After Patrice Antoinette Bernard was convicted of “accessing a government computer without authority, accessing computers, and identity theft” in violation of North Carolina law, she appealed. State v. Bernard, 762 S.E.2d 514 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2014). This opinion’s description of the facts from which this prosecution arose is a little murky, but it seems that until July 11, 2008, Bernard was an employee of the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University (which the opinion refers to as “A&T”), “but her employment was terminated.” State v. Bernard, supra.
The Court of Appeals explains that “on or about 8 September 2009”, Detective M. Tillery, of the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University Department of Police & Public Safety applied for a search warrant for Road Runner Hold Company LLC” based on an affidavit in which he outlined these facts:
On September 3, 2009 I, Detective M. Tillery, responded to 1020 Wendover Avenue, Greensboro, NC, which is property of NC A & T State University. The complainant, Mrs. Linda McAbee, Vice Chancellor of Human Resources at NC A & T SU, stated that someone accessed her NC A & T SU email account without her permission. The complainant stated that the unknown and unauthorized user(s) created an email which intended to deceive Administrators of the university.
The complaint stated that the information contained in the email addressed an issue which NC A & T State University and [defendant] Mrs. Patrice A. Bernard (Petitioner) is/was in litigation in Guilford County, North Carolina. The complainant also stated that the unauthorized email was sent on August 30, 2009 at 18:49 EST.
This affiant discovered through court documents that the petitioner filed a grievance in April 2008 in response to a termination letter dated April 22, 2008. According to court documents, the petitioner [defendant] received a Reduction In Force (RIF) letter indicating that her position would be eliminated for funding reasons. The petitioner filed an appeal.
University Administrators have been communicating with Mrs. McAbee to resolve this issue through legal means. Mrs. McAbee stated that someone accessed her email, constructed a bogus communication, and emailed the document to University Administrators in an effort to rehire or compensate the former employee, [defendant] Mrs. Patrice Bernard.
Mrs. Lisa Lewis–Warren, Department of Information Technology with NC A &T SU stated that her department conducted forensic analysis on Mrs. McAbee's desktop computer and the campus Network System. Mrs. Warren stated that her department discovered that the unauthorized communication was not sent from Mrs. McAbee's desktop computer.
Mrs. Warren stated that the NC A & T SU IT Department analysis indicated that an unauthorized person accessed Mrs. McAbee's university email account and other current employees email accounts of NC A & T SU, several times for several minutes from IP Address 126.96.36.199, between August 28, 2009 through September 2, 2009.
This affiant knows that many individuals and businesses obtain their access to the Internet through businesses known as Internet Service Providers (`ISPs’). ISPs provide their customers with access to the Internet using telephone or other telecommunications lines; provide Internet email accounts that allow users to communicate with other Internet users by sending and receiving electronic messages through the ISPs' servers; remotely store electronic files on their customers' behalf; and may provide other services unique to each particular ISP.
Through this affiant['s] training and experience, when an ISP or other providers uses dynamic IP addresses, the ISP randomly assigns one of the available IP addresses in the range of IP addresses controlled by the ISP each time a user dials into the ISP to connect to the Internet. The customer's computer retains that IP address for the duration of that session, and the IP address cannot be assigned to another user during that period. . . .
Through this affiant['s] training and experience, a static IP address is an IP address that is assigned permanently to a given user or computer on a network. A customer of an ISP that assigns static IP addresses will have the same IP address every time.
Through this affiant['s] training and experience, ISPs maintain records pertaining to the individuals or companies that have [a] subscriber account with it. Those records could include identifying and billing information account access information in the form of log files, email transaction information, posting information, account application information, and other information both in computer data format and in written record format. ISPs reserve and/or maintain computer disk storage space on their computer system for the use of the Internet service subscriber for both temporary and long-term storage of electronic communications with other parties and other types of electronic data and files. E-mail that has not been open is stored temporarily by an ISP incident to the transmission of the e-mail to the intended recipient, usually within an area known as the home directory.
Through my training and experience this affiant knows that when an individual uses a computer to obtain unauthorized access to a victim computer over the internet, the individual's computer will generally serve both as an instrumentality for committing the crime, and also as a storage device for evidence of the crime. The computer is an instrumentality of the crime because it is used as a means of committing the criminal offense.
State v. Bernard, supra.
“Based on these facts”, Tillery sought “a search warrant to seize anything within the possession of Road Runner regarding IP Address 188.8.131.52 between the dates of August 28, 2009 and September 2, 2009.” State v. Bernard, supra. The magistrate issued the search warrant and “[o]n or about 15 September 2009,” Tillery applied for an amended search warrant based on the same facts and requesting the same information to be seized; again, the magistrate issued the search warrant. State v. Bernard, supra. “On or about 15 September 2009,” Time Warner Cable's Subpoena Compliance Team, wrote Tillery and informed him that the IP Address at issue was assigned to Bernard. State v. Bernard, supra.
“On or about 16 September 2009,” Tillery again applied for a search warrant, but this
`time for [Bernard’s] home, vehicle, and her person. [His] factual basis for the warrant was the same as the Road Runner search warrants except he added that `[t]he ISP, Road Runner Hold Co LLC RRMA, identified IP Address 184.108.40.206 connection as being assigned to [defendant] Patrice Bernard located at 2722 Chadbury Drive Greensboro, North Carolina. This is the petitioner who is/was in litigation against NC A & T State University in Guilford County, North Carolina.’
The magistrate issued the search warrant. On or about 23 September 2009, Tillery again applied for a search warrant based on the same facts as in the other search warrants, this time specifically requesting to search a computer seized during the search of [Bernard’s] home. The magistrate issued the search warrant. All of the search warrants except for the one regarding [her] computer were returned by Tillery.
State v. Bernard, supra. (For the process of returning a warrant, see North Carolina General Statutes § 15A-257.)
“On 20 September 2010, [Bernard] was indicted for accessing a government computer without authorization, felony accessing computers, and identity theft.” State v. Bernard, supra. On February 22, 2013, Bernard “filed a motion to suppress `evidence obtained as a result of any supposed forensic examination’ of her computer because the information on her seized computer was manipulated.” State v. Bernard, supra. The trial judge issued a ruling on the motion in which he found, among other things,
`9. That Detective Tillery processed all seized property, including all computers and the above described paper documents, at North Carolina A &T State University Campus Police Headquarters;
20. That after processing all property seized from the defendant's home Detective Tillery stored all seized property in the North Carolina A & T State University Campus Police Evidence Management System;
21. That Detective Tillery checked out the computer hardware seized from the defendant's home from North Carolina A & T State University Campus Police Evidence Management System and delivered same to Detective Flinchum for purposes of a computer forensic examination on September 23rd, 2009;
22. That Detective Flinchum performed his forensic examination and returned the computer hardware to Detective Tillery, who again entered the computer hardware into the North Carolina A & T State University Campus Police Evidence Management System;
23. That Detective Flinchum found no evidence that the computer hardware seized from defendant's home had been accessed, powered-on or manipulated in any way from the time the hardware was seized until Detective Flinchum began his forensic examination on September 23rd, 2009[.]’
State v. Bernard, supra. The trial judge therefore denied Bernard’s motion to suppress. State v. Bernard, supra.
In reviewing the denial of her motion to suppress the Court of Appeals addressed, among other things, Bernard’s argument that “Detective Tillery was biased against her.” State v. Bernard, supra. It disposed of that issue relatively quickly, noting that
[w]e are not aware of any case law nor has [Bernard] directed us toward any indicating that the investigating officer's negative view or bias against a defendant may invalidate the application for the search warrant.
Regardless of the investigating officer's attitude, the question remains whether the facts as presented to the magistrate establish `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place’. State v. Hunt, 150 N.C. App. 101, 562 S.E.2d 597 (North Carolina Court of Appeals 2002). There was information to support the issuance of the search warrant, including a letter from Time Warner Cable to Detective Tillery which identified defendant's IP address as the source of the fraudulent emails.
State v. Bernard, supra.
The court also addressed Bernard’s argument that the Campus Police did not have he “jurisdiction . . . to carry out a search of a private residence which was not on the campus of A & T.” State v. Bernard, supra. The Court of Appeals noted that his was “a more difficult question”, as Bernard argued that the “A & T campus police acted beyond their statutory authority by executing a search warrant at her home.” State v. Bernard, supra.
It began its analysis of the issue by explaining that
`[a]search warrant may be executed by any law-enforcement officer acting within his territorial jurisdiction, whose investigative authority encompasses the crime or crimes involved.’ North Carolina General Statutes § 15A–247. `The territorial jurisdiction of a campus police officer shall include all property owned or leased to the institution employing the campus police officer and that portion of any public road or highway passing through such property or immediately adjoining it, wherever located.’ North Carolina General Statutes § 116–40.5(a).
Furthermore, North Carolina General Statutes §§ 74E–6, 74G–6, and 160A-288 provide campus police with the ability to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies and enter into joint agreements and mutual aid agreements that extend the campus police agencies jurisdiction. . . . In 1998, A & T and the City of Greensboro entered into an `AGREEMENT FOR POLICE COOPERATION AND MUTUAL AID’ (`Agreement’) which provided that:
`The Campus Law Enforcement Agency will have primary authority for investigation as described in Paragraph 2.2, although such investigation may require that officers of the Campus Law Enforcement Agency make inquiries and arrests beyond the perimeter of Campus in the following cases:
An offense committed on Campus for which [the] alleged perpetrator or suspect is no longer present on campus, whether or not officers are in active and immediate pursuit[.]’
State v. Bernard, supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore found that
the A & T campus police had authority to investigate `[a]n offense committed on Campus’ even if the suspect `is no longer present on’ the campus. Thus, the question is whether defendant's offense was `committed on Campus[.]’
[She] was charged with accessing computers under North Carolina General Statutes § 14–454(b) and accessing a government computer without authority under North Carolina General Statutes § 14–454.1(b); both of these crimes are in Article 60 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See North Carolina General Statutes §§ 14–454; –454.1 (2009). North Carolina General Statutes § 14–453.2 provides, `Any offense under this Article  committed by the use of electronic communication may be deemed to have been committed where the electronic communication was originally sent or where it was originally received in this State. “Electronic communication” means the same as the term is defined in North Carolina General Statutes § 14–196.3(a).’ North Carolina General Statutes § 14–453.2 (2009).
North Carolina General Statutes § 14–196.3(a) defines `[e]lectronic communication’ as `[a]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.’ North Carolina General Statutes § 14–196.3(a).
Under this broad definition of electronic communication, . . . defendant `sent’ an `electronic communication’ when she accessed the email account of an employee of A & T and sent a false email. North Carolina General Statutes § 14–453.2. . . .
Under North Carolina General Statutes § 14–453.2, defendant’s `offense[s were] committed on Campus’ since she sent the email through the A & T computer servers on the campus and pursuant to the Agreement, A & T campus police had jurisdiction to execute a search warrant at her private home. This argument is overruled.
State v. Bernard, supra. For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed Bernard’s convictions. State v. Bernard, supra.