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This post examines a recent opinion from the Supreme Court of Arkansas: State v. Riley, 2014 WL 5494168 (2014). The court begins its opinion by explaining
that the State of Arkansas, which prosecuted Quinton Riley for kidnapping, was
appealing “the circuit court's grant of appellee Quinton Riley's motion for a
new trial based on juror misconduct.” State v. Riley, supra.
As the Supreme Court noted, the “State argues on appeal that
the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a new trial and asserts
that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to [Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure –Criminal] 3(b) and (c) (2014).” State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court then explained what, exactly, happened in
the Circuit Court:
After a two-day jury trial held on
December 11–12, 2013, Riley was convicted of kidnapping and sentenced as a
habitual offender to life imprisonment. On December 16, 2013, Riley filed
a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct.
He alleged that Juror # 1, Brittany
Lewis, had used her cell phone to post on Facebook during jury deliberations in
violation of the circuit court's instructions to the jury that they were
prohibited from doing so. Riley claimed that he became aware of Lewis's posts
after the trial had already concluded. He asserted that he had been
prejudiced by Lewis's failure to follow the circuit court's instructions and
argued that Lewis's conduct violated his right to due process and prohibited
him from having a fair and impartial jury.
Riley attached to his motion the
Facebook posts made by Lewis.
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court explains that the trial judge then held a
hearing
on the motion for new trial on January
6, 2014. At the hearing, Lewis admitted that she had made several Facebook
posts during the course of Riley's trial. At 5:18 p.m. on the first day of
trial, during a recess, Lewis posted, `Still in this Court Room. Lord, I'm
ready to go home. I'm sleepy and tired, and my red wine is calling my name.’
Then, at 7:02 p.m. that same evening,
after the jury had begun deliberating, Lewis posted `Droooovvee. We can't come
to a decision. Ugh FML.’ Lewis's next post came at 11:07 p.m. after the jury
had been released for the evening.
She stated, `Got home at 9:30 after
leaving jury duty at 8:40. I'm just now eating my dinner while I'm irritated as
hell. I probably won't be able to sleep tonight after hearing testimonies and
seeing horrible pictures and I gotta do it all over again tomorrow. Nite nite.
“grabs wine while wishing I had vodka”[.]’
The next morning, on December 12, 2013,
Lewis posted at 8:34 a.m., `Good morning. Got jury duty again this morning, and
hopefully we won't be there until 8:40 p.m. like last night. Ain't nobody got
time for that.’
Lewis testified that all of her posts
were made during breaks in the trial. She admitted that her post at 7:02 p.m.
on December 11 was made during jury deliberations; however, she claimed that
she had taken a restroom break at the time. The [Circuit Court Judge] noted in
this regard that the restroom was inside the jury room and that no juror
had left the room during deliberations.
State v. Riley, supra.
After the hearing, the Circuit Court Judge
entered an order on January 10, 2014,
granting Riley's motion for new trial. The court found that the jury had been
repeatedly instructed throughout the trial not to discuss the case with anyone
and that they had also been specifically instructed in accordance with AMCI
101(g) not to use cell phones or other communication devices for any purpose
while in the jury room during deliberations.
The circuit court cited to this court's
decision in Dimas–Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, 385 S.W.3d
238 (2011), in which we held that the defendant was prejudiced by a juror's
posts on Twitter during the trial because this demonstrated that the juror had
failed to follow the trial court's instructions. Although the circuit court
noted that there were some differences in Lewis's conduct and that of the juror
in Dimas–Martinez, the court found that these differences were
not sufficient to distinguish that case from the present one.
The circuit court found that by posting
to Facebook, Lewis had disregarded and violated the court's clear orders. The
court stated that Lewis's conduct was even more egregious because one of her
posts was made while she was supposed to be deliberating.
The court found that all jurors are
presumed to be unbiased in following the court's instructions but that Lewis's
conduct had overcome that presumption. Based on its conclusion that Riley
had not received a fair trial, the circuit court ordered a new trial.
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court then explained that
[a]s a preliminary matter, this court
must first decide if it has jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal in this
case. We will not consider an appeal by the State unless the correct
and uniform administration of the criminal law requires review by this
court. Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 3(d). In practice, we review only State appeals
that are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law. State
v. Jenkins, 2011 Ark. 2, 2011 WL 143571 (Arkansas Supreme Court 2011)
State appeals that merely demonstrate
that the circuit court erred are not permitted. State v. Jenkins, supra.
Furthermore, we will not accept an appeal by the State where the circuit
court has acted within its discretion after making an evidentiary decision
based on the particular facts of the case or even on a mixed question of law
and fact, as those appeals do not require an interpretation of our criminal
rules with widespread ramifications. State v. Jenkins, supra.
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court went on to explain that, in this case, the
prosecution
argues that the
circuit court clearly erred in finding juror misconduct because Lewis did not
violate the court's instructions by her Facebook posts. The State contends that
Lewis's posts were not musings, thoughts, or comments about the facts of the
case, which are improper pursuant to Dimas–Martinez v. State, supra, and
that the circuit court in this case did not prohibit the jurors from making any
social-media posts at all.
In addition, the
State argues that, even if Lewis's posts violated the circuit court's
instructions, the circuit court erred by finding that Riley was prejudiced by
the violations. The State asserts that Dimas–Martinez v. State, supra is
factually distinguishable and that the circuit court abused its discretion in
extending that decision to the facts in this case.
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court went on to note that “Riley argues that
this court does not have jurisdiction of this appeal under Ark. R.App. P.-Crim.
3 and that it must therefore be dismissed”, and the court agreed. State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court explained that the
State's sole argument on appeal is that
the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Riley's motion for new
trial. In support of its argument, the State contends that the circuit court
clearly erred in finding that Lewis violated the court's instructions to
the jury and also that the court erred in finding that Riley was prejudiced by
these violations.
Both of these are factually intensive
inquiries. The issue of whether Lewis violated the circuit court's instructions
by her Facebook posts is based on the unique facts of this case, as is the
issue of prejudice. While the State attempts to frame its argument as one of
law by contending that the circuit court erred by extending the holding
in Dimas–Martinez v. State, supra, this issue is one that involves
the correct application of the law to the facts in this case.
This is demonstrated by the State's
assertion that Dimas–Martinez v. State, supra, is `factually
distinct’ from the present case. We do not accept State appeals that raise the
issue of an application of the law to the facts of the case, as we have held
that this does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the
criminal law. . . .
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court went on to explain that the prosecution in
this case
cites State v. Cherry, 341
Ark. 924, 20 S.W.3d 354 (Arkansas Supreme Court 2000), and State v.
Osborn, 337 Ark. 172, 988 S.W.2d 485 (Arkansas Supreme Court 1999),
both cases involving juror misconduct, in support of its contention that we
have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Ark. R.App. P.-Crim 3.
However, both of these cases are
distinguishable from the present case. Although we did not specifically
discuss the issue of jurisdiction in State v. Cherry, supra, we
did state that the appeal was extraordinary,’
as it involved a novel situation of juror misconduct. State v. Cherry,
supra.
Also, in State v. Osborn, the
appeal involved a question of law, which was whether the circuit court's
decision violated [Arkansas Rules of Evidence 606(b)]. We held that this issue was
one where the correct and uniform administration of the law required our
review. State v. Osborn, supra.
State v. Riley, supra.
The Supreme Court therefore held that the
State has failed to establish that this
court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 3, as it turns
on whether the circuit court's findings are supported by the unique facts in
this case, and it does not involve the correct and uniform administration of
the law. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
State v. Riley, supra.
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