The License Plate Recognition System, Reasonable Suspicion and the 4th Amendment

After Lawrence Williams was “indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon” in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 922(g)(1), he went to trial, the jury found him guilty and the U.S. District Court Judge who had the case “sentenced him to 66 months' imprisonment.”  U.S. v. Williams, 2015 WL 4666312 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). Williams appealed.  U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The Court of Appeals begins its opinion by explaining how the prosecution arose:

On January 26, 2013, Officer Jennifer Hendricks of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department was driving her patrol car when its license plate recognition (`LPR’) system gave an alert about a nearby car. The LPR system scans the license plates of cars that are within range of cameras mounted on the patrol car and can generate an alert if a scanned car is connected to a wanted person.

The alert showed Officer Hendricks that a man named Otis Hicks was associated with a nearby car and was wanted by the St. Louis County Police Department, a department that neighbors Hendricks's, for first-degree domestic assault. The alert also said that Hicks may be armed and dangerous. The LPR alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car.

After pulling the car over, Officer Hendricks approached the driver's side and saw two men inside. She asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Otis Hicks. Officer Hendricks then waited for a second police officer to arrive.

Upon arrival, Officer David Christensen asked the passenger, Williams, to get out of the car and present identification. According to Officer Christensen, Williams patted his waistband two times while getting out of the car and Williams's hands were shaking uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Officer Christensen handcuffed Williams and conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Officer Christensen felt what he recognized to be a firearm and removed a handgun from Williams's waistband. After finding the handgun, Officer Christensen found a bag containing `a dark rock-like substance’ in Williams's pocket that was later identified as heroin.

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The Court of Appeals goes on to explain that a

federal grand jury indicted Lawrence Williams for one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun and heroin. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from Officers Hendricks and Christensen. The magistrate judge recommended the denial of Williams's motions. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's relevant proposed factual findings and rulings.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the Government notified Williams that it would introduce his prior firearm-possession convictions at trial. Williams submitted two motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon, his 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm, and his earlier conviction of first-degree robbery. Williams also moved to exclude the heroin.

The district court denied Williams's motions to exclude the heroin and the 2002 and 1995 convictions. However, the court excluded the earlier robbery conviction because of, among other reasons, `the age, when it was completed, the similarity of the offenses, and the fact that we will already have two others that will be introduced into evidence.’

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

At Williams’ trial, his attorney attempted to cross-examine

Officer Hendricks about her motivation for testifying that Williams had actual possession of the handgun. After Williams's counsel asked Officer Hendricks if she had been frustrated with prosecutors' past decisions regarding whether to bring firearm charges, the Government objected, and the following colloquy took place at sidebar:

Counsel: Judge, it's my good faith belief that the police officers in the city of St. Louis sometimes decide to charge somebody with a gun that they found in the car even though the gun was not found on the person, and that the person that they decide to charge is the person in the car that has the worst record.

Court: Have you got some evidence of this that you are going to present here?

Counsel: No, I want to ask her.

Court: Do you have some evidence of that fact that you are prepared to present to me?

Counsel: No.

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The opinion then explains that, after

the Government argued that this had “nothing to do with the facts of this case,” the court asked Williams's counsel about the foundation for this line of questions:

Court: I am just going to tell you, [Counsel], absent some evidence to support some good faith belief that that occurs or occurred here, I will not permit you to go down that road.

Counsel: Well, may I tell the Court that my good faith belief is based on talking to a retired police officer about this case?

Court: No. If you want to bring that police officer in to testify here, then I will take his proffer and we can go from there.

Counsel: All right.

Court: But I will not permit you on the record that we have here to suggest that with respect to this witness.

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

Next, after

Officer Hendricks finished testifying, Officer Christensen took the stand. Before cross-examining Officer Christensen, Williams's counsel asked the court if he would be barred from pursuing the same line of questions:

Counsel: I assume [the Government] still wants to object and that you would make the same ruling, that I'm not allowed at this time to go into questions about the relationship between the police department and the warrant office at the [prosecutor's office].

Court: Not for the purpose and based upon the record that you have made today, correct.

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The District Court Judge then instructed the jury on “how it should consider the evidence of Williams's 2002 and 1995 convictions.”  U.S. v. Williams, supra. After deliberating, the jury found Williams guilty and this appeal followed.  U.S. v. Williams, supra.

Williams made two arguments on appeal, but only one of them implicates the 4^th Amendment.  U.S. v. Williams, supra.  In his other argument, Williams claimed that the trial judge “abused” his discretion by admitting, “under Rule 404(b),  evidence that Williams had twice been convicted of illegal firearm possession.” U.S. v. Williams, supra. 

Williams’ first argument was that

Officer Hendricks lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). According to Williams, because Officer Hendricks lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car, the handgun and heroin were fruits of an illegal stop and should have been suppressed. See generally Wong Sun v. U.S., 371U.S. 471 (1963).

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The 4^th Amendment creates a constitutional right for individuals to be free from “unreasonable” searches and seizures.  And as Wikipedia explains, a

brief, non-custodial traffic stop is considered a `seizure’ for the purposes of the 4th Amendment and must therefore be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The investigating officer must weigh the totality of the circumstances to determine whether sufficient objective facts exist to create reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaged in criminal activity.  If the investigating officer witnesses the driver commit a traffic violation, then said violation generally constitutes reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle. The officer may then detain the driver and any passengers of the vehicle for long enough to confirm and/or deny his or her suspicions.

If his or her suspicions are confirmed, then there may be probable cause to either search the vehicle and/or arrest its occupant(s), depending on the nature of the suspected violations. . . . .

Getting back to the Williams case, the Court of Appeals then analyzed Williams’ “reasonable suspicion” argument:

We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. U.S. v. Farnell, 701 F.3d 256 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012). `The 4th Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.’ U.S. v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2007). If police have reasonable suspicion, they `may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the suspicion.” U.S. v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2008).

`Reasonable suspicion must be supported by more than a mere hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.’ U.S. v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). . . . `We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an officer has a particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing.’ U.S. v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

The Court of Appeals then addressed whether there was reasonable suspicion in this case:

We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. U.S. v. Farnell, 701 F.3d 256 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012). `The 4th Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.’ U.S. v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2007).

If police have reasonable suspicion, they `may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the suspicion.’ U.S. v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013  (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2008). `Reasonable suspicion must be supported by more than a mere hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.’ U.S. v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2015). . .  `We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an officer has a particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing.’ U.S. v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012).

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

It went on to explain that, in this case,

Officer Hendricks relied upon the notice from the LPR system that: (1) Hicks was associated with a nearby car, (2) Hicks was wanted by the St. Louis County Police Department for first-degree domestic assault, and (3) Hicks may have been armed and dangerous. 

Williams nonetheless argues that Officer Hendricks did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because a “police officer who receives an alert from the LPR system has no way of knowing the extent of the person's relationship to the vehicle.’

Williams and the Government seem to agree that there are no reported federal decisions that have specifically dealt with the use of an LPR system in the 4th Amendment context. However, as we have held, `if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information.’  U.S. v. Farnell, supra. . . (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 648 F.3d 65 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8<sup>th</sup> Circuit 2011).  `Police officers may rely upon notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted in connection with the investigation of a felony “when making a Terry stop, even if the notice omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion.’” U.S. v. Smith, supra (quoting U.S.  v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8^th Circuit 2004)).

We fail to see how the use of the LPR system makes any difference in this case. Williams does not cite any precedent holding that the mechanism through which an officer receives notice from another department matters for 4th Amendment purposes. Indeed, the LPR system merely automates what could otherwise be accomplished by checking the license-plate number against a `hot sheet’ of numbers, inputting a given number into a patrol car's computer, or `calling in’ the number to the police station. Thus, we conclude that Officer Hendricks was entitled to `rely upon notice from another police department’ she obtained by using a more automated process: the LPR system. U.S. v. Jacobsen, supra. upholding a police officer's reliance on a wanted notice he discovered by performing a search on a license-plate number).

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

And, finally, Williams also argued that

Officer Hendricks's stop violated the 4th Amendment “because she could not tell who was driving the car until after she stopped it.” Williams asserts, without citation, that Officer Hendricks must `have [had] some idea at least that there [was] a black male driving the car’ before making the traffic stop. Officer Hendricks testified that she was unable to see who was inside the car until after she stopped it. Common sense dictates that police officers will often be unable to confirm the race or gender of a driver before initiating a traffic stop. Accordingly, we fail to see how Officer Hendricks's decision to briefly stop the car and check the driver's identification was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment merely because she initially could not identify the driver's race or gender. See U.S. v. Farnell, supra.

Williams concedes that Hicks was `perhaps associated with the car’ but nonetheless argues that the stop violated the 4th Amendment because Officer Hendricks `had no information of the time frame of when Hicks had been associated with the car.’

But our precedent makes clear that `officers may rely upon notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted in connection with the investigation of a felony “when making a Terry stop, even if the notice omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion.”’ U.S. v. Smith, supra (internal alteration omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Jacobsen, supra). Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

U.S. v. Williams, supra.

For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction. U.S. v. Williams, supra.