After a jury convicted Jeremy Jones Davis of “aggravated burglary and theft”, he appealed, “alleging the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law.” State v. Davis, 2014 WL 3928597 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 2014). After he was convicted,
the trial judge sentenced Davis to “six years for the C felony of aggravated
burglary, and four years for the D felony theft conviction, to run consecutive
for an effective sentence of ten years.” State
v. Davis, supra.
The Court of Criminal Appeals began its analysis of Davis’ argument
by explaining what evidence was presented at his trial:
Marty Dean testified that he and his
wife left home about 2:30 in the afternoon to attend the wake of their
thirty-five year old daughter who had died of cancer. They returned home about
10:00 pm with relatives to discover their house had been broken into, and
numerous items stolen.
He discovered all his guns and knives
had been stolen. Included was a family heirloom shotgun that had been in his
family for a hundred years or more, and other shotguns, rifles and pistols. His
knife collection included several pocket knives that had been given to him for
Father's Day and birthdays by his children. All his wife's jewelry had been
stolen; and the laptop computer and iPad were missing.
State v. Davis, supra.
The court notes that the
iPad and laptop were recovered; as were
three knives and a small amount of jewelry. [Dean] estimated the value of his
lost property to be in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars.
State v. Davis, supra.
As to the crime itself, the Court of Criminal Appeals went
on to explain that the
house had been entered by prying a door
open. The wake was public knowledge and there were many people there, including
all of his family. [Dean] testified he did not know [Davis], and did not give
him permission to enter his house.
Brenda Dean testified that when they
returned from the wake she discovered all her jewelry had been stolen. She
detailed the jewelry, to include four diamond rings, diamond earrings, other
rings, pearls, necklaces, gold items, and some costume jewelry. Some of the
jewelry had been her mother's. She estimated the value of the missing jewelry
to be in excess of twenty thousand dollars.
Timothy Pringle testified that he knew
the Deans and attended the wake. A couple of days later [Davis] came to his
house and requested if he could help take some information off an iPad and put
it to `factory reset.’ [Davis] offered a laptop to him if he would reset the
iPad. When he turned the iPad on to begin the reset, he saw a photo of Heather
Dean, whose wake he had attended.
He questioned [Davis], who told him he
participated in the aggravated burglary of a house that was supposed to be an
`easy score,’ during a wake. [Davis] was to be the look-out while two others
went into the house to get guns and jewelry. [Davis] stated he went in the
house and got what he could for himself, to include the iPad and laptop.
After [Davis] left his house, Mr.
Pringle called Mitchell Dean, brother of deceased Heather Dean. Mitchell came
to his house, and Pringle showed him the laptop and told him what he had been
told by [Davis]. Mr. Pringle had activated the security feature on the iPad so
it could be tracked to its location. Mr. Pringle reported to the police what he
knew and that he was trying to get the iPad back on his own.
Clyde Ragsdale testified that he works
for the Lewisburg City Police Department. His department was investigating the
aggravated burglary of the Dean residence. He was with other officers who
executed a search warrant on [Davis’] residence. He patted [Davis] down and
found a knife in one of his pockets, which was later identified as a knife
stolen from the Dean residence.
James Johnson testified he is a
detective with the Lewisburg Police Department and executed a search warrant on
[Davis] at his residence. He found an iPad with the same serial number as
reported stolen from the Dean residence.
State v. Davis, supra. The opinion also notes that Davis “did not
submit any proof to the jury.” State v. Davis, supra.
The Court of Criminal Appeals then began its analysis of
Davis’ argument on appeal, i.e., that the evidence presented at trial was not
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Davis, supra. It noted,
initially, that the standard for
appellate review when a criminal
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence is `whether, considering
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247 (Tennessee Supreme Court 2002); see also Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure13(e) (`Findings of guilt in criminal actions . . . shall be set aside if the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’).
The trier of fact, not this court,
resolves questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence as well as all factual issues raised by the
evidence. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578 (Tennessee Supreme Court 2003). This court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its inferences
for those drawn by the jury. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231
(Tennessee Supreme Court 2003).
On appeal, the State is entitled to the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which
may be drawn therefrom. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370
(Tennessee Supreme Court 2011). A verdict of guilty removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, placing the burden on
the accused to demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d
913 (Tennessee Supreme Court 1982).
State v. Davis, supra.
The Court of Criminal Appeals then began its analysis of
Davis’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge, explaining that
[a]ggravated burglary is a burglary of
`a habitation.’ Tennessee Code Annotated § 39–14–403(a). In order to
sustain a conviction for aggravated burglary, the State need only prove that a
defendant entered a habitation `with intent to commit a felony, theft.’
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39–14–403.
A person commits a `theft’ when, with
intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or
exercises control over the property without the owner's effective
consent, Tennessee Code Annotated § 39–14–103(a). . . .
State v. Davis, supra.
The court rather cursorily disposed of Davis’ argument on
appeal:
The facts in this case show that
[Davis] admitted he entered the victim's home to get what he could for himself,
to include an iPad and a laptop. He was found in possession of the victim's
stolen iPad, and a stolen knife that belonged to the victim.
There was ample proof from which the
jury could find that [Davis] intended to deprive the owner of the property. He
traded the victim's stolen laptop for computer services of cleaning the iPad of
the victim's information. He kept the iPad for his personal use, and had a
stolen knife that belonged to the victim in his pocket.
The court finds that considering the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated burglary
and theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Davis, supra.
On appeal, Davis also argued that the sentence imposed on
him was excessive. State v. Davis, supra. In addressing this issue, the court explained
that the 2005 amendments to
the sentencing act `served to increase
the discretionary authority of trial courts in sentencing.’ State v. Bise, 380
S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tennessee Supreme Court 2012). In light of this broader
discretion, `sentences should be upheld so long as the statutory purposes and
principles, along with any applicable enhancement and mitigating factors, have
been properly addressed.’ State v. Bise,
supra.
Therefore, this court reviews a trial
court's sentencing determinations under `an abuse of discretion standard of
review, granting a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing
decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of
our Sentencing Act.’ State v. Bise, supra.
State v. Davis, supra.
Since the sentences imposed on Davis were “within-range
sentences,” the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that “our review is abuse
of discretion.” State v. Davis, supra. It also explained that under the 2005
amendments to the state’s sentencing act, a trial judge “must consider the
following when determining a defendant's specific sentence and the appropriate
combination of sentencing alternatives”:
(1)
The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) The
presentence report; (3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to
sentencing alternatives; (4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal
conduct involved;(5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the
mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40–35–113 and 40–35–114; (6)
Any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts
as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) Any
statement the defendant wishes to make in the defendant's own behalf about
sentencing. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40–35–210(b).
State v. Davis, supra.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found, first, that the record
of the case showed that the
trial court fully considered the
factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–35–210. The trial court
considered the evidence and the nature of the conduct involved and discussed
the tragedy of a daughter's wake while the victim's house was being
burglarized; he referred to the pre-sentence report and discussed the prior
record of [Davis]; he discussed the enhancing factors found; he noted no
evidence or information was offered on mitigating factors; and the defendant
did not make a statement in his own behalf. [Davis] has failed to show an abuse
of discretion with regard to the sentence imposed for the crimes.
State v. Davis, supra.
Finally, the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that the
trial judge “determined that” Davis “has an extensive criminal record” and went
on to explain that Tennessee Criminal Code Annotated § 40-35-225 allows for
consecutive sentencing if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the “defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive”. State v. Davis, supra.
The court therefore found that Davis
had a prior felony conviction for
aggravated burglary, and seven misdemeanor convictions. He was on probation
seven times in the past, and had been revoked twice. He had been tried on
community corrections and was revoked. [Davis] has failed to show an abuse of
discretion for consecutive sentencing.
[Davis] was eligible for probation
because the `sentence actually imposed upon [him was] ten (10) years or
less.’ Tennessee Code Annotated § 40–35–303(a). The trial court considered
probation and found that the presumption in favor was `overcome in a very
dramatic way.’
The defendant has the burden of showing
the impropriety of the sentence on appeal. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40–35–401(d), Sentencing Comm'n
Comments. [Davis] has not carried his burden. We find no abuse of discretion by
the trial judge in the sentence imposed.
State v. Davis, supra. For all these reasons, the court affirmed
Davis’ convictions and sentence. State v.
Davis, supra.
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