This post examines a recent opinion from the Supreme Court of New Mexico: State v. Yazzie, 376 P.3d 858 (Supreme Court of New Mexico 2016). The court begins the opinion by explaining
that the
New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA), New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, §§ 66-5-201-239
(1978, as amended through 2015), prohibits operation of a motor vehicle without
liability insurance or other proof of financial responsibility and requires
that proof of compliance be reported to the Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) of the
New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (the Department) and kept with the
vehicle. See § 66–5–205(A)-(B); 66–5–205.1(A)-(B). An MVD database
that law enforcement officers can access from their onboard computers reports a
compliance status of `active’ or `suspended’ or `unknown,’ based on MVD record
information on liability insurance for each individual registered motor
vehicle.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that under the MFRA,
No person shall drive an uninsured
motor vehicle, or a motor vehicle for which evidence of financial
responsibility as was affirmed to the department is not currently valid, upon
the streets or highways of New Mexico unless the person is specifically
exempted from the provisions of the [MFRA].
Section 66–5–205(B). Violation of the MFRA is a misdemeanor
offense. Section 66–5–205(E).
The Supreme Court went on to explain that the
Legislature instituted the MFRA out of
an awareness `that motor vehicle accidents in New Mexico can result in
catastrophic financial hardship’ and with the purpose of ensuring that
motor vehicle operators `have the ability to respond in damages to accidents’
occurring on New Mexico roadways. Section 66–5–201.1. The MFRA further provides
that the Department shall neither issue nor renew the registration for an
uninsured vehicle and that it shall suspend an existing registration if
evidence reflects that insurance has not been maintained. See §
66–5–206.
In 2001, the New Mexico Legislature
amended the MFRA to enhance identification of uninsured vehicles. SeeH.B.847,
45th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2001); § 66–5–205.1(D), (F). Among the resulting
statutory provisions, the Legislature directed the Department to promulgate
rules requiring insurance carriers to submit monthly reports of terminated
insurance policies for the Department to keep in its files on the corresponding
vehicles. Section 66–5–205.1(D). In response, the Department began operating
the insurance identification database at issue in this case.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The court then took up the facts and law at issue in this
particular case, explaining that
[w]hile on routine patrol in San Juan
County, New Mexico State Police Officer James Rempe entered the license plate
number of the vehicle Defendant Joann Yazzie was driving into his patrol car's
mobile data terminal (MDT). The MDT remotely accesses records maintained by the
MVD regarding the compliance status of vehicles registered in New Mexico. The
query returned a result indicating that the compliance status of the vehicle
was `unknown.’ Upon receiving the report of `unknown’ compliance status,
Officer Rempe activated his emergency lights and pulled over Defendant's vehicle
to investigate further. The `unknown’ query return was the only basis for the
traffic stop. Based on further information the officer acquired as a result of
the stop, Defendant was arrested and charged in magistrate court with driving
while under the influence of alcohol and failure to maintain insurance.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress
all evidence obtained during the course of the stop, arguing that the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and thereby violated her right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of theNew Mexico Constitution. The magistrate court denied the motion, and Defendant
conditionally pleaded guilty to a violation of [New Mexico Statutes Annotated]1978, § 66-8-102 (2010) for driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs, second offense, reserving the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court went on to explain that,
[o]n appeal o the district court,
Defendant renewed her motion to suppress. At an initial motions hearing, the
State offered a witness from the MVD to provide explanatory testimony about the
meaning of an MVD designation of `unknown’ compliance status and about
`circumstances’ in which `insurance would be valid [or] not valid.’ The
district court observed,
`I think the State's looking for this
expert based on my previous decisions that insurance unknown just doesn't cut
it to me. I think it needs to be more, and I think the State's following my
previous directive that if they don't have more, I'm going to be suppressing
these stops.’
Accordingly the State called Walter
Martinez, Bureau Chief for the MVD Insurance Tracking and Compliance Program,
to testify at the subsequent suppression hearings. Martinez testified that the
database Officer Rempe accessed is maintained by a third-party vendor that
receives information from insurance carriers and matches it with vehicle
registration information provided by the MVD. The MVD receives nightly updates,
which are in turn immediately sent to other agencies, including the Department
of Public Safety.
An officer requesting insurance
information from the system pertaining to a particular vehicle receives one of
three possible responses through the MDT: `active’ or `suspended’ or `unknown.’
When entry of vehicle information triggers an `unknown’ compliance status, `it
is highly likely’ that there is no insurance. Martinez testified that the MVD
tracking process reflects that this likelihood of no insurance is ninety
percent or greater.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The opinion then explains that Martinez also testified that
when the MVD learns a vehicle is
uninsured, it notifies the owner and allows a total of ninety-five days for the
owner to produce evidence of financial responsibility before suspending the
registration of that vehicle. During this interim period following notice to
the owner, the MVD classifies the compliance status of the vehicle as `unknown.’
Martinez further testified about an MVD report of statistics on
uninsured-status vehicles, compiling data from the 118,477 vehicles categorized
as `unknown’ between October 5, 2011, and February 13, 2012. Of the total
number of vehicles of `unknown’ compliance status, only eleven percent actually
turned out to have had the required insurance when classified as `unknown,’ ten
percent had lapsed insurance coverage that was later reinstated. The
registrations of the remaining eighty percent were ultimately suspended for
failure to bring the vehicles into compliance with the law. Martinez testified
that although the precise numbers fluctuate, the percentages in the four-month
sample period were generally reflective of the population of vehicles the MVD monitors
for any given period.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court then pointed out that the
district court found that the
investigatory stop was constitutionally valid and denied Defendant's motion to
suppress, concluding that at the time Officer Rempe initiated the stop it was
reasonable for him to suspect that Defendant was in violation of the MFRA,
given the high likelihood that a vehicle with a reported `unknown’ compliance
status is uninsured.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that an MDT report that Defendant's insurance status was `unknown’ did not,
without more support, provide reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop
and that MVD statistics correlating `unknown’ compliance status with being
uninsured could not `serve as a proxy’ for the officer's own personal knowledge
at the time he conducted the stop, absent evidence he personally knew of the
statistical correlation. State v. Yazzie,
336 P.3d 984 (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2014). The Court of Appeals
accordingly reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to
suppress. Id.
We granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether a vehicle traffic stop based only on
information from an MVD records inquiry reflecting an `unknown’ compliance
status for the particular vehicle is supported by reasonable suspicion.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue outlined
above by explaining that
`[a]ppellate review of a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.’ State v. Ketelson, 150 N.M. 237, 257 P.3d 957 (New Mexico Supreme
Court 2011). First, we `look for substantial evidence to support the trial
court's factual finding, with deference to the district court's review of the
testimony and other evidence presented.’ State
v. Leyva, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2011); see
also Fitzhugh v. N.M. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Sec. Div., 122 N.M. 173, 922 P.2d 555 (1996) (`”Substantial
evidence” is evidence that a reasonable mind would regard as adequate to
support a conclusion.’ (citation omitted)) (New Mexico Supreme Court 2011). `We
then review the application of the law to those facts, making a de novo
determination of the constitutional reasonableness of the search or seizure.’ State v. Sewell, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.3d
885.
In this case, the district court
included findings of fact in its order denying Defendant's motion to suppress.
The parties neither dispute the central facts of this case nor assert that the
district court's findings were made in error. Accordingly, we accept the
district court's factual findings and address whether Officer Rempe's actions
were objectively reasonable and particularized as a matter of law. See
Davis Devon Energy Corp., 147 N.M.
157, 218 P.3d 75 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2009) (`When there are no
challenges to the district court's factual findings, we accept those findings
as conclusive’).
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court then explained that it would (i) analyze
whether Officer Rempe’s traffic stop complied with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and then (ii) analyze whether it complied
with the requirements of the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Yazzie, supra.
The court began its Fourth Amendment analysis by explaining
that
`[t]he United States and the New Mexico
Constitutions provide overlapping protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’ State v. Rowell, 144 N.M.
371, 188 P.3d 95 (New Mexico Supreme
Court 2008); see U.S. Constitution amend IV; N.M. Const. art. II § 10. Under
the interstitial approach adopted by this Court in State v. Gomez, we ask `first whether the right being asserted is
protected under the federal constitution. If it is, then the state
constitutional claim is not reached. If it is not, then the state constitution
is examined.’ 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (New Mexico Supreme Court 1997).
Accordingly, we first address whether Officer Rempe's traffic stop complied
with requirements of the United States Constitution.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court also noted that the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution
`prohibits “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory
stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’ U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 166, 173 (2002)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed, see Terry v. Ohio, supra, an investigatory stop is grounded on the
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (`Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than
that required to show probable cause’).
The overarching inquiry for all
intrusions on personal liberty under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness
under the particular circumstances, `which involves two questions: whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.’ State v. Neal,
142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 56 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The court then explained that a
traffic stop is justified at its
inception if it is supported by reasonable suspicion that a law has been
violated. See State v. Jason L., 129
N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2000). An officer's reasonable
suspicion must be `a particularized suspicion, based on all the
circumstances[,] that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking,
or has broken, the law.’ State v. Garcia,
147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2009). In determining
whether an officer's suspicion was reasonable, we employ an objective
assessment of the officer's actions. See State v. Hubble, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (New Mexico
Supreme Court 2009). `The purpose of requiring objectively reasonable
suspicion based on the circumstances is to prevent and invalidate police
conduct based on hunches, which are, by definition, subjective.’ State v. Ochoa, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d
143 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Accordingly, `[t]he subjective belief of the officer does not in
itself affect the validity of the stop.’ State
v. Hubble, supra. . . .
State v. Yazzie, supra.
Next, the Supreme Court took up the issue as to whether the
investigatory stop in this case was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment,
explaining that
[d]efendant understandably does not
argue that a stop based solely on an MVD database report of a `suspended’
compliance status would have been invalid given the statutory requirement to
maintain evidence of insurance or financial responsibility. See State v. Candelaria, 149 N.M. 125,
245 P.3d 69 (New Mexico Supreme Court 2011) (holding that officers had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle stop where official license and
registration records reflected that the vehicle was registered to a driver with
a revoked license). Conversely, a return of `active’ without any other indicia
of wrongdoing would necessarily fail to provide the individualized reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a lawful stop. The critical inquiry before us
rests on the response Officer Rempe received from the MVD database because an `unknown’
compliance status is factually and legally less determinative than compliance
statuses of `active’ or `suspended.’
The law necessarily tolerates some risk
of investigatory intrusion on a person's freedom of movement where ambiguous
circumstances could reasonably be construed as involving either lawful or
unlawful activity. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (relying on precedent and noting that even
where `conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent
explanation[,] . . . officers could detain the individuals to resolve the
ambiguity’). `[R]easonable suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct.’ U.S. v. Arvizu,
supra. Reasonableness of a particular seizure instead `is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that in Delaware v. Prouse, supra,
the U.S. Supreme Court
employed this balancing test and held
that discretionary license and registration spot checks of automobiles
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, supra. The Court found that
the marginal contribution to highway safety through such discretionary stops
did not outweigh the intrusion on individuals' Fourth Amendment interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra. The Court's concern centered on the lack of `an appropriate
factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile’ or the absence
of `some other substantial and objective standard or rule’ for discerning which
vehicle to stop out of the general pool of vehicles on the roadways. Delaware v. Prouse, supra. The case before us does not represent the “kind of
standardless and unconstrained discretion” that concerned the United States
Supreme Court in Prouse. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The also noted that
[t]his is not a case where an officer
made a stop solely on the basis that he had no information indicating whether
Defendant was operating a vehicle in compliance with the law. Officer Rempe
stopped the vehicle based on a report from the MVD records for the vehicle,
which under New Mexico law must be maintained for every registered vehicle,
that did not show compliance with the law and instead reflected an `unknown’
compliance status for the vehicle.
Other jurisdictions have addressed
analogous traffic stops based on suspected noncompliance with financial
responsibility laws where, unlike this case, the appellate record contained no
evidence of the statistical significance of an `unknown’ compliance status
report. See, e.g., U.S. v. Cortez-Galaviz, 49 F.3d 1203, 1206, 1209 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit 2007) (concluding that a database report of vehicle
insurance status `not found' was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion
to initiate a traffic stop in the absence of a showing of unreliability of the
database); State v. Dixson, 280 Ga.
App. 260, 333 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Georgia Court of Appeals 2006) (holding
that a stop was not based on reasonable suspicion where there were `no facts in
the record indicating that a return of “unknown” ma[de] it any more likely that
a vehicle [was] uninsured rather than fully insured’); Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 306 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Texas Court of
Appeals 2010) (declining to find reasonable suspicion without `evidence
developing the source of the information comprising the database, explaining
what was meant when insurance information was unavailable, explaining why such
information would be unavailable, illustrating the accuracy of the database,
establishing the timeliness of the information within the database, . . .and
the like’).
Under the approach of any of those
jurisdictions, reasonable suspicion supported the stop in this case. Not only
did the defense present no evidence of unreliability of the MVD database, as in
Cortez-Galaviz, but the State developed
the evidence, which Dixson and Gonzales-Galindo called out as lacking,
to demonstrate that reliance on the New Mexico MVD database report of an
`unknown’ compliance status provided a reasonable basis for suspecting that
Defendant's vehicle was probably uninsured, as reflected in the findings of the
district court.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Supreme Court therefore held that it
was objectively reasonable for Officer
Rempe to suspect Defendant was operating an uninsured vehicle in violation of
the law when the database indicated the compliance status was unknown to the
MVD. If Officer Rempe's suspicion was particularized, the stop for further
investigation `to verify or quell that suspicion’ was constitutionally justified. State v. Sewell, supra.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The court also found that,
[u]nder the circumstances presented
here, Officer Rempe was justified in his objective and particularized belief
that the MVD database maintained for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
the MFRA contained no information reflecting that the vehicle Defendant was
driving was insured. Officer Rempe then had reason `to pluck this needle from
the haystack of cars on the road for investigation of a possible insurance
violation.’ Cortez-Galaviz, supra.
Accordingly, Officer Rempe's investigatory stop complied with the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
The Court also went on to find that the result “under the
New Mexico Constitution is the same as under the United States Constitution.” State v. Yazzie, supra. This conclusion was attributable, in large part, to the fact
that the “search and seizure” provision of the New Mexico Constitution contains
language that is almost identical to what appears in the Fourth Amendment. State v. Yazzie, supra. More precisely,
Article II § 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that “`The people shall
be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable
searches and seizures.’” State v.
Yazzie, supra. The Supreme Court
therefore held that
[a]ccordingly, we apply the same
reasonable suspicion analysis to the investigatory stop here under Article II
Section 10 as we did under the Fourth Amendment, and we hold that under
the circumstances the traffic stop did not violate the New Mexico Constitution.
State v. Yazzie, supra.
So the Supreme Court reversed “the contrary opinion of the
Court of Appeals and affirm the district court order denying Defendant’s motion
to suppress.” State v. Yazzie, supra.
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