This post examines an opinion from the Court of Appeals of Alaska, which may be the first post I have done on an opinion from this
court. Bell v. State, 2017 WL 127985 (2017).
The Court of Appeals begins the opinion by explaining that
[i]n May 2012, several Apple iMac computers were stolen from West
Anchorage High School by persons unknown. Shortly after these computers were stolen, Robert
Daniel Bell sold one of them to a used electronics dealer. The dealer paid Bell
$140 for the computer.
The State subsequently charged Bell
with second-degree theft (theft by receiving stolen property valued at $500 or
more) and with third-degree theft (theft by deception for selling the iMac
to the used electronics dealer for $140). At Bell's trial, the main disputed issue was
the value of the computer —
if the value equaled or exceeded $500, the charge was a felony, if less, a
misdemeanor.
Bell v. State, supra.
The second-degree theft charge was brought under Alaska Statutes § 11.46.190. Bell v. State, supra. The third-degree theft charge was
brought under Alaska Statutes § 11.46.100(3). Bell v. State, supra.
The opinion goes on to note that the
iMac computer at issue had been customized for educational use.
The iMac was programmed to prevent software changes or updates unless it was
connected to the Anchorage School District's server. In addition, a content
filter prevented users from accessing websites deemed inappropriate for
students. These limiting features potentially affected the market value of the
stolen iMac.
After hearing all of the evidence, the
jury convicted Bell as
charged.
Bell v. State, supra.
The Court of Appeals then took up the arguments Bell made on
appeal, starting with the valuation of the stolen iMacs:
Alaska Statute 11.46.980(a) sets
forth the circumstance under which the normal method for valuation of property,
fair market value, can be supplanted by an alternative method of valuation,
replacement value:
`In this chapter [AS 11.46], whenever
it is necessary to determine the value of property, that value is the market
value of the property at the time and place of the crime unless otherwise
specified or, if the market value cannot reasonably be ascertained, the cost of
replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime.’
Bell's jury was instructed according to
this statute. On appeal, Bell argues that the trial judge committed error by
instructing the jury about the possibility of valuing the stolen iMac by its
replacement value, contending that no reasonable juror could have resorted to
replacement valuation. Secondly, Bell argues that because the school
district computer was
clearly worth less than $500, the judge should have entered a judgment of
acquittal on the offense of felony theft by receiving stolen property.
Lastly, Bell argues that the trial
judge should have granted him a judgment of acquittal on the offense of theft
by deception because no reasonable juror could have believed that the used
electronics dealer was deceived when Bell claimed that he was the legitimate
owner of the iMac.
For the reasons that follow, we find
Bell's arguments to be without merit and we affirm his convictions.
Bell v. State, supra.
I usually do not comment on arguments made in the cases I use as the
basis of blog posts, but as far as I can tell, Bell’s last argument about
the “reasonable juror” is, at the least, unusual.
The court then went through his arguments, beginning with
“the record pertaining to the value of the stolen computer”. Bell v.
State, supra. It explained that
[d]uring Bell's trial, the comptroller
for the Anchorage School District testified that the school district had
purchased the iMac as part of a bulk purchase of almost 1500 Apple computers Apple computers in July 2010. The
school district paid a discounted price of $889.24 for the computer. At the time it was stolen,
the iMac had been used in the Anchorage schools for two academic years.
A network specialist with the school
district's IT department testified that, if someone wanted to purchase an iMac
similar to the one that was stolen, the retail value would be between $1300 and
$1700. The network specialist also testified that Apple computers were `a higher-end
brand’ and that they retained their value even after use.
Anchorage Police Detective Steven Oyler
corroborated the network specialist's testimony. Oyler testified that, in his
experience, Apple computers are `a higher-dollar brand’ and that new iMacs sell
for about $1500.
During final argument, the prosecutor
argued that the iMac had an ascertainable fair market value and that, based on
the sale prices of like-model new iMacs, it was reasonable to infer that this
market value equaled or exceeded $500. Bell's defense attorney agreed that the
iMac had an ascertainable market value and he therefore urged the jurors to
ignore the `replacement value’ method of valuing the computer. The defense attorney argued
that there was at least a reasonable possibility that the iMac was worth
something less than $500.
Bell v. State, supra.
The Court of Appeals went on to articulate its analysis of,
and ruling on, Bell’s first argument:
Bell argues that the trial judge should
have granted him a judgment of acquittal on the second-degree theft offense
because no reasonable juror could have concluded that the value of the iMac was
$500 or more. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction, an appellate court must view the evidence, and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, in the light most
favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. The question is whether, viewing the evidence
in this light, a reasonable juror could have concluded that the State had
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have already described the evidence
presented at Bell's trial pertaining to the value of the iMac. Viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that it
was sufficient to convince fair-minded jurors that the iMac was worth at least
$500.
Bell v. State, supra.
The Court of Appeals went on to address Bell’s next
argument, which was that
the trial judge should never have
informed the jury that, under Alaska law, the value of property is its
replacement value if it is not reasonably possible to ascertain a fair market
value for the property.
More specifically, Bell argues that the
iMac was self-evidently marketable because Bell indeed sold it to the used
electronics dealer. Thus, Bell contends, no reasonable juror could have
concluded that it was not reasonably possible to ascertain a fair market value
for the computer. But the
jury was not required to find that, simply because Bell was able to sell the
iMac to the used electronics dealer, the computer had a fair market value.
`Fair market value’ is a term of art.
As we explained in Morris v. State, the phrases `market value’ or
`fair market value’ mean `the amount at which the property would change hands,
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to
buy or sell and both having knowledge of the relevant facts.’
The sale between Bell and the used
electronics dealer did not necessarily establish a fair market value under this
definition. The used electronics dealer testified that he bought the iMac under
the impression that it was an older but functional computer. It was not until later that he became aware of the
significant limitations on its functionality. And even when the dealer thought
that the iMac was functional, he was only willing to pay a very small price for
it — $140.
When this issue was presented to the
trial judge (as part of Bell's motion for judgment of acquittal following the State's case-in-chief), the judge himself declared that he thought it was `next
to impossible’ to ascertain a fair market value for the computer — although he
acknowledged that the jurors might see it differently, and so he allowed the
attorneys to argue their respective positions regarding the market value of
the computer.
We agree with the trial judge that
reasonable people could conclude that it was not reasonably possible to
ascertain a fair market value for the iMac, given the significant limitations
on its functionality. It was therefore proper for the trial judge to instruct
the jurors that, if the market value of the iMac could not reasonably be
ascertained, the jurors should use replacement cost as the measure of the computer's value.
On a related issue, we reject Bell's
argument that it is always a question of law — to be decided by the trial
judge, not the jury — whether the fair market value of particular property is
reasonably ascertainable. There may be cases where, based on the evidence,
reasonable people would have to agree that the property at issue had a
reasonably ascertainable fair market value. But in cases like Bell's, some
reasonable jurors might conclude that it was not reasonably possible to
ascertain a fair market value for the hobbled iMac. In such circumstances, a
judge is not entitled to take this issue from the jury.
Bell v. State, supra.
The comments quoted in the excerpt above, with regard to the “relevant
facts” are quoted from Johnson v. State,
188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska Court of Appeals 2008)).
The Court of Appeals went on to address Bell’s argument that
the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of theft by deception:
Bell claims the judge erred by denying
Bell's request for a judgment of acquittal on the theft by deception charge.
Bell argues the dealer must have known that the iMac was stolen and that Bell
had no right to sell it. Consequently, Bell contends there was no reasonable
possibility that the used electronics dealer was deceived. But Bell's argument
rests on viewing the facts in the light most favorable to himself rather than
in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict.
Subsections (D) and (E) of [AlaskaStatutes] 11.81.900(b)(18), respectively, define `deception’ as the `fail[ure]
to disclose a . . . legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property’ or the `promise
[of] performance that the defendant does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed.’ Because reasonable jurors could conclude that Bell deceived
the used electronics dealer under either of these definitions, the trial judge
properly denied Bell's motion for acquittal.
The used electronics dealer testified
that he required all customers to sign a document promising to indemnify the
dealer for any latent defects discovered in the purchased item. Bell signed
this indemnification contract using a false name. Based on this testimony,
reasonable jurors could find that Bell's promise to indemnify the dealer for
defects, made under a false name, constituted a promise of performance that
Bell did not intend to perform — and that Bell thereby committed deception as
defined in subsection (E) of the statute.
In addition, sufficient evidence was
presented for the jury to find Bell guilty of deception under subsection (D) as well. The dealer
testified that his business model was to purchase used electronics from people
whose circumstances compelled them to sell at a deep discount. He admitted that
he was aware of the risk that sometimes he would be purchasing stolen property.
But he testified that he did not knowingly make purchases of stolen goods and
that he specifically would not have purchased the iMac from Bell if Bell had
revealed that it was stolen.
Bell v. State, supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore held that
[b]ased on this testimony, a reasonable
juror could conclude that Bell deceived the used electronics dealer by failing
to disclose that the iMac was subject to a legal impediment, i.e.,
that it was stolen.
Accordingly, the trial judge properly
denied Bell's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the theft by deception
offense.
Bell v. State, supra.
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