The Traffic Stop, the K-9 and the Computer Check

After local Georgia police found “marijuana in a car that was stopped for lane infractions, Patrick Scott and Dorian Allen, the driver and passenger, respectively, were indicted for the possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.^” State v. Allen, 762 S.E.2d 111 (Georgia Court of Appeals 2014).  Scott and Allen then “moved to suppress the drug evidence as the fruit of an illegal seizure.”  State v. Allen, supra. After the trial judge granted their motion to dismiss, the prosecution appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals.  State v. Allen, supra.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the issues in the case by explaining that

the sole witness at the suppression hearing was the patrol officer who initiated the traffic stop. On direct examination, he testified to the following. On September 13, 2012, while stationed in the median of an interstate to monitor traffic, the officer observed a 2012 Nissan Altima vehicle cross from the center lane of travel into `the fast lane.’ As the Altima passed the officer's stationary position, the officer saw the driver `pointing his finger all in the passenger's face.’ Concerned that the driver was distracted, the officer decided to catch up with the Altima. As he did so, the officer saw the Altima `make the same lane infractions again’; the officer also saw that the driver was `still reaching over with his fingers, pointing in the passenger's face.’ The officer initiated the traffic stop.

The officer walked to the Altima and informed the two occupants, Scott and Allen, that they were stopped because of lane infractions. The officer asked them whether they were having an argument. Scott answered no, and stated that he was just talking to Allen. The officer advised Scott that he would be writing him a courtesy warning for the lane infractions. The officer obtained from Scott his driver's license and obtained from Allen a South Carolina identification card.

The officer perceived Scott and Allen were nervous. Because of the lane infractions, the officer wanted to `see how [Scott] was on his feet’ to `make sure he wasn't intoxicated.’ The officer asked Scott to exit the vehicle; Scott got out of the vehicle and walked to the location designated by the officer. The officer conducted a pat-down search of Scott; after finding no weapon, the officer `engaged in general conversation with [Scott]’ while he wrote the courtesy warning.

State v. Allen, supra.

It was what happened next that led to the indictment and the motion to suppress:

But after writing the warning, the officer did not thereupon hand it (along with the identifications) to Scott, who was standing beside him. Instead, as the officer testified,

`[O]nce I completed the warning I had dispatch check both of their driver's license[s]. Mr. Allen's was through South Carolina and Mr. Scott's was through Georgia. While waiting on returns from GCIC to come back, waiting on dispatch I had asked Mr. Scott for consent to search his vehicle. Mr. Scott wouldn't deny nor consent to a search.’

The officer testified that Scott replied only that `you already got me stopped,’ and `[s]o at that time I had Mr. Allen exit the vehicle also and once Mr. Allen exited the vehicle I had them both stand at the front of my patrol car and I retrieved my K–9 partner Kazan out of the rear of my vehicle.’ When the officer walked the drug dog around the Altima, the dog showed a positive odor response. The officer put Kazan back into the patrol car, then began searching the Altima. While searching the interior of the vehicle, the officer received the requested GCIC information from dispatch; when the officer's search reached the trunk of the car, he discovered the marijuana.

`[O]nce I completed the warning I had dispatch check both of their driver's license[s]. Mr. Allen's was through South Carolina and Mr. Scott's was through Georgia. While waiting on returns from GCIC to come back, waiting on dispatch I had asked Mr. Scott for consent to search his vehicle. Mr. Scott wouldn't deny nor consent to a search.’

The officer testified that Scott replied only that `you already got me stopped,’ and `[s]o at that time I had Mr. Allen exit the vehicle also and once Mr. Allen exited the vehicle I had them both stand at the front of my patrol car and I retrieved my K–9 partner Kazan out of the rear of my vehicle.’ When the officer walked the drug dog around the Altima, the dog showed a positive odor response. The officer put Kazan back into the patrol car, then began searching the Altima. While searching the interior of the vehicle, the officer received the requested GCIC information from dispatch; when the officer's search reached the trunk of the car, he discovered the marijuana.

On cross-examination, the officer provided additional details. He testified that, when talking to Scott and Allen as they sat in the Altima, he had looked at the vehicle's interior, but had seen neither marijuana nor any drug paraphernalia; and he had not detected the odor of marijuana. The officer stated that, when Scott complied with his directive to step outside the Altima, Scott continued to appear nervous, but showed `no signs of being intoxicated or impaired.’ The officer had concluded, `[Scott] wasn't intoxicated.’

Additionally, the officer agreed that `the courtesy warning was completed at that time as we see in the video . . . when [he] contact[ed] dispatch’; that `[a]fter [he] completed the warning’ he `ran the license[s] at that point’; and that the `written warning was completed prior to [his] running the GCIC to dispatch.’

State v. Allen, supra.

The Court of Appeals then explained that in their motion to suppress evidence,

Scott and Allen argued that the drug evidence was discovered only after the officer had unlawfully expanded the traffic stop. In its order ruling thereon, the court recited that it had considered, inter alia, both the officer's testimony and the recording. The court set forth the state's position that the extended detention was authorized by the officer's need to run a computer check, then found, however, that `the officer did not begin this inquiry until . . . at the point when the officer had finished writing a warning citation for the traffic offense.’

The court also determined that it was the drug dog's response that provided probable cause to search the vehicle, but ruled that at the time the drug dog had so responded, Scott and Allen were being unlawfully detained -- i.e., detained without any articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Allen, supra.

The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the facts and legal issues in the case, explaining, first, that the trial court judge “explicitly” includes in his

order this pertinent finding: `the officer did not begin this inquiry [the computer check at issue] until . . . the point when the officer had finished writing a warning citation for the traffic offense.’ This finding must be accepted, as there was evidence adduced at the hearing that supported it.  For instance, as detailed above, the officer unequivocally testified so. Moreover, the audio-video recording of the traffic stop supports the officer's account.

Construed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and grant of the suppression motion, the evidence showed that, before initiating the computer check, the officer had concluded the tasks related to the investigation of the lane infractions, including a determination that the driver Scott was not intoxicated. The officer, therefore, lacked articulable suspicion of any drug (or other) crime, as the officer's perception that Scott and Allen were nervous `did not support a finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion that would have justified prolonging the detention.’ [Quoting Nunnally v. State, 310 Ga. App. 183, 187(2), 713 S.E.2d 408 (Georgia Court of Appeals 2011).]

State v. Allen, supra.

The appellate court went on to outline the applicable legal principles, which derive from the 4^th Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable” searches and seizures:

As a general rule, an investigatory stop is not unreasonably prolonged by the time necessary to run a computer check. But it does not necessarily follow that an officer may initiate a computer check after completing the investigation into the basis for the traffic stop. Further, a police officer may check `for outstanding warrants or criminal histories on the occupants of a vehicle at a valid traffic stop’ based upon concerns for officer safety `as long as under the circumstances they do not unreasonably prolong the stop.’ But `[o]nce the tasks related to the investigation of the traffic violation and processing of the traffic citation have been accomplished, an officer cannot continue to detain an individual without articulable suspicion.’

A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time to complete that mission. The officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention.

Accordingly, the evidence here showed that the officer -- having accomplished the tasks related to his investigation into lane infractions and having no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity aside from the traffic violation -- unreasonably prolonged the duration of the traffic stop when he initiated the computer check.

State v. Allen, supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals then went on to explain that the

foregoing, governing principles were recently reinforced by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. State, [295 Ga. 362, 761 S.E.2d 19 (2014)] which recited:

`In some cases, a detention is prolonged beyond the conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place, and in those cases, the courts generally have concluded that such a prolongation -- even a short one -- is unreasonable, unless, of course, good cause has appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to pursue a different investigation.’

Construing the evidence in the instant case most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment, the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place -- for lane infractions -- had concluded. And there was no evidence that any `good cause . . . appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention in order to pursue a different investigation’ -- that began when the computer check at issue was initiated. (No evidence was adduced, and no argument has been made, that the computer check was intended to aid the officer in determining whether lane infractions had occurred.)

State v. Allen, supra (emphasis in the original).

The Court of Appeals then found that the evidence in this case,

when construed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment granting the accused's suppression motion, shows that the officer had concluded his investigation that warranted the detention in the first place; that the computer check initiated thereafter was not related to the investigation of the basis for the stop (lane infractions); and that no good cause had appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention while the officer pursued a different investigation (that began when the computer check was initiated).

The continued detention -- even if a short one -- beyond the conclusion of the investigation that warranted the traffic stop in the first place was therefore unreasonable. Because the officer was not authorized to initiate a different investigation during that unlawful detention, it cannot be said that he was then engaged in the lawful discharge of his duties; `officer safety,’ thus, cannot serve as justification for the computer check or for the unlawful detention. Notably, the officer did not testify, nor did the prosecutor argue before the trial court, that officer safety played any role in the computer check, the prolonged detention, or the search for drugs in the Altima.

Given the foregoing, the state has demonstrated no basis to disturb the order granting Scott's and Allen's motion to suppress the drug evidence. When the evidence is viewed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the drug evidence was discovered as a result of an unconstitutional seizure.

State v. Allen, supra.

It therefore affirmed the trial judge’s granting the motion to suppress the evidence that supported the drug possession charge against Scott and Allen. State v. Allen, supra.  If you are interested, the news story you can find here provides more information about the traffic stop and how it led to the charges.