This post examines an opinion a U.S. District Court judge in
California recently issued in two civil cases filed in federal court: Maddalena v. Toole, 2013 WL 5491869
(U.S. District Court for the District of California 2013).
Earlier, the judge consolidated the two cases,
presumably under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which lets a
judge “join for hearing or trial or any other matters” two or more cases that
“involve a common question of law or fact”.
The cases this federal judge consolidated are
Peggy Robinson v. Derrick John
Toole, No. 13–cv–06007–ODW(RZx) (C.D. Cal. filed August 15, 2013)
and Marianne Maddalena v. Derrick John Toole, No.
13–cv–04873–ODW(RZx) (C.D. Cal. filed July 5, 2013). (ECF No. 21.) Both
Plaintiffs' claims center around Defendant Derrick Toole's carefully-executed
cyberstalking, which spanned the course of at least two years.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
In this opinion, the judge is ruling on Toole’s motion to
dismiss the “Plaintiffs' Complaints as time-barred.” Maddalena
v. Toole, supra. Federal courts have
held that a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is the appropriate way to raise a claim that the statute of limitations has
run, which means the civil cause of action can no longer be brought.
As to how the cases arose, the judge began his analysis of
Toole’s motion by explaining that from October of 2009
through at least January 2011, Toole
used spyware programs, GPS devices, and other technology to pry into every last
detail of Plaintiffs' lives. Toole commenced his haunting of Plaintiffs' lives
by monitoring his girlfriend Marianne Maddalena's electronic communications. .
. . Eventually, Toole expanded his cyberstalking to Maddalena's work life and
began electronically monitoring Peggy Robinson, Maddalena's coworker and
friend. . . .
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
Since he was dealing with two separate cases, the judge then
outlined the facts that led to each, respectively, beginning with Maddalena,
who met Toole in “late 2007” and
dated [him] on and off for several
years. . . . On October 6, 2009, Toole -- without Maddalena's knowledge -- installed
the Spectorsoft eBlaster spyware program on her laptop. . . .Toole used
Spectorsoft to send himself a direct report of Maddalena's every email and
instant message. . . . Toole also sent himself hourly reports of her Internet
activity, ultimately gathering over 7,000 reports. . . .
In March 2010, Toole installed Spector Pro spyware
on Maddalena's work computer. . . . Then, in April, he installed a GPS tracking
device on her car. . . . Effectively, Toole tracked Maddalena's every keystroke
and physical movement. . . . By late 2010, Toole began to unravel her personal
relationships by impersonating her via emails and text messages to her friends
and family. . . .
[I]n January 2011, Maddalena realized someone had
been intercepting her emails when she received a reply to an email that she
knew she had not sent. . . . On January 25, 2011, Maddalena hired the computer
company Mac SOS to investigate her suspicions. . . . Mac SOS discovered
Spectorsoft on her laptop. . . .
Maddalena confronted Toole who admitted
installing the spyware on her laptop. . . . But Maddalena did not yet know
about the spyware installed on her other computers or GPS tracking on her car. .
. .
Maddalena hired counsel in February
2011, and reported the incident to the FBI in March 2011. . . . On September
19, 2011, the FBI conducted a formal search of Toole's home.
Two days later,
the FBI informed Maddalena that Toole had carefully curated a database of her
messages, emails, texts, and other private electronic data. . . . This news
came as a shock to [her]. . . . Since then, Maddalena has been diagnosed
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and is regularly attending therapy. .
. .
After meeting with the FBI,
Maddalena claims she continued to learn the `type and extent of [Toole's]
secretive infiltrations. that are the basis of this action. . . . For instance, [she] learned that since
2010, her mother and sister had been receiving countless hurtful emails from
Maddalena, in which she had accused them of being bad mothers. . . .
Maddalena
never sent these emails. . . . In retrospect, Maddalena considers this her
first indication of how Toole used spyware to steal her identity and dismantle
her personal relationships. . . .
Finally, on November 1, 2012, Toole was
convicted of a felony for his illegal electronic monitoring. . . . At the
restitution hearing on January, 11, 2013, Maddalena `realized the need to bring
a civil suit for damages which were not compensated through the criminal
proceeding.’ . . . Accordingly, on July 5, 2013, Maddalena filed this Complaint.
. . .
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
That brings us to Peggy Robinson, ”Maddalena’s co-worker and
confidante,” who
also fell victim to Toole's
wrongdoings. . . . In early 2010, Toole broke into Robinson's work
offices and installed spyware on her laptop computer, effectively gaining
access to her email, Skype, and G–Chat accounts. . . . As he did
with Maddalena, Toole printed and stored the entirety of Robinson's electronic
communications at his house. . . .
Robinson `began to discover’ in January
2011, that Toole had used spyware and other tracking devices to invade her
personal and professional life. . . . At this time, `through
conversations with each other,’ Maddalena and Robinson discovered that Toole
had read Robinson's G–Chats and emails. . . .
Robinson then
reported the incident to the FBI through her counsel. . . . During
the September, 2011 search of Toole's home, the FBI found plastic tubs filled
with hard copies of Robinson's online communications. . . . Robinson
then filed her Complaint on August 15, 2013. . . .
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra. You can read more about the
facts in the cases in the news stories you can find here and here.
In their complaints, Maddalena and Robinson “allege[d]
various state-law-tort claims” and claims for damages under three federal
statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S. Code § 2510; the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S. Code § 2701; and the Computer Fraud andAbuse Act, 18 U.S. Code § 1030. Maddalena
v. Toole, supra. A federal district
court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the state-law claims (which could
be heard by a California state court) but would have jurisdiction to hear the
three federal claims. However, as Wikipedia
explains, under the principle of pendent jurisdiction the federal court can
take jurisdiction of the state-law claims; the principle is based on
efficiency, i.e., it is reasonable to let the federal court resolve all of the
claims, as long as there is at least one “anchor” federal claim.
The judge began his analysis of Toole’s motion to dismiss
the federal claims as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations by
noting that the three federal claims all have
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two-year statutes of limitations. To
recover civil damages for a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 2510, a party must
file within two years after the date upon which a claimant has a `reasonable
opportunity’ to discover the violation. 18 U.S. Code § 2520(e). For 18
U.S. Code § 2701, a civil action runs only for two years after the date upon
which the claimant `first discovered or had a reasonable opportunity to
discover the violation.’ 18 U.S. Code § 2707(f). The applicable statute of
limitations for 18 U.S. Code § 1030 explains that an action must be
raised `within two years of the date of the act complained of or the date of
the discovery of the damage.’ 18 U.S. Code § 1030(g).
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
Here, Toole argued that the plaintiffs’ federal claims accrued,
or came into existence,
when [they] discovered the illegally
installed spyware in January 2011, and therefore the two-year statutes of
limitations have passed. . . .
Plaintiffs contend that although they initially
suspected Toole's actions in January 2011, they did not discover every
technological mechanism used to spy on them, nor `the extent of Toole's
secretive infiltrations,’ until September 21, 2011, when the FBI explained the
findings from their raid of Toole's home. . . . Therefore, Plaintiffs argue,
September 2011, is the proper accrual date.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
The district court judge began his analysis of the arguments
by explaining that
[l]ike many statutes of limitation, the
statutes at issue in this action do not require that the claimant have actual
knowledge of the violation. Rather, 18 U.S. Code § 2520(e), §
2707(f), and1030(g) demands only that the claimant have had a reasonable
notice to discover the violation.
One court has explained that the statute of
limitations for 18 U.S. Code § 2520(e) will bar a suit if the plaintiff
`had such notice as would lead a reasonable person either to sue or to launch
an investigation that would likely uncover the requisite facts.’ Sparshott
v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 311 F.3d 425 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 2002). . . .
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
He then found that Toole was correct because the plaintiffs
had a
reasonable opportunity to discover the
violations long before the FBI investigation in September 2011. Maddalena
certainly had a reasonable opportunity to discover Toole's illegal activity on
January 25, 2011, when she discovered the Spectorsoft software on her computer.
In fact, Maddalena acknowledges in her Complaint that she actually discovered Toole was responsible for the installation of Spectorsoft when she confronted him. . . . Thus, beyond a reasonable opportunity, Maddalena had actual knowledge of Toole's illegal electronic monitoring. . . .
In fact, Maddalena acknowledges in her Complaint that she actually discovered Toole was responsible for the installation of Spectorsoft when she confronted him. . . . Thus, beyond a reasonable opportunity, Maddalena had actual knowledge of Toole's illegal electronic monitoring. . . .
Similarly,
Robinson had sufficient notice of Toole's misconduct by January 2011. Robinson
admits that she `[began] to discover the illegal use of . . . spyware on her
computers’ in early January, 2011. . . .
Robinson asserts that `Through conversations with each other Maddalena and [Robinson] came to discover that [Toole] was privy to information that could not possibly be obtained by normal means.’ . . .Thus, Robinson also had actual knowledge of Toole's illegal electronic monitoring in January 2011.
Robinson asserts that `Through conversations with each other Maddalena and [Robinson] came to discover that [Toole] was privy to information that could not possibly be obtained by normal means.’ . . .Thus, Robinson also had actual knowledge of Toole's illegal electronic monitoring in January 2011.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
He also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
`secretive technological nature’ of
Toole's wrongdoing prevented them from fully discovering the arsenal of spyware
he installed and the extent to which he was monitoring their activities is
irrelevant.
A victim of wiretapping does not need to discover every type and
means of the defendant's misconduct. See Sparshott v. Feld Entm't,
Inc., supra (rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendant's use of
technologically different means of wiretapping did not put her on notice of his
wrongdoing and explaining that the earlier incidents gave her a `reasonable
opportunity to discover later violations’).
Further, a plaintiff need not even know
the exact perpetrator of an injury to have sufficient notice to bring
suit. See Dyniewicz v. U.S., 742 F.2d 484, 486–87 (U.S.Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 1984.)
Here, it is sufficient that
Plaintiffs were aware of the immediate injury giving rise to their federal
claims-the secretly-installed spyware. And although it took a `full-throttle’
FBI investigation to uncover the full extent of Toole's actions, the January
2011 discovery of Spectorsoft was enough notice for Plaintiffs to bring suit.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
And the district court judge explained that
taking legal action or launching an
investigation indicates that a plaintiff has been made reasonably aware of the
defendant's misconduct. Sparshott v. Feld Entm't, Inc., supra. Plaintiffs
fit squarely within this rule.
In February 2011, after the spyware
discovery, Maddalena `hired legal counsel to advise her and they reported this
incident to the FBI.’ . . . Although Maddalena did not bring a civil suit at
that time, by March 2011 she had spoken with two different attorneys and
participated in the FBI investigation. . . .
Both of these actions make clear that
by January 2011, Plaintiffs had sufficient notice of Toole's cyberstalking to `sue
or to launch an investigation that would likely uncover the requisite facts.’ Sparshott
v. Feld Entm't, Inc., supra.
At the very latest, Plaintiffs were on notice by February or March of 2011, when they had enough information regarding Toole's cyberstalking to enlist help from legal counsel and the FBI. Even if the Court accepted the later date of March 2011, as the accrual date the two-year statutes of limitation would have run almost five months before Plaintiffs' filing dates.
At the very latest, Plaintiffs were on notice by February or March of 2011, when they had enough information regarding Toole's cyberstalking to enlist help from legal counsel and the FBI. Even if the Court accepted the later date of March 2011, as the accrual date the two-year statutes of limitation would have run almost five months before Plaintiffs' filing dates.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
The judge therefore held that
[b]ased on the timeline offered by
Plaintiffs in the Complaint, the Court is compelled to believe that January
2011, is the proper accrual date under the applicable statutes of limitation.
Because Plaintiffs waited almost two-and-a-half years to file their complaints,
their actions are time-barred.
Maddalena v. Toole,
supra.
So, Toole won, here.
The judge dismissed the Plaintiffs’ respective claims “with prejudice,”
which means they cannot be brought again.
Maddalena v. Toole, supra. He dismissed their claims under California
state law without prejudice, which means they can try to pursue those claims in
a state court. Maddalena v. Toole, supra.
Dear Ms. Brenner,
ReplyDeleteWhen the law fails or is shamefully inadequate as it is in cases like this. Justice is not served and the criminal is free to spread their poison to other victims and continue with their current victims...
The plaintiffs in these two cases, by their wealth, had another course of action available to them that was substantially cheaper than the lawyers and unlike the lawyers... is swift justice.
Just a Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's character Sherlock Holmes sometimes pursued his villains using means outside the law. Both women could have hired one of the local not so upstanding Private Investigators or shady lawyer to act as their agent in this manner.
A few thousand dollars in cash on a local biker bar can purchase a lot of baseball bat time for scum like Mr. Toole.
Cyber criminals do not expect retribution to come to their door. Especially to have all of their electronics stolen from them or to be physically assaulted by a brute squad.
With a very clear message as to what their limits are in the future and specifically what is now out-of-bounds.
What are they going to say to the police?
"Officer, officer while committing a felony crime my victims beat me senseless and stole my criminal tools..."
No they can't say a thing. If they did they would be charged from their confession and then when in jail all of the other real nasty criminals would use them as a Nancy for letting a 'sheep' (aka victims) get the upper hand on them.
Sometime the law will work to grind down these sociopaths and psychopaths. When it doesn't you now have to resort to sub rosa methods.