This post examines an opinion the Appellate Court of
Illinois issued recently: Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer
Ministries, Inc., 2014 IL App (5th) 130193 (2014). As the court explains in
the opening sentence of its opinion, the plaintiff in the civil suit,
Regions Bank, d/b/a Regions
Morgan–Keegan Trust (“the Bank”), as independent administrator of the estates
of Sheri Coleman, Garett Coleman, and Gavin Coleman, appeals from an order of
the circuit court of Monroe County dismissing with prejudice its claims against
the defendant, Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. As I
have noted in earlier posts, and as Wikipedia explains, a motion asserting that
the plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is how lawsuits with
insufficient legal theories underlying
their cause of action are dismissed from court. For
example, assault requires intent, so if the plaintiff has failed
to plead intent, the defense can seek dismissal by filing a . . . motion. `While
a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). . . .
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. Wikipedia is referring to a motion brought
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure while the motion in this
case was brought under Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 5/2-615, but the
process is the same under both. Regions
Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. You can, if you are
interested, read more about how § 5/1-615 works in the article you can find
here.
The lawsuit arose from these events (and allegations):
In May 5, 2009, Sheri Coleman and her
young sons, Garett Coleman and Gavin Coleman . . . were murdered in their home
in Columbia, Illinois. Christopher Coleman, the husband of Sheri and the father
of Garett and Gavin, was charged with and subsequently convicted of the
murders. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole
for these crimes. On May 5, 2009, and for more than eight years prior,
Christopher Coleman had been employed in high-level security positions by Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc. It is alleged that in the months leading up to the
murders, Coleman used his work computer to email death threats directed at himself,
the decedents, and Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. You
can, if you are interested, read more about the murders here and here.
The court goes on to explain that on May 4, 2011, the Bank
filed a Complaint for
wrongful death against Christopher
Coleman, Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc. (JMM), Joyce Meyer, and Daniel B. Meyer.
Christopher Coleman has not entered an appearance in this case. . . . Joyce
Meyer and Daniel Meyer were voluntarily dismissed . . . pursuant to a
stipulation by the parties.
JMM entered its appearance and filed a
motion to dismiss the counts against it pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (Code) . . on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state
any claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted JMM's
motion, but permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Bank filed an amended complaint that contained “three
counts” against
JMM. Count III alleges wrongful death
under a theory of a negligent undertaking to protect the decedents from
threatened harm. Count IV is the corresponding survival action. Count V is
brought under a theory of negligent retention of the employment of Christopher
Coleman. JMM renewed its motion to dismiss all counts under section 2–615 of
the Code for failure to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. . .
.
JMM argued that count III should be
dismissed because it did not allege sufficient facts to establish that JMM
undertook to protect the decedents from the harmful acts of a third party, and
count V should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not allege a logical
connection between retaining Christopher Coleman as an employee and his murderous
acts. After considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, the trial court
granted JMM's motion and dismissed counts III, IV, and V of the first
amended complaint with prejudice.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Bank appealed, claiming “the first amended complaint
contains sufficient allegations of fact to establish duties owed by JMM to the
decedents under theories of a voluntary undertaking and negligent retention.” Regions
Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. The Appellate Court began its analysis of the
appeal by noting that a “cause of action should not be dismissed under section
2–615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that
would entitle the plaintiff to recover.” Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The court began its analysis of that issue by noting that
the claims against JMM
are negligence-based. In order to state
a cause of action for negligence, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to
establish the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, a breach of the duty, and an injury proximately caused by the
breach. Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill.2d
414, 804 N.E.2d 519 (Illinois Supreme Court 2004). Whether a duty exists is a
question of law for the court to decide. Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life, supra. Whether
a duty was breached and whether the breach was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries are questions of fact for a jury to decide. Bajwa
v. Metropolitan Life, supra.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. If
you are interested, Wikipedia explains more about the role of “duty” in
negligence claims.
The Appellate Court began its analysis of the existence of a
duty by noting that
we consider whether the factual
allegations in count III are sufficient to establish JMM voluntarily undertook
to protect the decedents from the criminal acts of a third person. Ordinarily,
a person has no affirmative duty to protect another from harmful or criminal
acts by a third person. Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195
Ill.2d 210, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (Illinois Supreme Court 2000). Exceptions to this
general principal have been recognized: (1) when the parties are in a `special relationship,’
i.e., common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business invitor-invitee, or
voluntary custodian-protectee, and the harmful or criminal acts were reasonably
foreseeable; (2) when an employee is in imminent danger and this is known to
the employer; (3) when a principal fails to warn an agent of an unreasonable
risk of harm involved in the agency; and (4) when there is negligence in the
performance of a voluntary undertaking. Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co., 267
Ill.App.3d 775, 641 N.E.2d 845 (Appellate Court of Illinois 1994). The
voluntary-undertaking exception is at issue here. In Illinois, this exception
has been narrowly construed and the duty imposed is limited by the extent of
the undertaking. . . .
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
It also noted that § 323 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which has “been recognized in Illinois,” addresses
“liability on a voluntary undertaking to render services to another.” Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries,
Inc., supra. Section 323 provides as
follows:
One who undertakes,
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is
suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
The Appellate Court went on to explain
that a plaintiff’s complaint can allege
nonfeasance or
misfeasance in the performance of a voluntary undertaking. Bourgonje v.
Machev, 362 Ill.App.3d 984, 841 N.E.2d 96 (Illinois Appellate Court 2005).
In the case of `nonfeasance,’ a plaintiff must allege facts to indicate (a)
that the defendant voluntarily undertook to render services necessary for the
protection of another person or took charge of another person's protection; (b)
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in that it wholly failed
to perform the undertaking; and (c) that harm was suffered because of the other
person's reliance on the defendant's undertaking. . . .
In the case of
`misfeasance,’ a plaintiff must allege facts to indicate (a) that the defendant
voluntarily undertook to render services necessary for the protection of
another person or took charge of another person's protection; (b) that the
defendant negligently performed the undertaking; and (c) that the defendant's
negligence increased the risk of the harm to the other person or that the
plaintiff suffered harm due to his reliance on the undertaking. See Wakulich v. Miraz, 203 Ill.2d 223, 785 N.E.2d
843 (Illinois Supreme Court 2003).
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Appellate Court then analyzed the
Complaint at issue here, in light of the principles outlined above. It explained that the Complaint “generally
alleges” that JMM employed
Christopher Coleman
in high-level security positions from November 2000 through May 5, 2009; that
during the period of [his] employment, JMM enacted an electronic communications
policy (E–Comm policy) which governed its employees' use of its electronic
communications systems and equipment; that JMM's E–Comm policy prohibited its
employees from sending or viewing inappropriate, obscene, harassing, or abusive
images, language, and materials on its electronic communications systems and
equipment; that pursuant to the E–Comm policy, JMM reserved the right to
monitor and inspect communications sent, received, and stored on its electronic
communications systems and equipment; and JMM `management’ had the sole
discretion to take disciplinary action against the violators of said policy.
It also alleges that
from November 14, 2008, to May 5, 2009, Christopher Coleman created and
transmitted via email harassing notes and death threats directed to himself,
the decedents, and JMM, using his company-issued computer; that from November
14, 2008, to May 5, 2009, [he] created harassing notes and death threats
directed to himself and the decedents, which were hand-delivered to the mailbox
at the Colemans' home; and that prior to May 5, 2009, JMM was aware death
threats had been made against Christopher Coleman and the decedents, and the
death threats had been delivered to the Colemans' home and through Christopher
Coleman's email account. . . .
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
As to the Complaint, the Appellate Court explained that Count
III alleges that
JMM recognized or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have recognized that in light of
life-threatening email, the provision of security services was necessary for
the protection of the decedents. It further alleges that JMM undertook,
gratuitously or for consideration, to provide security services for the
protection and safety of the decedents, which included:
(a) monitoring,
accessing, and inspecting communications sent, received, and stored on its
electronic communications equipment, and conducting any necessary follow-up
investigation regarding the content and source of those communications;
(b) taking
disciplinary actions against the violators of its policy;
(c) stationing
security at or around the decedents' residence;
(d) installing a
security alarm and surveillance equipment at the decedents' residence; and
(e) monitoring and/or
informing the local authorities of the numerous death threats made against the
decedents.
Count III further
alleges that JMM breached one or more of the aforementioned duties in that it:
(a) failed to
monitor, access, inspect, disclose, and conduct a follow-up investigation on
the numerous death threats made against the decedents that were transmitted,
received, or stored on JMM electronic communications equipment;
(b) failed to take
necessary disciplinary action, including termination, regarding the death
threats made against the decedents that were transmitted, received, or stored
on JMM electronic communications equipment;
(c) failed to provide
security in and around the decedents' residence after numerous death threats
were made against the decedents;
(d) failed to monitor
the decedents' residence and/or failed to install surveillance equipment in or
around the residence after numerous death threats were made against the
decedents; and
(e) failed to inform
law enforcement authorities of the numerous death threats made against the
decedents.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra. It
also noted that Count III
alleges that JMM's
negligent performance of one or more of the aforementioned voluntary
undertakings resulted in an increased risk of harm to the decedents, and that
JMM's failure to perform one or more of the aforementioned voluntary
undertakings resulted in harm to the decedents who, in reliance upon JMM's
promises, failed to take precautions for their own protection.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Appellate Court then concluded that
[w]hen pared to the
core, count III alleges that JMM voluntarily undertook to investigate the
source of the death threats directed at the decedents, which were made or
received through JMM's electronic communications systems and equipment, and to
provide security at the decedents' home for the protection of the decedents;
that JMM failed to perform or negligently performed these undertakings; and
that JMM's negligent acts or omissions increased the risk of danger to the
decedents.
In our view, the
factual allegations and the reasonable inferences therefrom, when liberally
construed and taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient
to establish a duty of care owed by JMM to the decedents under a
voluntary-undertaking theory.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
It also found that Count III “adequately” alleged
that
negligent performance
of its voluntary undertaking increased the risk of harm to the decedents.
Accepting the allegations as true, it may be reasonable to infer that JMM
increased the risk of harm to the decedents by failing to conduct an adequate
investigation of its own communications systems and equipment, essentially
electing to remain ignorant of facts concerning the source of the threats, when
a reasonable person may have conducted an internal investigation of its systems
and equipment. It may also be reasonable to infer that Sheri Coleman did not
have an equal and independent means to investigate the threats, and that Sheri
Coleman, relying on JMM's promises to investigate the threats and to provide
security, did not take steps to protect herself and her children from the
threatened harm.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Appellate Court therefore held that Count III contained
“sufficient allegations” of
act to state a cause of action for
wrongful death based on a voluntary-undertaking theory and should not have been
dismissed. It follows that count IV, the corresponding survival claim, should
not have been dismissed. We pause here to note that we are only deciding a
procedural issue and that neither party should take our resolution of this
issue as a measure of the merits of the case.
The allegations in count III are broad
and the plaintiff will have to present evidence to support them. If the
plaintiff can produce evidence to support its factual allegations, the finderof fact will be asked to determine whether JMM breached a duty it undertook to
provide to the decedents, and if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause
of the harm.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Appellate Court also found that after reviewing
the allegations in Count V,
we conclude it lacks sufficient factual
allegations to establish that the negligent retention of
Christopher Coleman as a JMM employee was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm to the decedents. Count V does not set forth sufficient factual
allegations to establish that Coleman's misuse of his position of employment
was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the decedents. Nor does
it set forth sufficient allegations of fact to establish that Coleman's misuse
of the employer's chattel, a computer, was a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm to the decedents.
The allegations that Christopher
Coleman was particularly unfit for his management position in the security
department, that his particular unfitness created a danger of harm to third
persons, including the decedents, and that JMM breached its duty in retaining
Coleman when it should have reasonably appreciated that Coleman's continued employment
posed a risk of harm to the decedents and others, are conclusions unsupported
by any specific facts.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
The Appellate Court therefore held that the trial judge’s
decision to dismiss count V with
prejudice is affirmed, and its decision to dismiss counts III and IV is
reversed. Counts III and IV are hereby reinstated and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Regions Bank v. Joyce
Meyer Ministries, Inc., supra.
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