This post examines an opinion from the Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso: O’Brien v. State, 2017 WL
360691 (2017). The court begins the
opinion by explaining how, and why, the case arose:
Appellant Jacob O'Brien, his brother
Christopher O'Brien, and their friends Seth Winkler and Tyler Bumpers went on a
successful hunting trip and returned home with the heads of two aoudad sheep.
They posted pictures of their bounty on Facebook. Unfortunately, their hunting
trip occurred on the property of Nathan Pickett, who, Appellant admitted, had
not given them permission to hunt. Appellant claimed he had been informed that
Seth Winkler's father owned the property. The jury disbelieved Appellant's
assertion and found him guilty of criminal trespass. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to 60 days' in jail and imposed a $500 fine.
O’Brien v. State,
supra. In a footnote, the court explains that “Christopher O'Brien was also
charged with the same offenses as Appellant, and the cases against the brothers
were prosecuted in a single trial.” O’Brien
v. State, supra. The opinion went on to explain that
Appellant contends on appeal that that
the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two photographs from a game
camera showing Appellant, his brother, and his friends on Pickett's property.
He also contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
O’Brien v. State,
supra. As an aside, I should note
that this is a long blog post because the opinion is, as lawyers say, very “fact-specific”,
i.e., there are a lot of issues of fact that came up in the case.
The Court of Appeals begins its analysis of the defendant’s
arguments on appeal by explaining how the prosecution arose:
Nathan Pickett purchased a 300–acre
parcel of land in Terrell County from Joan Winkler in April 2011. The property
included a cabin, running water, multiple deer blinds, and motorized game
feeders. Aoudad sheep had been found on the property since 2012. The property lies
more than 20 miles from the nearest highway. The final 10 miles is across a
private road, which is guarded by a closed gate marked with a `no trespassing’
sign. Pickett's property in particular is guarded by fencing and a locked front
gate bearing a `no trespassing’ sign that is marked with the name `Pickett.’
Numerous other signs also warn against trespassing or hunting on the property,
some of which also colorfully warn: `Trespassing may induce lead poisoning,’
`Security provided by Ruger,’ and `Trespassers will be shot; Survivors will be
shot again.’
Pickett visited his property about once
a month. During a Memorial Day weekend trip in 2013, Pickett installed a game
camera. During a subsequent visit in August, Pickett discovered the lock on the
entry gate had been shot and was inoperable. Pickett found tire tracks heading
around the gate and that someone had moved the tire spikes and boulders that
had been installed to prevent vehicles from driving around the gate. Because it
was impossible to open the gate, Pickett was forced to drive around the gate,
following the newly-discovered tire tracks, in order to travel the remaining
quarter mile to his cabin. As soon as his cabin came into view, Pickett
discovered the carport gate and gatepost had been knocked down. He also
discovered that a striped retractable sun awning had been crudely cut away with
a knife. Pickett found drink bottles and empty food cans on the patio and saw
that the patio furniture had been moved and firewood had been used. In the fire
pit, Pickett located spent shell casings from a 30.06 rifle and a .45 caliber
automatic colt pistol, which are not guns he owns.
Pickett had his son retrieve the data
card from the game camera and began reviewing the captured images. Pickett
found two images depicting four unknown men. Both photographs were date-stamped
July 6, 2013, and were admitted into evidence as State's Exhibits 1 and 2,
respectively. Pickett testified he did not know Jacob O'Brien, Christopher
O'Brien, Seth Winkler, or Tyler Bumpers, and that he had not given them
permission to be on his property or to hunt exotic animals or aoudad sheep on
his property. Pickett shared the game camera photographs with Joan Winkler,
Seth's mother, in the hope that she may recognize the men in the images. Joan
Winkler informed Pickett that her son Seth was among the men in the
photographs, and according to Pickett, told him that Seth knew that the
property had been sold.
Pickett provided the photographs from
the game camera to Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Warden Arnold Pinales and
informed him that the photographs depicted trespassers who had been poaching on
his property without his consent. Warden Pinales testified that aoudad sheep
are considered exotic game, and that a regular hunting license is required to
legally hunt an exotic animal. In an effort to identify the offenders, the
photographs were posted online in various hunting and fishing forums and on
Facebook. Pickett gave Warden Pinales the name of Seth Winkler as a possible
suspect. Warden Pinales eventually determined that Appellant, Christopher
O'Brien, Seth Winkler, and Tyler Bumpers were the four men depicted in the
photographs from Pickett's game camera.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
[a]ppellant testified briefly at trial,
following his brother Christopher's testimony. Appellant stated that the events
happened exactly (`100 percent’) as Christopher had testified. He testified
that right before the hunting trip, Christopher invited him along as their
`pack rat.’ In a written statement, Appellant stated he had been informed that
the property they were going to `was Seth's father's cabin,’ that he had no
idea `we were trespassing,’ and that if he had known it `wasn't Seth's
property, I would not have gone on that trip.’ Appellant claimed he had no
reason to believe the property was not owned by Seth Winkler's father. He trusted
his brother, and if Christopher `was going and saying it was okay,’ he was
`okay with that.’
Before Appellant testified, Christopher
O'Brien had taken the stand and admitted that he had hunted and killed an
aoudad on Pickett's property without his consent. He also admitted that he was
one of the individuals in the game camera photos and that everything shown in
the photographs was `completely true.’ But Christopher asserted Seth Winkler
had informed him that the property belonged to Seth's father. Like
Appellant, Christopher also claimed that if Seth had informed him that his
father did not own the property, he would have never gone hunting on the
property.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
In a footnote appended to the next to the last sentence in
the paragraph above, the court explains that
[a]ppellant's mother testified that she
was present when Seth and Christopher were planning the hunting trip and Seth
informed her that the property belonged to Seth's father and that he had
permission to hunt on the property at any time.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court then continues with its narrative of the facts in
the case, explaining that
Christopher testified that after
driving six or seven hours, they arrived at the property late at night.
Christopher claimed they accessed the property from its southeast corner along
the rugged `back drive,’ which Seth said was the original drive used when they
were building the cabin. Christopher denied that there were any fences or
gates, or that he saw any `no trespassing’ signs, on the south side of the
property and claimed that he never saw any signs bearing Pickett's name.
Christopher said he was convinced from the moment he set foot on the property
that it was Seth's father's property, because it was exactly as Seth had
described. Christopher admitted, however, that `I was a little uncertain
because, you know, a story could be too—you know, too good to be true at times.’
According to Christopher, the following
day after the hunt, they drove out of the property the opposite way toward the
front gate. When they reached the front gate, Christopher for the first time
noticed a `no trespassing’ sign, but he did not believe it had Pickett's name
on it. Christopher testified that Seth Winkler had told him before they left on
the hunting trip that he had a set of keys to the front gate. But when they
arrived at the front gate to leave, Seth informed him they would have to drive
around it because he didn't have the keys to open the gate. Christopher
concluded `after the fact’ that `there were never any keys.’ Christopher
claimed that to get out, he drove his truck around and over the boulders by the
front gate and did not move them, noting that his truck had a six-inch lift kit
that allowed him to drive right over the boulders.
Christopher admitted that they left
trash on the property. He also admitted that the carport gate had been moved.
He also stated that when they were loading the aoudad heads into the back of
his truck, Seth pulled or cut down the striped sun awning because, according to
Seth, his father was going to replace it anyway. He denied that they used the
striped sun awning to cover the aoudad heads so that they would not be detected
on the return trip, but rather Seth did not want Christopher's truck bed to get
bloody. Christopher acknowledged that an exotic aoudad hunt would normally cost
approximately $1,500 or more, but he did not see any problem with hunting at no
cost on what he believed was the property of Seth's father. Christopher
admitted that he had posted a photograph on Facebook of himself and Seth
holding two aoudad heads with the caption, `Got 'em.’
Pickett testified on rebuttal that
there is a gate on the southeast side of his property that is always locked. He
also explained that it would have been impossible for a vehicle to reach his
cabin from the southeast due to a massive, 200–foot deep canyon located between
the southeast gate and the cabin.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the facts,
the law and the issues in the case:
In Issue One, Appellant contends the
trial court erred in admitting the two game camera photographs showing his
presence on the property (State's Exhibits 1 and 2) because they were not
properly authenticated and because their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We conclude that later-admitted evidence authenticated
the photographs and rendered any error in their admission harmless, and that
Appellant failed to preserve his argument that their admission violated his
right to confrontation.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court went on to outline the “applicable law” and the “standard
of review” it was required to apply to the issues in this appeal:
Authentication is a condition precedent
to admissibility of evidence. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex.Crim.App. 2012). To properly authenticate evidence, `the proponent must
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.’ TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). The trial court
decides the threshold question whether the proponent has supplied sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence
is authentic. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638; TEX. R. EVID. 104(a)
(whether to admit evidence is a preliminary question to be decided by the
court). In performing its gate-keeping function, the trial court need not be
persuaded that the proffered item of evidence is authentic. Tienda,
358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court must only decide that the proponent has
supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the
evidence is authentic. Id. The ultimate question whether an
item of evidence is what its proponent claims it is a question for the jury. Id.
We review a trial court's ruling on the
preliminary question of admissibility for abuse of discretion. Id. We
will not interfere with a trial court's ruling that a jury could reasonably
find the proffered evidence to be authentic if the ruling is within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Id.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the issues in the
case by explaining that
Appellant contends the trial court
abused its discretion because the photographs were not properly authenticated
prior to admission. The photographs were offered through Warden Pinales who
admitted that Pickett had retrieved the images from the game camera and
provided them to him and that he was not present when the photographs were
taken or subsequently developed. Appellant argues that Warden Pinales had no
personal knowledge of how the photographs were taken, what equipment was used
to take them, whether that equipment was in good-working order, whether the
photographs were a true and correct depiction of what came from the camera's
digital information card, or whether the photographs had been manipulated in
any manner. There is no requirement, however, that the witness who authenticates
a photograph have been the photographer or present when the photograph was
taken or developed. Pena v. State, 467 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.App.–San
Antonio 2015, no pet.). All that is required for authentication is testimony
that the photograph accurately represents the person, object, or scene depicted
in the photography. See Delacerda v.
State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 393 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see
also Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 221–22 (Tex.Crim.App.
1988).
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that
Appellant correctly points out that
Warden Pinales did not testify that the photographs accurately represented the
persons, objects, or scene depicted before the photographs were admitted into
evidence. Evidence prematurely admitted in error, however, may become
admissible or be rendered harmless by subsequent evidence. James v.
State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd). `A
conviction will not be reversed for error in receiving evidence that was not
admissible when received but which became admissible at a subsequent stage.’ Romo
v. State, 700 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
pet.). Any error in admitting photograph into evidence without proper
authentication is cured when a witness later testifies that he was present when
photograph was taken. Davis v. State, 687 S.W.2d 78, 82
(Tex.App.–Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd). After the trial court had admitted the
photographs depicting Appellant's presence on Pickett's property, Appellant
admitted that he had been present on Pickett's property, rendering any error in
their admission harmless. Christopher also admitted that he was present on
Pickett's property in July 2013 and that everything shown in the photographs was
`completely true,’ establishing that the photographs accurately represented the
persons depicted therein. These subsequent admissions by Appellant and
Christopher provided the necessary evidence to authenticate the photographs and
rendered any error in their admission harmless.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court went on to address Obrien’s next argument, which
was that
[a]ppellant correctly points out that
Warden Pinales did not testify that the photographs accurately represented the
persons, objects, or scene depicted before the photographs were admitted into
evidence. Evidence prematurely admitted in error, however, may become
admissible or be rendered harmless by subsequent evidence. James v.
State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd). `A
conviction will not be reversed for error in receiving evidence that was not
admissible when received but which became admissible at a subsequent stage.’ Romo
v. State, 700 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
pet.). Any error in admitting photograph into evidence without proper
authentication is cured when a witness later testifies that he was present when
photograph was taken. Davis v. State, 687 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex.App.–Dallas
1985, pet. ref'd). After the trial court had admitted the photographs depicting
Appellant's presence on Pickett's property, Appellant admitted that he had been
present on Pickett's property, rendering any error in their admission harmless.
Christopher also admitted that he was present on Pickett's property in July
2013 and that everything shown in the photographs was `completely true,’
establishing that the photographs accurately represented the persons depicted
therein. These subsequent admissions by Appellant and Christopher provided the
necessary evidence to authenticate the photographs and rendered any error in
their admission harmless.
O’Brien v. State,
supra. In a footnote appended at the
end of the last sentence in the paragraph above, the court noted that
[t]here was also other circumstantial
evidence showing that State's Exhibits 1 and 2 accurately depicted Appellant
and the property. Pickett testified that State's Exhibits 1 and 2 were taken by
the game camera he had installed and showed a date stamp of July 6, 2013. Also
Warden Pinales testified that he had had taken his own photographs of Pickett's
property from the same vantage point as State's Exhibits 1 and 2 and that his
photographs fairly and accurately depicted Pickett's property.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
Next, the court took up O’Brien’s argument that the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
barred admission of the photographs. The Confrontation Clause bars the
admission of out-of-court testimonial statements by a declarant whom the
criminal defendant has been unable to confront. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51, 68 (2004). Appellant argues the photographs are testimonial
because Warden Pinales's knowledge of the photographs was based solely on
information supplied by Pickett. Both Warden Pinales and Pickett testified at
trial, however. They were therefore available to be confronted at trial, and
were in fact cross-examined by defense counsel. In any event, a photograph is
not an out-of-court testimonial statement, and thus its admission cannot
violate the Confrontation Clause. Herrera v. State, 367 S.W.3d
762, 773 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (autopsy photograph
is not a testimonial statement); statement); Wood v. State, 299
S.W.3d 200, 214–15 (Tex.App.–Austin 2009, pet. ref'd); TEX. R. EVID. 801(a) (a`statement’
is an oral or written verbal expression, or nonverbal conduct intended by the
person as a substitute for verbal expression). More importantly, Appellant has
waived any error by failing to raise a Confrontation Clause objection at trial.
Appellant objected to admission of the photographs solely based on the lack of
proper authentication under the rules of evidence. An objection based on the
rules of evidence does not preserve error on Confrontation Clause grounds. Reyna
v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). When the legal basis of
a trial objection differs from that on appeal, the issue is not preserved for
our consideration. See Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687,
691 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009); see Clark v. State, 365
S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012); see also Yazdchi v.
State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) (failure to object at
trial may waive even errors of constitutional magnitude). We overrule Issue
One.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court then took O’Brien’s next argument, which was that
the trial court erred in failing to
grant his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to prove the
elements necessary to support his conviction for criminal trespass. A challenge
to a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict is actually a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Madden
v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
It began its analysis by explaining the standard of review
it applies to sufficiency of the evidence (or insufficiency of the evidence)
arguments:
We review sufficiency complaints under
the legal-sufficiency standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia. Fernandez
v. State, 479 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016); Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). The relevant inquiry
is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Fernandez, 479 S.W.3d at
837–38 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). If a
rational fact finder could have so found, we will not disturb the verdict on
appeal. Id. at 838; see also Temple v.
State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone may
be sufficient to establish guilt. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d
166, 170 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and
weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses. Id. at
170 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789).
When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury
resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Id.; see also Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (observing that it is the fact
finder's duty `to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts’).
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court then went on to outline what the State’s (the
prosecution’s) burden was in this case, noting, initially, that
[w]e measure the sufficiency of the
evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct
jury charge. Miles v. State, 357 S.W.3d 629, 631
(Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d
234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct jury charge `accurately
sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.’ Id. The Texas Penal Code
provides that a person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or
remains on or in property of another without effective consent, and the person
had notice that the entry was forbidden. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2016). Notice that the entry was forbidden can be given by fencing
or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders or to contain
livestock, or a sign or signs posted on the property indicating that entry is
forbidden that are reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2)(B, C) (West Supp. 2016). The information
alleged that Appellant `did then and there intentionally and knowingly enter on
property of another, to-wit: Nathan Pickett, without the effective consent the
owner, Nathan Pickett, and the said Defendant had notice that the entry was
forbidden [.]’ Under a hypothetically correct charge, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally and knowingly
entered Pickett's property without his consent and with notice that the entry
was forbidden.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of O’Brien’s
sufficiency of the evidence argument, noting, initially, that O’Brien’s
argument
on sufficiency of the evidence simply
sets out verbatim what he argued to the trial court in his motion for directed
verdict. Appellant's brief fails to present any analysis of exactly how the
evidence was insufficient. Although the briefing is deficient, we will
liberally construe Appellant's brief as attacking the sufficiency of all the
elements of criminal trespass.
Pickett's testimony established that he
owned the property and that he had not given Appellant and the others
permission to enter his property. And Appellant admitted at trial that he had
entered Pickett's property without his permission. Appellant's position at
trial was that he did not intentionally or knowingly enter Pickett's
property without his consent because he had been misinformed that the property
belonged to Seth Winkler's father, and that he did not have notice that his
entry was forbidden.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court went on to explain that
[a]ppellant's position on intent was
buttressed by the testimony of Christopher and his mother that Seth told them
the property belonged to his father that Seth had permission to hunt on the
property at any time. Appellant claimed that if he had known it was not Seth's
property, he would never have gone on the trip. While this testimony
constitutes some evidence that Appellant may have lacked the necessary intent
or knowledge, the mere existence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis does
not render the evidence factually insufficient. Goodman v. State, 66
S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Here, the jury heard other circumstantial
evidence of mens rea from which they could reasonably conclude that Appellant
knew that the property was not owned by Seth Winkler's father and had knowingly
and intentionally entered Pickett's property without his consent.
Christopher claimed that they entered
the property at night from the southeast corner and did not encounter any
fences, locked gates, or `no trespassing’ signs that would have alerted him
that Pickett owned the property. But Pickett testified that entry and access to
his cabin was impossible from the southeast and that his property was protected
by fencing, locked gates, and numerous no trespassing signs, some of which—like
the front gate—were marked with the name `Pickett.’ Pickett testified not only
that access was impossible from the southeast corner but also that the lock on
the front gate had been shot in an attempt to gain entry and that the rock
barriers had been moved to gain access around the gate. The jury could have
reasonably inferred from this evidence that the entire hunting party entered
not from the southeast, but from the front gate, and knowing the property did
not belong to Seth's father, attempted to destroy the lock to gain access, and
then moved the barriers in order to drive around the front gate. Christopher
also admitted that he and his companions left trash around the cabin, knocked
down the carport gate and gatepost, and cut down the distinctive sun
awning—actions the jury could have reasonably concluded were inconsistent with
a claimed belief that the property was owned by Seth Winkler's father. The jury
could have also concluded that the awning was used to cover up the aoudad heads
from detection on the return trip, showing knowledge that the aoudad had been
illegally hunted. From all this evidence, the jury could have rejected
Appellant's assertion that he thought they had permission to enter the property
and reasonably concluded that Appellant intentionally and knowingly entered the
property knowing it was not owned by Seth Winkler's father.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The opinion then goes on to explain that
[p]roof of a culpable mental state
generally relies upon circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574
S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Knight v. State, 457 S.W.3d
192, 199 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2015, pet. ref'd). Ordinarily, proof of a culpable
mental state must be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused
and the surrounding circumstances. Ledesma v. State, 677
S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.Crim. App. 1984); Knight, 457 S.W.3d at 199. The
jury was not required to believe Appellant's claims that he mistakenly believed
that the property was owned by Seth's father and not by Pickett. The jury was
free to believe some, all, or none of the testimony and other evidence
presented. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 496 (Tex. Crim. App 1996). In sum, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to
reject Appellant's defensive theory of mistake and to conclude that Appellant
both knowingly and intentionally entered Pickett's property without his
consent.
Likewise the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Appellant entered the property with notice that the entry was
forbidden. First, the property was protected by fencing and a locked front
gate, giving notice that entry was forbidden, and the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Appellant and his companions entered the property
through the front-gate and not from the southeast as claimed, and that after
unsuccessfully attempting to shoot the lock off the front gate, they moved the
rock barricades to gain entry. Second, the evidence also demonstrated that the
property was protected by numerous `no trespassing’ signs that were reasonably
likely to come to the attention of intruders, some of which were marked with
the `Pickett’ name. Under the criminal trespass statute, either was
sufficient to demonstrate that entry was forbidden. See Jackson
v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1999, no pet.) (fencing
around house was sufficient to provide notice that entry was forbidden); Matter
of D.L.K., 690 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex.App.–Eastland 1985, no pet.) (fencing
and locked gates were sufficient to provide notice that entry was forbidden); Leal
v. State, 736 S.W.2d 907, 913 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 1987), pet.
dism'd, 773 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (per curiam) (entry
on ranch through locked gate bearing a `No Trespassing’ sign, by cutting chain
securing the gate, `was a clear violation of Texas' criminal trespass statute’).
Having considered all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational juror could
have found the essential elements of the offense of criminal trespass beyond a
reasonable doubt. We overrule Appellant's second issue.
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
The court therefore found that “[h]aving
considered all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the
offense of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt.”
O’Brien v. State,
supra.
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