the victim was also guilty of a crime. Wisconsin Statutes § 939.14.

Recording someone nude in violation of § 942.09(2)(am)1 in order to protect against possible adverse scenarios is not a legitimate reason or defense. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Adams made the recording for the purpose of self-protection.

State v. Adams, supra. 

Finally, the Court of Appeals “briefly address[ed]” Adams’

half-hearted argument that the woman consented or relinquished her expectation of privacy because the laptop computer that was recording her was in view. Adams raises this issue for the first time in his reply brief. See Schaeffer v. State Pers. Commission, 150 Wis.2d 132, 441 N.W.2d 292 (Wisconsin Court of Appeals 1989) (argument raised for first time in reply brief generally not considered).

Furthermore, the jury found that there was no knowledge or consent, and Adams does not challenge that finding or raise any sufficiency of the evidence argument.

State v. Adams, supra. 

You can, if you are interested, read more about the case, and see a photo of Adams, in the news story you can find here. You can also read more about the case in the story you can find here.

GoDaddy, the Teamsters Union and Defamation

This post examines a recent opinion from the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit:  Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 2015 WL 1214476 (2015). The court began its opinion by explaining that

[p]laintiffs Peter and Barbara Ricci (“the Riccis”) bring this action pro se against GoDaddy.com, LLC (`GoDaddy’) and the Teamsters Union Local 456 (the `Union’ or the `Teamsters’), alleging that false statements about the Riccis in a Union newsletter were republished on a website hosted on GoDaddy's servers.

As relevant here, plaintiffs sue GoDaddy for defamation; they sue the Teamsters for retaliation in violation of sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (`NLRA’), 29 U.S. Code §§157, 158(b)(1)(A), and for breach of the NLRA's implied duty of fair representation. 

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

Next, the court notes that this

case arises out of a dispute between Peter Ricci and the Teamsters Union 456. According to the Complaint, Appellant Peter Ricci has been a Teamster Union member since 1983. . . . In September 2002, Mr. Ricci attended a meeting in which he was asked to speak in support of a fellow union member, Eddie Doyle. . . . Mr. Ricci declined to do so. . . . Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ricci began having employment problems, which he believes was retaliation by Mr. Doyle for not speaking on his behalf at the September 2002 independent review board meeting. . . .

Almost ten years later, on August 22 and 23, 2012, unidentified individuals allegedly associated with the Teamsters Union Local 456, not GoDaddy, distributed newsletters to unidentified union members, which [the Riccis] contend contained defamatory statements about them and their family members. . . .  

No specific details regarding the statements have been alleged. The newsletters were subsequently posted by an unidentified third party on two websites registered by someone with no affiliation to GoDaddy. . . . GoDaddy did not author or post the allegedly defamatory material. . . .

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

The brief filed on appeal on behalf of Teamsters Union Local 456 adds the following:

Ricci was a truck driver member of . . . Teamsters Local 456 from September 7, 1983 to December 6, 2012. . . . Teamsters Local 456 is a `labor organization’ . . representing truck drivers in Westchester County, New York and providing, through Local 456 Taft-Hartley employee benefit funds, various pension, welfare and other benefits to covered workers, retirees, and their dependents via collective bargaining agreements with employers and trust and plan documents.

[The Riccis] commenced this action July 8, 2013. . . . The Complaint, inter alia, contained indeterminate causes of action . . . seeking 5 million in damages from the Teamsters Local 456 for purported retaliation and defamation arising from Peter Ricci's alleged decision to refrain from assisting Local 456 by speaking at a membership meeting in 2002. . . .

Brief and Appendix for Teamsters Union Local 456, Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 2014 WL 6721023.

The Riccis filed their lawsuit in the Supreme Court of New York but Teamsters Union Local 456 moved it into a U.S. District Court, pursuant to a process allowed by federal law. Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra.  The Teamsters Union and GoDaddy then moved to dismiss the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

The U.S. District Court Judge who had the case granted both motions to dismiss, which effectively ended the Riccis’ lawsuit. Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra.  They appealed the dismissals, and in this opinion the Court of Appeals is reviewing the correctness of the U.S. District Court Judge’s rulings.  Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals explains that the Riccis

do not allege that GoDaddy had any role in creating the allegedly defamatory newsletters. To the contrary, their complaint repeatedly alleges that the newsletters were drafted and distributed by others. See Complaint ¶ 9 (alleging that `Teamsters Union Local 456’ is `the creator of the newsletters’); see also id. ¶ 10 (alleging that GoDaddy (eventually) `decided to reveal the . . . identity of the publisher and creators of the newsletters’).

As to GoDaddy, the only allegations in the complaint are: (1) GoDaddy hosted a website that published the allegedly defamatory newsletters, see id. ¶¶ 9–10; (2) GoDaddy `refused to remove the newsletter’ from its servers, id. ¶ 9; and (3) GoDaddy `completely refused to investigate Barbara Ricci's complaints,’ id. None of those allegations are disputed by the parties.

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

The court began its analysis with the dismissal of the Riccis’ claim against GoDaddy, explaining that

[a]ccepting as true all of the allegations in the complaint, GoDaddy is immune from the Riccis' defamation claims under a provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996: `[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.’ 47 U.S. Code § 230(c)(1). Preemption is express: ‘No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.’ 47U.S. Code § 230(e)(3).

The Riccis seek to hold GoDaddy liable as a `publisher or speaker’ of allegedly defamatory statements authored by someone else-that is, “another information content provider.” 47 U.S. Code § 230(c)(1). So if GoDaddy is being sued in its capacity as a provider of an `interactive computer service,'  d., it is immune from defamation liability under the Communications Decency Act.

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that the statute

defines `interactive computer service’ expansively, to include `any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.’ 47 U.S. Code§ 230(f)(2). This wording has been construed broadly to effectuate the statute's speech-protective purpose:

`Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. . . . Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum. . . .

None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability. . . .Congress made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages. Zeran v.

America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 1997). In short, a plaintiff defamed on the internet can sue the original speaker, but typically `cannot sue the messenger. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2008).

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

The Court of Appeals then noted that

[w]e have never construed the immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act, but other courts have applied the statute to a growing list of internet-based service providers. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 2014); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 2008); Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., supra.

That includes GoDaddy. See Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc.,  2008 WL 2705377 (U.S. DistrictCourt for the District of Arizona 2008) (`GoDaddy, as a web host, qualifies as an interactive computer service provider under the CDA.’).

We join this consensus. The Riccis allege only that GoDaddy `refused to remove’ from its web servers an allegedly defamatory newsletter that was authored by another. These allegations do not withstand the Communications Decency Act, which shields GoDaddy from publisher liability (with respect to web content provided by others) in its capacity as a provider of an interactive computer service.

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra.  The court therefore found that the District Court Judge did not err in dismissing the Riccis’ claims. Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra. 

It also affirmed the court’s dismissal of the Riccis’ “labor law claims against the Teamsters Union” because it found they were

all barred by the six-month statute of limitations in the NLRA. See 29 U.S. Code § 160(b); see also DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). The last event referenced in the complaint took place on December 6, 2012, when Peter Ricci left the Teamsters Union. Even assuming the statute did not begin to run until then, the complaint, which was filed on July 8, 2013, was about a month late.

Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, supra.