After he was “charged in a one count indictment with
knowingly and intentionally distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S. Code § 841(a)(1)”, Christopher Williams filed a motion to suppress “all
evidence discovered after police seized and searched his cell phones following
a traffic stop of a vehicle in which [he] was a passenger.” U.S. v.
Williams, 2014 WL 412526 (U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont 2014).
According to the opinion, this is how Williams came to be
prosecuted:
On . . . February 7, 2013, Vermont
State Police (`VSP’) Trooper Michael Studin was travelling northbound on
Interstate 91 in Vermont when he stopped a motorist for an alleged violation
of 23 [Vermont Statutes Annotated] § 1038, which requires that vehicles remain
entirely in a single lane `as nearly as practicable.’ In the location of the
traffic stop, I–91 is a two-laned highway which is separated from two lanes of
southbound traffic by a large median. There was light traffic on the day in
question and the weather and pavement were clear.
Studin
was driving in the passing lane when he approached a vehicle with out-of-state
plates which he recognized as a rental car by the placard in its rear window
and because the make and model . . . were typical for a rental car. He observed
the vehicle `coming close to the dotted center line,’ . . . and maneuvered his
cruiser behind [it]. Shortly thereafter, he purportedly observed the vehicle
cross the passing lane demarcation and initiated a traffic stop on that basis.
At the time, there was no other traffic with which the target vehicle could
potentially collide. . . .
After effecting the stop, Studin
exited his cruiser, approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and observed [it]
was occupied by two males. [Williams] was the passenger and was seated in the
front of the vehicle with the driver. Studin asked the driver for his
identification and asked to whom the vehicle was registered.
The driver
provided a New York driver's license and [said] the vehicle was rented by his
passenger's girlfriend. . . . Studin noticed `an overwhelming odor of burnt
marijuana coming from the car’ and observed `flakes of marijuana’ on [Williams’]
clothing and on the floor. . . . Studin asked whether they had been smoking
marijuana in the car, and [he] stated they had `rolled a blunt’ and smoked it
as they were traveling north.
Studin asked about the purpose of their trip. [Williams
said] he was confined to a wheelchair and they were traveling to Saint Albans .
. . to retrieve a wheelchair for his use. Studin asked for identification from
the [Williams], who denied having photo identification but [said] his name was
`Christian Wilson.’ Studin then explained to the men that he stopped the
vehicle because it had `drifted into the other lane.’ . . . The driver
explained that he was considering changing lanes but decided not to.
U.S. v. Williams, supra.
Studin then “ordered” the driver to get out of the vehicle, after
which the driver consented
to a search of his person and was placed in the
front seat of the cruiser. In response to questions, the driver [said they]
were from New York and . . . the trip was . . . to pick up a wheelchair. The
driver further advised that the marijuana belonged to [Williams]. Studin asked
for the driver's consent to search the vehicle. [He] consented . . .but [said] Studin
should request [Williams’] consent as well because [his] girlfriend rented it.
VSP Sergeant Eric Albright arrived to
assist. . . . After Studin advised him of the situation . . . Albright stated
he had received an email describing an individual `from the New York City area
that was traveling to the St. Albans area who was confined to a wheelchair.’ .
. . He retrieved the email, which provided a description that matched the passenger
and identified the person as Christopher Williams. As a result of these facts,
Studin determined that the passenger had provided a false name and was actually
[Williams].
At approximately 4:15 p.m.,
Studin went back to the vehicle and obtained [Williams’] written consent for a
search of [it]. [He] signed the consent form as `Christian Wilson’ and [said]
the marijuana belonged to the driver. Studin helped [Williams] exit and
instructed him to leave his cell phone in the vehicle. Thereafter, law enforcement
searched the vehicle's interior and discovered three cell phones: two iPhones
and a flip phone. [Williams] claimed ownership of all three phones and did not
consent to a search of them at that time.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
After the officers searched the vehicle, Studin
confronted [Williams] with the
information obtained from the email and [he] admitted his true identity. The
driver was given a written warning for violating 23 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 1038. [Williams] and the driver were detained and transported to
VSP's Brattleboro barracks.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
Williams was searched at the barracks and the officers discovered
marijuana on his person. Studin
processed [his] cell phones and observed multiple incriminating text messages
stored therein. Studin [said] he did not manipulate the cell phones in order to
access the messages as they were `clearly visible on the screen . . . without having
to do anything to them.’ . . . This was a result of a notification system built
into the iPhones that automatically displays missed calls and text messages on
the main screen even when the phone is password protected and locked.
Studin
testified [at the hearing on the motion to suppress] that the iPhone screens should have been dark because they had not
been in use for an extended period of time and he was unsure how [they] became
illuminated such that the messages were visible. As for the flip phone, Studin opened
[it] to determine whether it was on, at which point he observed additional
messages. Studin did not take photographs of the text messages, but took notes
and incorporated them into his report.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
Officers also contacted
Detective Matthew Plunkett with the
Northern Vermont Drug Task Force who reported that he had conducted a
controlled purchase of heroin from [Williams] approximately nine months prior
to the traffic stop as part of a federal investigation. Thereafter, a decision
was made to charge [him] for the prior sale of heroin. [Williams] was formally
arrested for that crime within an hour or two of the traffic stop.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
After he was arrested, Williams was taken to a correctional
facility where
Detective Plunkett took custody of his
three cell phones. Plunkett pressed the power button on the iPhones to
illuminate the screens and photographed the incriminating messages, but was
unable to search the iPhones further as they were password protected. Plunkett
also searched the flip phone, which was not password protected, and reviewed
its text messages and call log. The messages . . . `had [evidentiary] value
where people were talking about stuff
[Plunkett] believed to be drugs.’
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
On February 8, 2013, Williams was “charged federally with
the May 29, 2012 distribution of heroin.”
U.S. v. Williams, supra.
Because the federal authorities thought Williams
may have concealed narcotics in his
anal cavity, [they] obtained a search warrant to examine [his] body, using
evidence obtained from [the] initial searches of [his] cell phones in [their]
warrant application. Following [Williams’] initial appearance, the magistrate
judge authorized agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency to take [him] into
custody for the execution of the search warrant at a local hospital. . . . No
further contraband was ultimately recovered from [Williams] as a result of the
search warrant.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra. (For a similar warrant and search, check out this news story.)
While he was at the hospital, “`expressed interest in
cooperating’” with law enforcement, which led a federal prosecutor to contact
his lawyer, who said Williams “might be” interested in cooperating. U.S. v.
Williams, supra. Discussions between
them led to the prosecutor’s asking if Williams would consent to a search of
his cell phones, and he agreed, providing “the passwords for his two iPhones,
which were searched and” later returned to him.
U.S. v. Williams, supra.
In his motion to suppress, Williams claimed the stop
violated Vermont law because “touching the passing lane on a public highway
does not constitute a motor vehicle violation under Vermont law.” U.S. v.
Williams, supra. The prosecution claimed the “stop was justified because
Studin had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle crossed the line in violation
of 23 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 1038”, but the District Court Judge who has
the case disagreed. U.S. v. Williams, supra. She
found the vehicle “momentarily” touched a “passing lane demarcation”, which did
not produce a failure to “remain entirely” in the proper lane. U.S. v.
Williams, supra. So, she found the
stop violated the 4th Amendment which meant Williams was illegally
seized. U.S. v. Williams, supra.
Williams consented to the search of the vehicle after being
illegally seized, so he argued his consent was the product of the illegal
seizure and the evidence discovered should be suppressed as a “fruit of the poisonous tree.” U.S. v. Williams, supra. The
prosecution claimed his “detention was proper because he twice provided a false
name to authorities in an effort to deflect an investigation of his activities.” U.S. v.
Williams, supra. The judge agreed,
noting that during the traffic stop, Studin had
probable cause to arrest [Williams] for
providing false information to a police officer based upon [his] identification
of himself as `Christian Wilson’ and an email identifying a man who matched [his]
description and travel plans as `Christopher Williams.’ . . . Searching
the vehicle was thus proper . . . because it was objectively reasonable to
believethat evidence of [Williams’] true
identity may be discovered in the vehicle from items such as luggage tags,
hotel invoices, credit cards, mail, or other documents bearing [his] name, even
if law enforcement was more interested in evidence of other crimes.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
That brings us to Williams’ argument that the officers’
post-arrest manipulation and inspection
of his cell phones cannot be justified as part of a search incident to arrest
because those searches lack a temporal proximity to his arrest and were not
necessary for officer safety or to preserve evidence. He further argues that
his subsequent consent to a search of his phones was tainted by the initial
warrantless searches as well as by the use of evidence derived from the phones
to obtain an intrusive search warrant of his body's cavities.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
The prosecution argued, in response, that the officers’
initial searches of the cell phones'
content were constitutional under [the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant], or, in the
alternative, [Williams’] consent to a search of his phones five days after the
initial search purged any conceivable taint.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
As Wikipedia notes, search incident to arrest is an
exception to the 4th Amendment’s default requirement that officers
obtain a warrant before searching a place, a thing or a person. It allows an
officer who has arrested someone to search the person and the area around the
person; the justification is to find evidence to prevent it from being
destroyed and/or to find weapons that could be used against the officer. You
can read more about the exception in this prior post. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the Supreme Court narrowed the exception
somewhat, holding that police can
search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle, incident to a recent occupant's arrest (and therefore without a
warrant) only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the
vehicle at the time of the search, or that the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest.
The judge in this case did not address the search incident issue, as
such. Instead, she found that
[a]ssuming arguendo that
law enforcement's initial searches of [Williams’] cell phones were unlawful, [his]
subsequent consent to the search of the cell phones was voluntary and purged of
any arguable taint. Upon his lodging at a correctional facility, [Williams] expressed
to law enforcement his desire to cooperate. In the five days that followed his
arrest, [he] appeared before a magistrate judge, was appointed experienced
counsel, and was advised of his rights. . . .
[He] was accompanied by counsel
and presented with the option of providing consent under specific terms to
which he and his counsel agreed. He
was not forced to consent to the search or to provide the passwords that would
permit it to take place. Instead, his decision to cooperate was a tactical one
that he initiated.
U.S. v. Williams,
supra.
So she held that “[b]ecause [Williams’] consent to search
his cell phones was an act of free will untainted by the prior search, the
exclusionary rule does not apply.” The
judge therefore denied his motion to suppress.
U.S. v. Williams, supra.
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