After the Family Court in Lexington County, South Carolina
granted a divorce to James Arthur Teeter III and Debra Teeter, James appealed
the “court's rulings regarding the valuation and classification of property” at
issue in the divorce and excluding “information obtained from the e-mail
account of Debra Teeter (Wife) regarding her relationship with another man.” Teeter v. Teeter, 759 S.E.2d 144 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina May 2014).
This post examines James' argument concerning the emails
and how the Court of Appeals resolved the issue. Teeter
v. Teeter, supra.
It begins by explaining that James (“Husband”) and Debra
(“Wife”) were married in
November 1996. . . . Husband
was employed as a stock broker for Prudential Securities. He owned several
parcels of real estate including his residence, the Indian Creek property, and
three rental properties. During the marriage, Husband changed
employers and went to work for Legg Mason as a stock broker. He eventually
founded his own investment firm, Apex Investment Advisors, LLC, in 2003.
Wife became a certified fraud examiner
during the marriage. At the time of the temporary hearing in May 2009, Husband
claimed gross annual income of $71,000 and Wife claimed $78,756. At the time of
the final hearing, in 2011, Husband claimed gross annual income of $116,000 and
Wife claimed $97,000. Husband and Wife always maintained separate checking
accounts, and Husband put all his regular income, rental income, and proceeds
from real estate transactions into his single account.
In 1998, Husband sold the Indian Creek
property, and [they] bought their dream home (Bob White property). Husband
generally made the mortgage payment on the property and paid for utilities and
repairs, while Wife bought groceries and paid for childcare and other
miscellaneous expenses. During the marriage, Husband purchased additional
rental properties. The division of some of those properties is at issue on
appeal. . . .
[A]fter the birth of their second child
in 2001, they began to grow apart. After the parties separated in 2008, Husband
suspected Wife was involved with another man. He testified he saw Wife's e-mail
password written on a sheet of paper that was lying on top of her open purse
while he was visiting the marital home to see the children.
Husband also testified he installed
spyware on Wife's computer but indicated it did not produce any relevant
information, only a couple of `garbled’ screen shots. Husband read some of
Wife's e-mails, which revealed she had been in contact with a former colleague.
In one series of e-mails from 2009,
Wife attempted to convince the man to meet her in Myrtle Beach. Additionally,
Wife admitted at trial she had lied to Husband about attending a class reunion
in Nashville and instead went to see the former colleague in Arizona in 2010.
Wife never admitted to committing adultery. Husband admitted to committing
post-separation adultery.
Teeter v. Teeter,
supra (May, 2014). (For what it's worth, South Carolina is one of several U.S. states in which adultery is still a crime.)
The Court of Appeals also noted that the Family Court had
previously granted the parties' divorce
based on one year's continuous separation. With respect to equitable
apportionment, the Family Court determined the division of marital assets
should be 55%/45% in Husband's favor.
The family court excluded evidence of
Wife's e-mails and the evidence flowing therefrom on the basis that their
interception violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. However,
the Family Court emphasized that Wife's alleged adultery had no impact on its
division of assets.
Teeter v. Teeter,
supra (May, 2014).
The appellate court began its analysis of James' argument
concerning the exclusion of the emails by explaining that in
`reviewing the decision of the
family court, an appellate court has the authority to find the facts in
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.’ S.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 741 S.E.2d 739 (Supreme
Court of South Carolina 2013). `While this [c]ourt retains its authority to
make its own findings of fact, we recognize the superior position of the family
court in making credibility determinations.' S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Sarah W., supra.
Moreover, consistent with our
constitutional authority for de novo review, an appellant is
not relieved of his burden to demonstrate error in the family court's findings
of fact.’ Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, , 709 S.E.2d 650 (South
Carolina Supreme Court 2011).
Therefore, `the family court's factual findings
will be affirmed unless appellant satisfies this court that the preponderance
of the evidence is against the finding of the [family] court.’ Lewis v. Lewis, supra.
Teeter v. Teeter,
supra (May, 2014).
The Court of Appeals then took up the issue of excluding the
emails. Teeter v. Teeter, supra. In
so doing, it was not simply reviewing what the Family Court judge did.
The Court of Appeals issued its initial ruling in this case
in March of 2014. Teeter v. Teeter, supra (May, 2014). It then issued a new opinion in May, which
withdrew and superseded the March opinion in the case. (And no, I do not know why it did that.)
The Court of Appeals began its consideration of his argument
by noting that James
contends the family court erred in
concluding he violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.Code § 2515 (2000), based on a lack of credibility in his testimony that he
accessed Wife's emails by means other than spyware. . . .
Teeter v. Teeter (March
2014).
It also explained that the Family Court
did not find Husband's testimony that
he stumbled onto Wife's password to be credible. Husband admitted he
installed spyware on Wife's computer for the purpose of monitoring her emails.
The determination of credibility lies largely within the province of the family
court.
The record supports the family court's
factual finding in light of Wife's testimony that she had not written down her
password and would have left it in her planner at work had she done so. The
only way Husband knew to investigate Wife's out-of-town trip was by accessing
her email account.
Without further argument or testimony
that Husband's installation of the spyware did not violate the Act, Husband has
not demonstrated the family court erred by excluding all the evidence related
to Wife's relationship with her former colleague. . . .
Even if the family court erred in
excluding evidence of the relationship, the court explicitly stated in its
order that neither Wife's conduct nor Husband's post-separation adultery were
considered in the equitable division of assets. The court determined Husband
and Wife grew apart as a consequence of not communicating after the birth of
their second child.
While Wife's post-separation contact
with her former colleague was not completely irrelevant, the family court
determined it did not impact the break-up of the marriage nor deplete the
marital assets.
That is a finding well-within the
family court's purview, and Husband has not met his burden of proving the
family court erred.
Teeter v. Teeter (March
2014).
The court then took up James’ claim concerning the
applicability of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S. Code § 2515
to the issue concerning the emails in this case. Teeter
v. Teeter, supra. Section 2515
provides as follows:
Whenever any wire or oral communication
has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no
evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Teeter v. Teeter,
supra (March 2014). In other words, if James used spyware to “intercept”
Debra’s password and read her emails, then evidence of the relationship he
learned about from those emails could not be used in the divorce
proceeding.
The Court of Appeals rather efficiently disposed of this
issue by basically reiterating what it had said in its original opinion:
The family court did not find Husband's
testimony that he stumbled onto Wife's password to be credible. Husband
admitted he installed spyware on Wife's computer for the purpose of monitoring
her e-mails. The determination of credibility lies largely within the province
of the family court.
The record supports the family court's
factual finding in light of Wife's testimony that she had not written down her
password and would have left it in her planner at work had she done so.
The only way Husband knew to
investigate Wife's out-of-town trip was by accessing her e-mail account.
Without further argument or testimony that Husband's installation of the
spyware did not violate the Act, Husband has not demonstrated the family court
erred by excluding all the evidence related to Wife's relationship with her
former colleague. See Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C.
373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (Supreme Court of North Carolina 1976) (holding all
evidence regarding the wife's adulterous conduct derived by the husband's interception
of her phone calls inadmissible under the Act).
Even if the family court erred in
excluding evidence of the relationship, the court explicitly stated in its
order that neither Wife's conduct nor Husband's post-separation adultery were
considered in the equitable division of assets.
The court determined Husband and Wife
grew apart as a consequence of not communicating after the birth of their
second child. While Wife's post-separation contact with her former colleague
was not completely irrelevant, the family court determined it did not impact
the break-up of the marriage nor deplete the marital assets.
That is a finding well-within the
family court's purview, and Husband has not met his burden of proving the
family court erred.
Teeter v. Teeter,
supra (May, 2014).
For these and other reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Family Court’s ruling on this issue. Teeter
v. Teeter, supra (May, 2014).
No comments:
Post a Comment