This post examines an opinion from the Court of Appeals of South Carolina: State v. Edwards, 415 S.C. 4017, 82 S.E.2d 124 (2016). The court began the opinion by explaining
that
Cleophus N. Edwards, Jr. appeals his
convictions for murder, first-degree burglary, and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the circuit court erred in
admitting into evidence (1) a laptop computer, (2) clothing and shoes from a
suitcase, and (3) the results of DNA analysis and shoe imprint comparisons.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
Next, the Court of Appeals began outlining the facts that
led to this prosecution:
On February 3, 2011, Carolyn Hanton
(the victim) was stabbed to death inside her house. Aaron Hanton, the victim's
husband, reported a red Acer laptop was missing from the house. On February 16,
2011, when police went to Appellant Edwards's house to execute an arrest
warrant for a probation violation, an officer observed Edwards using a red Acer
laptop and matched its serial number to the serial number from the victim's
computer box. Police questioned Edwards about the laptop following his arrest,
and he confessed to stabbing and robbing the victim. A grand jury subsequently
indicted him for murder, first-degree burglary, and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The opinion went on to explain what happened next:
Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress
evidence of the laptop, arguing police searched and seized it in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. The State proffered the testimony of Officer Ryan
Harter, who responded to the victim's house on February 3, 2011. Officer Harter
testified that when the victim's family members informed him that a red Acer
laptop was missing, he entered the serial number from the laptop's box into a
police database and reported it as stolen.
Unrelated to the victim's murder,
Officer Harter accompanied a team to Edwards's house on February 16, 2011,
to execute an arrest warrant for a probation violation. There, Officer
Harter observed Edwards sitting with a red Acer laptop on his lap. Officer Harter
testified that he was familiar with computers, and the model he viewed on
Edwards's lap was `extremely consistent’ with the missing laptop from the
victim's house. Officer Harter stated, `Acer is not a real popular brand. And
the fact that it is a red laptop really kind of sets it apart. We knew it was a
widescreen laptop, and so it met a lot of criteria just from [being] able to
view it.’ Officer Harter testified that he turned the computer over to view the
serial number and discovered it matched the serial number of the missing
computer. On cross-examination, Officer Harter reiterated that the brand,
color, and screen width of the computer caught his attention. Officer Harter
stated, `I believe[d] it had a high probability of being the computer we were
seeking.’ Officer Harter acknowledged Edwards did not give him permission to
move the computer to view the serial number and that police did not have any
prior knowledge or tips that the computer would be located at Edwards's house.
Edwards argued that even though he was
on probation, he had the right to be free from unreasonable searches in his
home, and Officer Harter needed reasonable suspicion to search the computer.
According to Edwards, the computer was `really an innocent object,’ and simply
observing a computer of the same brand and color as the missing computer was
insufficient to give Officer Harter reasonable suspicion.
State v. Edwards,
supra. (We will return to the issue
of reasonable suspicion later.)
The court then outlined what happened next:
Edwards also moved to suppress articles
of clothing and shoes seized from a suitcase outside his house. The State
explained that after his confession, police secured a warrant to search
Edwards's house for weapons, clothing, and shoes. While police were
executing the search warrant, Melvin Simmons and Britney Davis—Edwards's
former roommate and his roommate's girlfriend—independently brought a suitcase
purportedly belonging to Edwards to drop off at the house. According to the
State, Officer Gerald Carter saw Edwards's name on the luggage tag, opened the
suitcase at the scene, viewed a pair of tennis shoes, closed the suitcase, and
took it into custody.
The State explained that Officer
William Ketcherside got a search warrant for the suitcase the next day,
documented its contents, and transported the contents to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) for testing. Edwards argued the
suitcase evidence should be suppressed because it was not covered under the
search warrant for the house and because exigent circumstances did not support
the warrantless search of the suitcase. Edwards also asserted police lacked the
necessary reasonable suspicion to search the suitcase because it was `an
innocent object’ that police had no reason to believe contained evidence of the
crime.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The opinion goes on to explain that the “circuit court”,
i.e., the trial court,
denied the motions to suppress the
computer and suitcase evidence, determining that police needed only reasonable suspicion
for the searches based on the probation statute and Edwards's
signing of a waiver acknowledging that as a condition of his probation, he was
subject to warrantless searches based upon an officer's reasonable suspicions.
The circuit court ruled that Officer Harter had reasonable suspicion to examine
the computer, noting his experience and firsthand knowledge of the missing red
Acer from his investigation of the victim's house thirteen days earlier.
Additionally, the circuit court found that Officer Carter had reasonable
suspicion to search the suitcase based on the discovery of the laptop at
Edwards's house and his confession.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The Court of Appeals summarized that, at Edwards’ trial,
the circuit court admitted the laptop,
suitcase clothing, and tennis shoes into evidence over Edwards's objection.
SLED Agent Karl Kenley, qualified as an expert in footwear identification and
comparison, opined that the tennis shoe from the suitcase had the same outsole
designs as shoeprints found at the victim's house. SLED Agent Catherine Leisy,
qualified as an expert in DNA analysis, opined that samples collected from the
outside of the tennis shoe and from the bloodstained jeans from the suitcase
matched the victim's DNA profile.
The jury convicted Edwards of murder,
first-degree burglary, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a
violent crime. The circuit court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of
life imprisonment for murder and first-degree burglary.
State v. Edwards, supra.
On appeal, Edwards argued that “the circuit court erred in
admitting the laptop into evidence because police searched it without probable
cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” State v. Edwards, supra. The
Court of Appeals noted that
`[a] [circuit] court's Fourth
Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if supported by any evidence, and
an appellate court may reverse only when there is clear error.’ State v. Taylor, 401 S.C. 104, 108, 736
S.E.2d 663, 663 (South Carolina Supreme Court 2013).
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis of Edwards’
argument regarding the laptop by explaining that
[i]n Arizona v. Hicks, the
United States Supreme Court held an officer's movement of stereo equipment to
view its serial number constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 480 U.S. 321, 324-325, (1987). The Supreme
Court explained that this action, which was unrelated to the objective of an
authorized intrusion into the house, exposed concealed parts of the apartment
to view and produced a new invasion of privacy that constituted a search. 480
U.S. at 325. Analyzing the reasonableness of the search, the Supreme Court held
that probable cause is generally required to conduct a search of an object in
plain view, and the officer's reasonable suspicion that the equipment was
stolen was not enough to support the movement and examination of the stereo
equipment. 480 U.S. at 325-329.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The court went on to explain that it agreed
that Officer Harter's movement of the
laptop to view its serial number constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. See 480 U.S. at
324-325 (holding an officer's movement of stereo equipment to view a
serial number constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment). Because Officer
Harter's action exceeded the scope of his lawful purpose of being at the
apartment to execute an arrest warrant and exposed new information to view, we
believe his examination of the laptop constituted a search. See id. Next,
we must analyze the reasonableness of the search.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
As Wikipedia’s entry on the Fourth Amendment explains, the
amendment requires that officers’ conduct be “reasonable” when they search an
area belonging to a citizen and/or when they seize property belonging to the
citizen.
Getting back to the opinion, the Court of Appeals went on to
point out that
[p]ursuant to the probation statute, a
court may impose certain conditions upon probationers. South Carolina Code Ann. § 24-21-430 (Supp. 2015). `[T]he
conditions imposed must include the requirement that the probationer must permit
the search or seizure, without a search warrant, based on reasonable
suspicions, of the probationer's person, any vehicle the probationer owns or is
driving, and any of the probationer's possessions by ... [a] law
enforcement officer.’ Id.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The court then began its analysis of the constitutionality
of the search in this case:
In United States v. Knights, the
United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's
house based on reasonable suspicion did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The
defendant signed a probation order containing a condition that he would
`[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal
effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of
arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement
officer.’ Id. at 114 (alteration in
original).
While the defendant was on probation, a
police officer searched his residence without a warrant based on suspicions
that he was involved with an arson. Id.
at 114. The Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search, balancing
the defendant's expectation of privacy with the promotion of legitimate
government interests. Id. at 118-121. The Supreme Court found,
`[T]he search of [the defendant] was reasonable under [the] general Fourth
Amendment approach of “examining the totality of the circumstances,” with the
probation search condition being a salient circumstance.’ Id. at 118 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). Given the defendant's reduced
expectation of privacy due to agreeing to the probation condition, the police
officer's search, which was supported by reasonable suspicion, was permissible. Id. at 119-121. . . . The Court explained
that `[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to
a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood
that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.’ Id.
at 121.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The court then took up the issue of reasonable suspicion,
explaining that the
`term “reasonable suspicion” requires a
particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of
criminal activity.’ State v. Woodruff,
344 S.C. 537, 546, 544 S.E.2d 290, 295 (South Carolina Court of Appeals 2001). `In
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the whole picture must be
considered.’ Id. `Generally stated, reasonable suspicion is a
standard that requires more than a ‘hunch’ but less than probable cause.’ State v. Provet, 391 S.C. 494, 500, 706
S.E.2d 513 516 (South Carolina Court of Appeals 2011). `[C]ourts must “consider the totality of the
circumstances” and “give due weight to common sense judgments reached by
officers in light of their experience and training.”’ Id. at 500-501, 706 S.E.2d at 516 (quoting United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317,
321 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 2004)). `Reasonableness
is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.
As a result, the nature of the reasonableness inquiry is highly fact-specific.’ State v. Provet, supra 501, 706 S.E.2d
at 516 (quoting State v. Tindall,
388 S.C. 518, 527, 388 S.C. 518, 527, 600 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2010)).
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The Court of Appeals went on to explain that,
[a]lthough Edwards argues police lacked
probable cause for the search under Hicks, we find Officer
Harter needed only reasonable suspicion to support the search of the red
laptop. This situation is distinguishable from that in Hicks because
of Edwards's agreement to submit to searches of his possessions based on
reasonable suspicion as a condition of his probation. Because of Edwards's
reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer, reasonable suspicion was
enough to support a search under the Fourth Amendment in these
circumstances. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (`When an officer has
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is
engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct
is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy
interests is reasonable’). Therefore, the analysis hinges on whether Officer
Harter had reasonable suspicion to search the laptop.
We find that evidence supports the
circuit court's ruling that Officer Harter had reasonable suspicion under the
totality of the circumstances. See Taylor, 401 S.C. at 108, 736 S.E.2d at 665 (`A [circuit] court's Fourth
Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if supported by any
evidence, and an appellate court may reverse only when there is clear error’); State v. Provet, 391 S.C. at 500, 706
S.E.2d at 516 (`In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the
[circuit] court must consider the totality of the circumstances’).
Officer Harter was aware of a stolen
red widescreen Acer laptop because he documented the serial number from the
computer box at the victim's house. Additionally, when entering Edwards's
house, Officer Harter was aware that Edwards was on probation because police
were executing an arrest warrant for a probation violation. When Officer Harter
saw the laptop on Edwards's lap, he had reasonable suspicion to believe it was
the victim's stolen laptop because of the distinctive nature of a red Acer
widescreen laptop, his knowledge of computers, the short elapsed time of
thirteen days since the murder, and the four-block proximity between Edwards's
house and the victim's house.
Accordingly, we hold the evidence
supports the circuit court's ruling that police did not violate Edwards's
Fourth Amendment rights because Edwards had a diminished expectation of privacy
as a probationer and Officer Harter had reasonable suspicion to search the
laptop under the totality of circumstances. Thus, the circuit court did not err
in admitting the laptop into evidence. See Taylor, 401 S.C. at 108, 736 S.E.2d at 665 (`A
[circuit] court's Fourth Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if
supported by any evidence, and an appellate court may reverse only when there
is clear error’).
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The court went on to address Edwards’ argument that
police lacked probable cause for the
search under Hicks, we find Officer Harter needed only
reasonable suspicion to support the search of the red laptop. This situation
is distinguishable from that in Hicks because of Edwards's
agreement to submit to searches of his possessions based on reasonable
suspicion as a condition of his probation. Because of Edwards's reduced
expectation of privacy as a probationer, reasonable suspicion was enough to
support a search under the Fourth Amendment in these circumstances. See
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
at 121 (`When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer
subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough
likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.).
Therefore, the analysis hinges on whether Officer Harter had reasonable
suspicion to search the laptop.
State v. Edwards,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then announced its ruling on this
issue, explaining that
[w]e find that evidence supports the
circuit court's ruling that Officer Harter had reasonable suspicion under the
totality of the circumstances. See Taylor, 401 S.C. at 108, 736 S.E.2d at 665 (`A [circuit] court's Fourth
Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if supported by any
evidence, and an appellate court may reverse only when there is clear error’); State v. Provet, 391 S.C. at 500, 706
S.E.2d at 516 (`In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the
[circuit] court must consider the totality of the circumstances’).
Officer Harter was aware of a stolen
red widescreen Acer laptop because he documented the serial number from the
computer box at the victim's house. Additionally, when entering Edwards's
house, Officer Harter was aware that Edwards was on probation because police
were executing an arrest warrant for a probation violation.
When Officer Harter saw the laptop on
Edwards's lap, he had reasonable suspicion to believe it was the victim's
stolen laptop because of the distinctive nature of a red Acer widescreen
laptop, his knowledge of computers, the short elapsed time of thirteen days
since the murder, and the four-block proximity between Edwards's house and the
victim's house. Accordingly, we hold the evidence supports the circuit court's
ruling that police did not violate Edwards's Fourth Amendment rights because
Edwards had a diminished expectation of privacy as a probationer and Officer
Harter had reasonable suspicion to search the laptop under the totality of
circumstances. Thus, the circuit court did not err in admitting the laptop into
evidence. . . .
State v. Edwards,
supra.
For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Edwards’ conviction. State v. Edwards,
supra.
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