Kelly Randall Meadows “entered a guilty plea to driving
while being an habitual motor vehicle offender pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement” but also “reserved a certified question of law for appeal.” State
v. Meadows, 2015 WL 554745 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 2015). The issue Meadows preserved for appeal was
“`whether reasonable suspicion or probable caused existed to stop and seize [Meadows’]
vehicle based on incorrect information contained in the police database?’” State v. Meadows, supra.
The court began its opinion by explaining how the
prosecution arose:
On March 23, 2011, Metro Nashville
Police Officer Coleman Womack was on routine [Meadows]. Womack testified that
in the area of Dickerson Road upon which he was traveling, many older model
vehicles displayed registration tags that were actually legally assigned to a
different vehicle. He explained that when an older vehicle's tags expired, the
owner sometimes used the tag of another vehicle rather than renew the expired
tags. For that reason, Womack often used the laptop computer in his patrol car
to access a database to see if a particular registration tag was assigned to
the vehicle upon which it was displayed. [Meadows’] 1985 Mitsubishi pickup
truck was over twenty-five years old, so Womack `ran’ the number, 990 TGD,
displayed on the truck through the database. Womack testified that the tag
number,
`came back to some type of Pontiac or
something, which is once again, it's common when the tag runs out, its expired,
if your car won't pass [emissions testing], take the tag off another vehicle
and put it onto [sic] yours.’
As a result of the information received
from the database, Officer Womack stopped [Meadows’] vehicle. Womack approached
the pickup truck and told [Meadows] he
was stopped because the tag number was not assigned to the truck. Womack asked [Meadows]
for his driver's license. [Meadows] responded that he did not have a driver's
license. [He] provided a non-license identification card and stated that the
tag did belong to the truck. [Meadows] produced a vehicle registration that
showed the registration tag on the truck had in fact been properly assigned to
the 1985 Mitsubishi pickup truck driven by [Meadows].
State v. Meadows, supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[v]aguely leaving open the possibility
that the registration paper produced by [Meadows] possibly could
have been a `false’ registration, Womack reluctantly conceded that the database
provided him with incorrect information. Specifically, Womack testified,
`I'm assuming it gave me erroneous
information, yes. I don't know that for a hundred percent, no. . . . I don't
think it was [a registration violation], no. I never said -- it's very unusual
for that to happen I guess is what I'm saying, I don't -- that doesn't happen
once in a, you know, ten years that a tag comes back to something else and somebody
hand me the registration showing it's not, so it's very unusual.’
State v. Meadows, supra (emphasis in the original). The court went on to note that “[i]n fact, the
exact same thing happened to Womack in March 2003, as set forth in an opinion
heavily relied upon by the State in its argument in the case”. State
v. Meadows, supra.
The Court of Criminal Appeals goes on to explain that
Womack testified that he ultimately
arrested [Meadows] for the Class E felony offense of driving while his driving
privileges were revoked after being declared an habitual motor vehicle
offender. [Meadows] filed a motion to suppress all evidence, asserting Womack
made an unconstitutional stop of [him] without a warrant and without a lawful
exception to the warrant requirement. The only person who testified at the
suppression hearing was Womack, and the summary of the facts in this opinion
comes from that hearing.
State v. Meadows, supra.
At the hearing, Meadows argued that
since the only reason Womack initiated
the stop was proven to be incorrect information, then there was not a
reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, [Meadows] had
a valid registration tag displayed on his vehicle at the time of the stop.
Therefore, [he] argues, a valid warrantless stop could never be based upon his
vehicle unlawfully displaying an unauthorized vehicle registration tag.
State v. Meadows, supra.
The prosecution countered with the argument that
the registration tag did belong to the
1985 Mitsubishi pickup truck did not mean the warrantless stop was
unconstitutional. The State asserted that at the time of the stop the
information about [Meadows’] registration tag, even if erroneous, provided
specific and articulable facts which gave Womack a reasonable suspicion that a
crime was being committed.
State v. Meadows, supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that the trial judge
took the matter under advisement and
subsequently filed a memorandum opinion denying the motion to suppress. In its
findings of fact the trial court stated that Womack received information from
the police database that the registration tag attached to the 1985 Mitsubishi
pickup truck was assigned to a different vehicle. The trial court found that,
in fact, the 1985 Mitsubishi pickup truck driven by Defendant did have the
proper registration tag attached to it. The trial court determined that `the
State produced evidence to establish the legal justification for the officer to
make the stop, however, that information proved to be erroneous.’
The trial court relied upon the case
of David M. Whitman, Jr., 2005 WL 3299827 (Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals 2006), in which Womack on a previous
occasion `stopped a vehicle for a registration violation after a computer check
of state and local databases erroneously showed the tags belonged to a
different vehicle.’ Based upon the holding of a panel of this Court in David
M. Whitman, Jr., that the erroneous information did not negate
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, the trial court denied [Meadows’] motion
to suppress.
State v. Meadows, supra.
The court then began its analysis of Meadows’ argument on
appeal: “`Whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop and
seize [Meadows’] vehicle based on incorrect information contained in the police
database?’” State v. Meadows, supra.
The appellate court explained that it
is well settled that both the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of theTennessee Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures by agents of the State. While the basic constitutional rule is that
any warrantless search or warrantless seizure is unreasonable, there are a few
specific exceptions to the rule. . . . There are two levels of
police-citizen interaction which constitute a `seizure’ for the purpose of
constitutional analysis. . . .
These categories are the (1) full-scale
arrest, which must be justified by probable cause that the seized person has
committed an offense, and (2) a brief investigatory detention, which must be
supported by reasonable suspicion that an offense has been or is being
committed, and the reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific and
articulable facts. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891 (Tennessee Supreme Court 2008). As noted above,
the `level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is
lower than that required for probable cause.’ State v. Day, supra. However, the officer's reasonable suspicion,
in order to justify a warrantless stop, must be supported by `specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
State v. Meadows, supra.
The appellate court went on to note that in State v. Day, supra, the Tennessee
Supreme Court pointed out that, under U.S. Supreme Court precedents, “a court
must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a
police officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable
facts”. State v. Day, supra (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (U.S. Supreme Court 1990)). And in State
v. Day, supra, the Tennessee Supreme Court listed the “circumstances” cited
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama
v. White:
(1) the objective observations of the
police officer;
(2) information obtained from other
officers or agencies;
(3) information obtained from citizens;
and
(4) the pattern of operation of certain
offenders.
State v. Day, supra.
The appellate court then took up the “totality of the
circumstances” in the
case under review, we first observe
that no information was obtained from any citizens. All of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing came from the testimony of Womack. Womack
testified that in the geographical area of the stop, many older vehicles
displayed registration tags which were legally assigned to a different vehicle.
The trial court did not mention this testimony in its findings of fact.
However, the testimony was not challenged during cross-examination by [Meadows],
and the findings of fact by the trial court strongly imply that the trial court
accredited all of Womack's testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that the pattern
of operation of certain offenders in the area that [Meadows] was driving was as
testified to by Officer Womack.
State v. Meadows,
supra.
The court goes on to note that Womack
observed that [Meadows] was operating
an older vehicle in the area where it was not uncommon for older vehicles to
display non-authorized registration tags. Womack obtained information from the
police database via the laptop computer in his patrol car that the registration
tag affixed to [Meadows’] 1985 Mitsubishi pickup truck was supposed to be
displayed on a different vehicle.
As conceded by the State and
specifically found by the trial court, the information relied upon by Womack
was incorrect. Under White, `reasonable suspicion’ depends
upon the `degree of reliability’ of information possessed by the officer. Alabama v. White, supra. An obvious question as to the reliability of
registration tag information in the police database is raised because a blatant
mistake in crucial information has happened twice to the officer in this case.
However, the question is merely academic.
Womack's credibility as to his
testimony that the database sent him incorrect information was not attacked at
the suppression hearing. For instance, there was no independent proof presented
that what was contained on the database was inconsistent with Womack's
testimony. Also, there was no evidence of widespread errors in the database
system that would tend to show the database information was not reliable. While
the trial court found in its memorandum opinion that [Meadows’] case was
`eerily similar’ in facts to an earlier case where Womack was given the
identical type of incorrect information, the trial court nevertheless found
that Womack was given the incorrect information from the database.
State v. Meadows,
supra.
It therefore held that the
`degree of reliability’ of the source
of the information possessed by Womack, under the specific facts contained in
the record in this case, was sufficient to support reasonable suspicion, based
upon specific and articulable facts, that Defendant was committing a violation
of the law regarding vehicle registration tags and that the stop was therefore
not in violation of the constitutions of the United States or the State of
Tennessee.
State v. Meadows,
supra.
The court based that conclusion on the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Tennessee’s decision in State
v. Rhymer, 915 S.W.2d 465 (Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals 1995), in which
a police officer noticed that the
license plate on a grey Volkswagen had marks on it indicating to the officer
that the plates might have belonged to another vehicle. . . . After
requesting a registration check from dispatch, the officer was advised that the
license plate was registered to a brown Chevrolet. . . . Based upon
this information, the officer stopped the Volkswagen and subsequently arrested
the defendant for DUI. . . . It was later determined that the
information supplied by the police database was erroneous; the license plate
was properly transferred from the Chevrolet to the Volkswagen. . . .
After analyzing both federal and
Tennessee cases, the Rhymer court held that the police
officer's reliance on the erroneous information received via computer check
coupled by the physical appearance of the license plate provided the officer
with reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. . . . As the Rhymer court
explained, `[t]o hold that police officers could not rely on [information from
a police computer database] in forming reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop would have the effect of unnecessarily tying the hands of
officers in countless situations.’
State v. Meadows,
supra (quoting State v. David M.
Whitman, Jr., State v. David M. Whitman, Jr., 2005 WL 3299817 (Court
of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 2005)).
The Meadows court
therefore found that its analysis in State
v. Rhymer, supra, also applied here:
Looking at the facts of this case, it
is our view that the information from the computer check, albeit erroneous,
provided reasonable suspicion that [Meadows] was in violation of a traffic law.
It is undisputed that the police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle based
upon information he received as a result of a computer check, which showed that
[his] license plate registration belonged to another vehicle.
This information came from a source
independent of the officer's own knowledge and perceptions. Once the officer
learned of the license plate discrepancy, he had an objective basis for
suspecting that [Meadows] was violating a traffic law; and therefore, he was
justified in stopping the vehicle and requesting a driver's license and vehicle
registration from [Meadows]. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied [Meadows’]
motion to suppress, and the issue is without merit.
State v. Meadows,
supra.
This opinion is essentially predicated on the principle,
which the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted, that an officer’s “reasonable
mistake of law” can provide the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a search
under the 4th Amendment. State v. Meadows, supra. You can read
more about that here and here.
No comments:
Post a Comment