After a federal grand jury indicted Henry Stephens “for
being a felon in possession of a firearm on May 16, 2011, in violation
of 18 U.S. Code § 922(g)(1)”, he filed a motion to suppress certain evidence. U.S. v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 2014). The motion to suppress targeted evidence police obtained by using Global Positioning System (GPS)
technology:
In 2011, federal and state law
enforcement officers in the Baltimore area were investigating Stephens for
possible drug and firearms crimes. The investigation began as a result of
information provided by a registered confidential informant, and it was
spearheaded by Officer Paul Geare, . . . Geare was also deputized as an ATF
agent and assigned to a `High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area’ (`HIDTA’) task
force unit, which was `a hybrid unit of federal agents as well as city police
officers’ operating pursuant to Baltimore City and HIDTA guidelines. . . . The
HIDTA joint task force is `organized to conduct investigations into drug and
gun violations of both federal and state law, and its
investigations indeed [lead] to both federal and state prosecutions, determined
on the basis of the facts uncovered.’ U.S. v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit (2010). . . .
On May 13, 2011, Geare -- acting
without a warrant -- installed a battery-powered Global-Positioning-System
device under the rear bumper of Stephens' vehicle, which was parked in a public
lot in Parkville, Maryland. Geare had information that Stephens was a
convicted felon, would be working security at a nightclub known as `Club Unite’
on the evening of May 16, and usually carried a firearm when he worked there.
With this knowledge, Geare -- in conjunction with other officers -- implemented
a plan to detain Stephens and search him on May 16 at Club Unite.
During the evening of May 16, Geare
used the GPS to locate Stephens' vehicle at an area school. Geare and another
city police officer (Sergeant Johnson) observed and followed Stephens as he
drove the vehicle to his residence. Before Stephens left . . . to drive
to Club Unite, Geare and Johnson saw Stephens, who was standing outside his
vehicle, reach around to the back of his waistband. They interpreted this
. . . as being a check for a weapon. Based on this and other information
they had previously obtained, the officers `had at least reasonable suspicion,
if not probable cause, that [Stephens] was armed and was on his way to work at
Club Unite.’ . . .
When Stephens drove away from his
residence, Geare alerted other officers who had been briefed on the plan to go
to Club Unite. Using visual observation and a portable laptop computer to
monitor the GPS, Geare and Johnson followed Stephens' vehicle as he drove on
public roads to Club Unite. Upon Stephens' arrival at Club Unite, the officers
who had been alerted approached him and conducted a patdown, which revealed an
empty holster in the middle of his back. Within a matter of minutes, a
Baltimore city police officer arrived and conducted a canine inspection of the
vehicle exterior. After the canine alerted, the officers searched the vehicle
and found (among other things) a loaded pistol.
The officers then arrested Stephens and
charged him with one or more state-law crimes. Stephens remained in state
custody for approximately three months, until a federal grand jury indicted him
for illegal firearm possession by a convicted felon. See 18
U.S. Code § 922(g)(1). After the federal indictment, the state charges were
dismissed. . . .
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra (emphasis in the original).
The Court of Appeals explains that, while this case was
pending in the trial court – the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland – the U.S. Supreme Court decided U.S.v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). U.S. v. Stephens, supra. In Jones, the Court held that the
government’s installation
`of a GPS device on a
target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a “search”’ within the meaning of the 4th Amendment.
Because the officers in Jones did not have a valid warrant authorizing the GPS
usage, the search -- i.e., GPS usage -- violated the 4th
Amendment.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra. Since the officers in the Jones case had not gotten a warrant that
authorized the installation and use of the GPS device, the search violated the
4th Amendment. U.S. v. Stephens, supra.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, Stephens moved to suppress the
firearm and other evidence seized on
May 16. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court
concluded that in light of Jones, Geare's warrantless use of
the GPS on Stephens' vehicle was an unconstitutional search that led to the
seizure of the challenged evidence. However, the court held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply because Geare used the GPS in good faith. . .
. Stephens entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the
suppression order. See Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then took up the issue in the
case: whether the government could use
the evidence obtained as a result of using the GPS technology. U.S. v. Stephens, supra. It began by explaining that for
purposes of this appeal, we accept the
district court's ruling that Geare's use of the GPS to locate and follow
Stephens in May 2011 was an unreasonable search under the 4th Amendment that
led directly to the seizure of the evidence from Stephens' vehicle and his
arrest. Starting from this premise, we must decide the separate question of
whether the exclusionary rule renders the evidence inadmissible. Because
the facts are not disputed, this question involves a pure legal
conclusion, and we review the district court's ruling de novo. . . .
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
It then turned to the exclusionary rule, explaining that the
U.S. Supreme Court
created the exclusionary rule `to
safeguard against future violations of 4th Amendment rights through the rule's
general deterrent effect.’ Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). The
exclusionary rule `generally prohibits the introduction at criminal trial of
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's 4th Amendment rights,’ Pennsylvania
Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 1998), but the `sole
purpose’ of the rule `is to deter future 4th Amendment violations,’ Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011), and its application `properly has been
restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively
advanced,’ Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). As the
Court has recently made clear, the exclusionary rule is not a “strict liability
regime,” Davis v. U.S., supra, and exclusion of evidence has`always
been [the] last resort, not [the] first impulse.’ Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
It went on to note, though, that
`[e]xclusion exacts a heavy toll on
both the judicial system and society at large,’ because it `almost always
requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or
innocence,’ and `its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the
truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.’ Davis
v. U.S., supra. In order for the exclusionary rule `to be appropriate, the
deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.’ Davis
v. U.S., supra.
`Police practices trigger the harsh
sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful
deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice
system.’ Davis v. U.S., supra. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is
applicable `[w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent disregard for 4th Amendment rights, [and] the deterrent value of
exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.’ Davis v.
U.S., supra.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
But as the Court of Appeals also noted,
`when the police act with an
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when
their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.’ Davis
v. U.S., supra. The `pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is
objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers,’
and the `good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.’ Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
It then explained that in conducting the good faith inquiry,
the Supreme Court has
found the exclusionary rule to be
inapplicable in a variety of circumstances involving 4th Amendment
violations. See, e.g., U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (police
conducted a search in reasonable reliance on a warrant later held
invalid); Illinois v. Krull ,
480 U.S. 340 (1987) (police conducted a search in reasonable reliance on
subsequently invalidated state statutes); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (police
reasonably relied on erroneous information in a database maintained by judicial
employees); Herring v. U.S. supra (police reasonably relied on
erroneous information in a database maintained by police employees).
Our precedent makes it clear that
application of the good-faith inquiry is not limited to the specific
circumstances addressed by the Supreme Court. For example, in U.S. v. Davis,
690 F.3d 226 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 2012), we held the
exclusionary rule did not apply where officers engaged in an unconstitutional
search by extracting and testing the defendant's DNA sample during a murder
investigation without a warrant. We explained that the Supreme Court's `recent
decisions applying the exception have broadened its application, and lead us to
conclude that the 4th Amendment violations here should not result in application
of the exclusionary rule.’ U.S. v. Davis, supra.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
The Court of Appeals then took up the issue as to whether
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply in this
case. It began by explaining that in
May, 2011,
before Jones, neither
the Supreme Court nor this Court had expressly approved or disapproved of
warrantless GPS usage. However, in 1983, the Supreme Court held in U.S.
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), that
the use of a beeper to track a vehicle was not a search under the 4th
Amendment. In doing so, the Court explained that `[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another,’ and noted that the beeper simply
conveyed to the public what was evident from visual surveillance. U.S. v.
Knotts, supra.
Knotts is not exactly on
point with the facts of this case, but it is the legal principle of Knotts .
. . that matters. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428U.S. 364 (1976) (“in all 4th Amendment cases, we are obliged to look to
all the facts and circumstances of this case in light of the principles set
forth in . . . prior decisions’). . . . [W]e reiterate that in conjunction with
the general legal landscape that existed before Jones, `Knotts was widely and reasonably understood to
stand for the proposition that the 4th Amendment simply was not implicated by
electronic surveillance of public automotive movements,' U.S. v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 2013) and it was the `foundational
Supreme Court precedent for GPS-related cases,’ U.S. v. Cuevas–Perez, 640
F.3d 272 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2011).
After Jones, we know
such an interpretation of Knotts is incorrect. Without the
benefit of hindsight, however, and with no contrary guidance from the Supreme
Court or this Court, we believe a reasonably well-trained officer in this Circuit
could have relied on Knotts as permitting the type of
warrantless GPS usage in this case. See U.S. v. Aguiar, 737
F.3d 251 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit 2013) (in declining to apply
the exclusionary rule, the court stated `sufficient Supreme Court precedent
existed at the time the GPS device was placed for the officers here to
reasonably conclude a warrant was not necessary’).
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore held that “[b]ased on the
foregoing, we find no basis to set aside the order denying Stephens'
suppression motion. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.” U.S. v. Stephens, supra.
One of the judges dissented, pointing out that the
good-faith exception “requires officers to `act with an objectively ‘reasonable
good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful’” and arguing that Geare did
not do that. U.S. v. Stephens, supra. She also pointed out that
at the time the warrantless search was
conducted in this case, the District of Columbia Circuit, neighboring the
District of Maryland where the warrantless search here occurred, had determined
that a warrantless GPS search violated the 4th Amendment. See U.S.
v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 2010), aff'd
in part sub nom. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). In fact, at the
time the warrantless search was conducted in this case, Maynard had
been accepted for argument before the Supreme Court, further undercutting the
Government's position here that the issue was generally settled.
Additionally, the Maynard case
illustrates that as early as 2005, similarly situated officers were obtaining
warrants for GPS searches such as the one performed in this case. Nonetheless,
officers in this case did not `take care to learn’ what was required of them by
4th Amendment precedent under these circumstances. Davis v. U.S.,
supra.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra.
The dissenting judge also noted that “Detective
Geare testified that he did not seek advice from any legal authority regarding
the constitutionality of such a search, even though there was no exigent
circumstance preventing him from doing so.”
U.S. v. Stephens, supra. And she explained that
[i]nstead, Geare testified that in
utilizing the GPS device in this case, he relied simply on his own past conduct
using GPS devices in prior cases that had resulted in convictions. Geare
testified it was his `understanding’ that a warrant was not required when
attaching a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and his `belief’ that as long as
the vehicle was in a public area attaching a GPS device `was fine.’ . . . . He
certainly did not receive such guidance from the United States Attorney's
Office because, per his own testimony, he did not bother to ask.
U.S. v. Stephens,
supra. She, therefore, would have
reversed the judgment of the District Court.
U.S. v. Stephens, supra.
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