This post examines an opinion a U.S. District Court Judge
recently issued in a civil case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan: Enjaian v. University of Michigan, 2014
WL 3662709 (2014). As the judge explains,
[p]laintiff Jesse R. Enjaian, pro se, filed the instant action alleging that Defendant Renée Schomp
wrongfully reported criminal stalking behavior to the University of Michigan
Law School and the University of Michigan Department of Public Safety. Based on
Schomp's complaint, Enjaian claims police unreasonably searched his
apartment and seized various items in violation of his rights under the 4th Amendment.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
The judge then explains that Enjaian is
a former student and classmate of
Schomp's at the University of Michigan Law School. Enjaian alleges that on
December 9, 2011, Schomp made a phone call to the University Department of
Public Safety complaining about two email messages that Enjaian sent to the
entire Law School. Following Schomp's phone call, university police obtained a
search warrant to search Enjaian's apartment for evidence related to criminal
stalking. Police seized a laptop, cell phone, MP3 player, and four external
hard drives from Enjaian's apartment. Enjaian claims that the police held his
property for 446 days before they returned it to him.
Enjaian further alleges that on March
27, 2012, Schomp emailed Defendant Sergeant Jose Dorta, a University of
Michigan police officer, claiming Enjaian possessed a firearm and `intended to
use it during an act of mass-homicide.’ Specifically, Enjaian states:
`Schomp wrote to Dorta and another
employee that she “has considered where the best place in the Law School would
be to hide in the event that Enjaian came to the School with a gun”’ and that a
mutual friend told her he was `“so concerned about his girlfriend's safety with
regard to Enjaian, that he came over to her dorm room right away carrying a
baseball bat.”’. . .
Enjaian claims he did not learn of this
email until March 2013. No criminal stalking or any other charge was filed
against Enjaian, and the University Police returned his property more than a
year later, near the end of February 2013.
On September 12, 2013, Enjaian filed
the instant lawsuit, alleging that Sergeant Dorta and the University of
Michigan violated his 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and that Schomp's `allegations’ constitute libel per se under
Michigan law.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
The three defendants (University of Michigan, Sergeant Dorta
and Schomp) responded by filing motions to dismiss Enjaian’s suit under Rule12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which lets a judge
dismiss a lawsuit if the plaintiff has failed to state a viable cause of action. As Wikipedia explains, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is how
lawsuits with
insufficient legal theories underlying
their cause of action are dismissed from court. For
example, assault requires intent, so if the plaintiff has
failed to plead intent, the defense can seek dismissal by filing a 12(b)(6)
motion. `While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
The judge took up each motion to dismiss, starting with
Sergeant Dorta. Enjaian v. University of Michigan, supra. He began his analysis of this motion by
explaining that
Enjaian alleges that Sergeant Dorta, as
a sergeant in the University of Michigan police department, `established
policies and procedures’ and `made management decisions’ regarding the search
of Enjaian's electronic devices. Enjaian claims Sergeant Dorta's actions
violated his 4rth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. Sergeant Dorta moves to dismiss Enjaian's claim, arguing qualified immunity protects him from suit.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
The judge began his analysis of Enjaian’s argument by
explaining that the
`doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2009). Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, the court
must resolve an assertion of qualified immunity at the ‘earliest possible stage
in the litigation.’ Id.
In assessing a claim of qualified
immunity, the court must assess whether: (1) `the facts a plaintiff has
alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) `the
right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.’
Id. The court may exercise its
discretion in deciding which of these two prongs should be addressed
first. Id. As the plaintiff, Enjaian `bears the burden of
showing that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.’ Chappell v.
City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 2009).
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
The judge then explained that Enjaian
has not met this burden. To begin with,
it is unclear exactly what Enjaian is claiming. Much of his response to
Defendants' motion to dismiss consists of block quotations from a variety of
cases, without any attempt at developed argumentation. To the extent that
Enjaian does discuss the facts of his case, he appears to argue that Sergeant
Dorta used an invasive search methodology in attempting to crack a variety of
passwords present on Enjaian's computer.
It appears this cumbersome
investigative methodology resulted in Enjaian's computer and other personal
property -- including some that had no relevance to internet communications -- being
retained by the investigators longer than he believes was reasonably necessary.
However, the 4th Amendment does not protect against unreasonable delay in
returning lawfully seized property to the owner. Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176
F.3d 342 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 1999). Thus, whether
Enjaian is able to allege a violation of his 4th Amendment rights turns on
whether the search and seizure of that property was itself illegal.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
He then analyzed whether Enjaian was able to do this:
Construed liberally, Enjaian's response
argues that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish a
sufficient nexus between the computer equipment to be searched and the alleged
stalking at issue. A review of the affidavit reveals that the
affiant, Officer Bernard Mundt, stated, inter alia, that he
received reports Enjaian had engaged in behavior and that he `feels’ [Enjaian]
was `intentionally stalking Schomp.’ . . . Officer Mundt, however, is not a
defendant in this lawsuit.
Enjaian asserts that `the U–M campus
police at Ann Arbor is a very small department,’ and that Sergeant Dorta `established
polices and procedures and has made management decisions for the search and
seizure of computer evidence during criminal investigations.’ Beyond that,
Enjaian does not explain how the supervisor, Dorta, as opposed to the affiant,
Mundt, violated his constitutional rights in connection with the creation of
what certainly is a very sparse, and likely insufficient, warrant affidavit. Nor
does he specify which policies and procedures he disagrees with.
Because Enjaian has not alleged
anything other than vague and conclusory assertions connecting Sergeant Dorta
to the alleged constitutional violation, the court concludes Enjaian has failed
to allege a violation of his constitutional rights. Enjaian's claim against
Sergeant Dorta will be dismissed without prejudice.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra. Since the
dismissal was without prejudice, Enjaian could re-file his lawsuit, if he was
able to address the issues the judge noted.
And if you are interested, you can find an application for a search
warrant here, to find out how the affidavit is used, etc.
The judge then took up Enjaian’s claims against the
University, explaining that he
seeks a judgment against the University
of Michigan declaring that the search warrant issued to the University of
Michigan Police Department was overbroad and in violation of the 4th Amendment.
The University of Michigan moves to dismiss this claim, arguing that, as a
Michigan state department, it is entitled to immunity from suit under the
11th Amendment.
The 11th Amendment provides, in
relevant part: `The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State[.]’ U.S. Constitution, amendment
XI.
`This immunity is far reaching. It bars
all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary
relief, against the state and its departments, by citizens of
another state, foreigners or its own citizens.’ Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of
Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 1993) (emphasis added).
Enjaian's complaint concedes that the
University of Michigan is a state agency. . . . Although state officials may be
sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory
relief, see Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury supra, no
such official appears as a defendant in the instant lawsuit. Enjaian's claim against the University of
Michigan is barred by the 11th Amendment and will therefore be dismissed
without prejudice.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
Finally, the judge took up Schomp’s motion to dismiss,
explaining that Enjaian
also alleges that Schomp's report to
police constitutes libel per se under Michigan law. MichiganCompiled Laws § 600.2911. However,
because Enjaian's only federal claim has been dismissed, the court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Enjaian's state-law claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See also Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express
Corp., 89 F.3d 1244 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 1996) (`When
all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations
usually will point to dismissing the state law claims. . . .’).
Accordingly, Schomp's motion to dismiss
will be granted.
Enjaian v. University
of Michigan, supra.
The ruling on Schomp’s motion went to a jurisdictional
issue, unlike the rulings on Dorta’s and the University’s motions to
dismiss. Those Rule 12(b)(6) motions
were directed at the substantive cause of action he sought to assert against
both of those defendants, i.e., a violation of his 4th Amendment
rights. As Wikipedia explains, U.S.
District Courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide civil suits that arise
under the U.S. Constitution (including the 4th Amendment) and the
laws and treaties of the United States.
It also has jurisdiction to hear lawsuits that do not involve federal
and/or U.S. Constitutional law if those suits involve citizens of different
state, which is known as the courts’ “diversity jurisdiction.”
Enjaian’s claims against Dorta and the University were
allegedly based on a violation of his 4th Amendment rights. Since the 4th Amendment is part of
the U.S. Constitution, the court would have had jurisdiction over those claims,
if they had been viable federal law claims.
Enjaian’s claim against Dorta was a state claim allegedly arising
under Michigan’s libel law. A federal
court can only hear cases that arise under state law if (i) the parties are from different states (which apparently was not true here) or (ii) the state
law claims come under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, which is created
by 28 U.S. Code § 1367(a). Supplemental
jurisdiction is based on the premise that if a federal court has jurisdiction
over Doe’s federal claim against Smith, it is reasonable to let the court hear and decide Doe’s state law claim against Smith as long as the
state law claim arises out of the same set of facts. As Wikipedia notes, the
rationale for this is efficiency, i.e., if the non-federal, non-diversity
jurisdiction claims are based on the same set of facts, it makes sense to
dispose of all them in a single, federal proceeding.
Enjaian and Schomp apparently were not from different
states, so the court had no basis for keeping the libel per se claim.
The judge therefore dismissed the lawsuit. Enjaian v. University of Michigan, supra.
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