After being charged with detaining a person while impersonating
a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 913, producing a fraudulent
identification document in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 1028(a)(1) and
possessing a fraudulent identification document in violation of 18 U.S.Code § 1028(a)(6), Eric Marques Devlin–Bell, Jr. moved “to suppress
all evidence taken from the laptop” found in his car on April 12. U.S. v. Bell, 2013 WL 194200 (U.S.District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 2013).
The case began on April 6, 2012, when Cain Township Police Department
Sergeant
Chris Sambuco stopped a dark blue Ford
Crown Victoria driven by Bell for failure to use a turn signal. . . . Bell's
car had tinted windows, three antenna mounts, and two LED suction cup
police-style warning lights adhered to the back window. A female was in the
front passenger seat. Upon approaching the driver side door, Sambuco noticed
Bell was wearing a nylon police belt with pouches and carrying a handgun.
Sambuco also heard a cellular phone in the car scanning the Chester County Police
radio.
Sambuco directed Bell to place both
hands on the steering wheel and asked for his driver's license, vehicleregistration and proof of insurance. Bell produced the registration, proof of
insurance, and a Pennsylvania identification card. Sambuco walked back to his
patrol car to verify the information, and learned Bell's Pennsylvania driver's
license was suspended, but his insurance and registration were in proper order.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
Sambuco went back to the car and “invited” Bell to speak
with him outside the passenger’s hearing.
U.S. v. Bell, supra. They
walked to the rear of Bell’s car, where Sambuco told Bell he was going to issue
him several citations (one of which apparently involved “his car’s window
tint”). U.S. v. Bell, supra. After telling Bell he could not drive the car
because his license was suspended, Sambuco left Bell in the parking lot where
the encounter took place. U.S. v. Bell, supra.
On April 10, 2012, Tredyffrin Township Police Department
Detective Todd Bereda began investigating an encounter involving Michael
Boykins, whose car was disabled, and “a man wearing security gear, police
related regalia, and a badge, and driving a dark blue Ford Crown Victoria
outlined with lights and whip antennas”. U.S.
v. Bell, supra. Boykins later identified the man as Bell. U.S. v.
Bell, supra. Bereda learned about that and also learned about Sambuco's encounter with him. U.S. v. Bell, supra. And he found out Bell’s
driver's license was suspended until 2015.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
On April 12, Bereda met with Sambuco and Chester County
Detective Matthew Gordon to set up a consensual encounter with Bell to discuss
the encounter between Bell and Boykins. U.S.
v. Bell, supra. Among other things,
they “partially filled out” a Waiver of Rights and Consent to Search form to
use during the encounter. It authorized a search of Bell’s Crown Victoria and
the seizure of “any police lights and any police and/or law enforcement style
identifications.” U.S. v. Bell, supra.
Bereda and Sambuco then used a marked Caln Township
Police patrol car to drive to Bell's last known address. U.S. v. Bell, supra. As they drove, “they saw Bell driving the dark
blue Crown Victoria”. U.S. v. Bell, supra. Sambuco turned the
emergency lights on, signaling Bell to stop. U.S. v. Bell, supra. Bell pulled into a parking lot; the stop began
at approximately 6:00 p.m. U.S. v. Bell,
supra.
Sambuco pulled into the lot and parked 10 to 20 feet behind Bell's car. U.S. v. Bell, supra. He got out, approached
the driver's side of Bell's car and asked for his driver's license, vehicle
registration and insurance card. U.S. v.
Bell, supra. Sambuco saw Bell's firearm in a holster on the front passenger
seat. U.S. v. Bell, supra. Bell gave
Sambuco his registration, insurance card and Pennsylvania identification card. U.S. v. Bell, supra.
After Bell gave him his identification and documents,
Sambuco removed the ammunition from Bell's firearm and put it and the ammunition
“in separate locations in the car for safety.” U.S. v. Bell, supra. At Sambuco's request, Bell got out of the car
and walked with Sambuco to the rear of his car. U.S. v. Bell, supra. Sambuco t handed Bell's documents Det. Bereda,
who began talking to Bell. U.S. v. Bell,
supra.
Sambuco then told Bell that while they could issue a
citation for driving with a suspended license, they had decided not to do so;
Bereda gave Bell his documents and told him he was free to leave. U.S. v.
Bell, supra. Bereda started walking back to the patrol car, but stopped and
asked Bell if he would talk about the encounter with Boykins. U.S. v.
Bell, supra. After they had chatted
for about an hour, standing near Bell’s vehicle, Bereda asked Bell if he would
consent to a search of his car, handing Bell the consent to search form the
officers had partially filled out earlier.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
After Bell signed the form, the officers searched his car
and seized these items:
i. One silver security officer's badge
attached to a chain;
iii. One `U.S. Enforcement Officer’ identification
card depicting Bell's photograph; and
iv. One laptop computer.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
Bell was “cooperative and congenial” until they found the laptop.
U.S. v. Bell, supra. The officers
were “suspicious” of the checks because “title” was misspelled and the phone
number on them “was disconnected.” U.S.
v. Bell, supra. When Bereda said he
thought they were counterfeit, Bell said “a copy of one of the checks was on
the computer,” and offered to show them. U.S.
v. Bell, supra. When he turned on
the laptop, the officers “saw the emblem of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations on the screen.” U.S. v.
Bell, supra. Because Gordon thought
Bell might delete what was on the laptop, he did not ask for consent to search it,
“but rather stopped talking to Bell, effectively ending the consent search.”
Det. Gordon then seized the laptop and left. U.S. v. Bell, supra. The other officers left a few minutes
later. U.S. v. Bell, supra.
On April 13, Gordon got a warrant to search the laptop “for
evidence of forgery.” U.S. v. Bell, supra. On June 5, a U.S. Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of the laptop for
evidence of the “federal crimes of impersonating a federal officer, producing
and/or possessing a fraudulent identification document, mail fraud, and wire
fraud.” U.S. v. Bell, supra. The
laptop was searched on July 27, 2012 and the search apparently produced
evidence that led to the federal charges. U.S. v.
Bell, supra.
In moving to suppress, Bell claimed the search of his laptop
violated the 4th Amendment. U.S. v. Bell, supra. He conceded that
the traffic stop did not violate the 4th Amendment because Bereda
and Sambuco knew he was driving without a driver’s license, which allowed them
to “seize” Bell by stopping him to issue a citation for the violation. U.S. v.
Bell, supra. (The 4th Amendment creates a right to be free from
“unreasonable” searches and seizures; a “seizure” of person involves law
enforcement officers’ interfering with a person’s freedom of movement, such as
stopping Bell and detaining him while they checked out the violation.)
The U.S. District Court judge who has the case disagreed,
finding that the seizure of
Bell terminated when, within five
minutes of the initiation of the stop, Bereda returned Bell's insurance card,
registration, and identification; told Bell he was not citing him for driving
with a suspended license; informed Bell he was free to leave; and began walking
back to his patrol car. The subsequent conversation about the April 9 incident between Bell and Bereda
was entirely consensual.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
By consenting to an encounter with police, a person waives,
or gives up, his or her 4th Amendment rights. So, since Bell could have left but did not,
he was not “seized” by the officers, so the encounter raised no 4th
Amendment issue. The judge also found
that Bell consented to the search of his car, which meant that, as noted above,
he waived his 4th Amendment rights with regard to the search. U.S. v.
Bell, supra.
Finally, Bell argued that the evidence found on the laptop “must
be suppressed because the Government detained it for an unreasonable amount of
time in violation of his 4th Amendment rights.”
U.S. v. Bell, supra. As noted
above, it was seized on April 12 but the federal search was not conducted until
July 27. U.S. v. Bell, supra.
In addressing this argument, the judge noted that a “‘seizure
lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the 4th Amendment if its
manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by
the 4th Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures.’“ U.S. v. Bell, supra (quoting U.S. v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)). Bell argued that the interference with his 4th
Amendment interests in his
computer is particularly intrusive
because computers are commonly used to store highly personal information. .
. . his new business venture. This argument . . . is somewhat undermined by the
fact that after the computer was seized, Bell never asked for it to be
returned. . . . The fact Bell protested the seizure of his laptop
adds little to the balancing because he nevertheless has not asked for its
return.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
The judge also found it was “significant” that a warrant to
search Bell’s computer was
obtained the day after it was seized. `The
longer the police take to seek a warrant, the greater the infringement on the
person's possessory interest will be, [because] a greater infringement on
possession than a shorter one.’ U.S. v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2012). In U.S. v. Mitchell, 565
F.3d 1347 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit 2009), . . .
the Government waited 21 days before applying for a warrant, an amount of time
which the court found was unreasonable. . . As noted in Mitchell, one
of the purposes of obtaining a search warrant promptly after an item is seized
is to ensure the item is promptly returned should the search reveal no
incriminating evidence.
Here, within one day of the seizure, a
Chester County magisterial district judge determined probable cause existed
that the computer contained evidence of a crime and issued a search
warrant. . . . Bell admitted during the April 12 encounter and in a
call with Bereda soon after the encounter that the computer contained evidence
concerning fraudulent checks. Thus, the likelihood that Bell's computer would
not be returned to him significantly mitigates the intrusion upon his 4th
Amendment interests.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
Bell also claimed the delay in obtaining the federal search
warrant was objectionable, but the judge found it was not “unreasonable” in
violation of the 4th Amendment because
federal investigators did not begin
their investigation of Bell until April 13, the same day the state warrant was
issued. Accordingly, some delay in obtaining the federal warrant was necessary
to allow federal investigators an opportunity to determine (a) whether a
federal crime had been committed, and (b) whether Bell's computer contained
evidence of those federal crimes. Meanwhile, Bell's interest in the property
remained relatively weak because he admitted the computer contained evidence he
had forged checks, a possible state and federal crime. Moreover,
in investigating Bell's commission of federal crimes, the federal investigators
relied heavily on cooperation from Chester County and Tredyffrin Township law
enforcement agencies. There is an obvious public and government interest in
promoting local and federal cooperation on criminal investigations.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
Finally, the judge
found there was no reason to believe “probable
cause to search Bell's computer dissipated after the [state] warrant was
issued” because “the computer remained in the custody of the Chester County
Detectives Office and then federal law enforcement officers.” U.S. v. Bell, supra. He
therefore denied Bell’s motion to suppress.
U.S. v. Bell, supra.
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