After a jury convicted him of “felony stealing” in violation
of Missouri Revised Statutes § 570.030,
Reginald Williams appealed. State v. Williams, __ S.W.3d __ 2013 WL
3190103 (Missouri Court of Appeals 2013). Since the judge found Williams was
“a prior and persistent offender”, which raised his potential sentence, the judge sentenced him to ten years in a Missouri prison. Appellant’s Brief, State v. Williams, 2013 WL 489700.
According to this opinion, the case arose on January 18,
2011, when Detective Rodney Hickman
set up a bait car at 1401 Chestnut Street in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Hickman placed
a black bag containing a laptop computer and an electronic tracking device in
the front seat of the vehicle. Hickman also notified other officers in the
department of the existence of the bait car and tracking mechanism.
On January
23, 2011, the tracking device activated, indicating that the laptop had been
removed from the bait car.
At
the same time, St. Louis Police Officers Willie Haymore and James Zwilling were
patrolling . . . and received a notification from their
dispatcher that the tracking device on the laptop had been activated. Haymore
had received Hickman's notification of the bait car and tracking
mechanism, and understood the activation of the tracking beacon meant that
someone had removed the laptop bag from the bait car.
The officers immediately began
following the signal from their location in order to pursue the suspect they
believed was in the act of stealing the laptop and tracking device. Following
the tracking device signal, the officers pursued Williams from the City of St.
Louis, Missouri to the MetroLink station in East St. Louis, Illinois.
As the officers approached the
MetroLink platform, they heard another officer shout `laptop bag,’ and saw
Williams with the laptop. After a brief struggle, Haymore forced Williams to
the ground and handcuffed him. Williams informed the officers that he found the
laptop on the train. Approximately 15 minutes elapsed between the time the tracking
beacon activated, and Williams's arrest.
State v. Williams,
supra.
At Williams’ trial, the jury heard the testimony of Kenneth
McCaster, who was
nearby at the time of Williams's
arrest, and heard Williams tell Haymore [he] found the laptop bag. McCaster
informed a nearby officer that [he] had been on the MetroLink with Williams and
had seen Williams board the MetroLink with the laptop in his possession at a
station in the City of St. Louis.
McCaster [said] Williams initially
offered to pay him to `hack the code’ of the computer. McCaster also informed
the officer that after McCaster refused to help him activate the laptop
computer, Williams attempted to sell the computer to McCaster for $100, which
McCaster also refused.
State v. Williams,
supra.
On appeal, Williams argued, first, that the trial judge
erred in denying his motion to suppress the laptop and tracking device because
“admission of the evidence was improper because the items were retrieved
outside of the officers' jurisdiction, and therefore constituted an unlawful
search and seizure.” State v. Williams, supra. His second
argument was that “the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal
because insufficient evidence exists in the record to support a verdict that
Williams committed felony stealing.” State v. Williams, supra.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Williams’ first
argument by noting that the
validity of the search and seizure at
issue . . . depends on the validity of the underlying arrest. This case involves
the pursuit of a suspect from Missouri into Illinois. Under both Missouri and
Illinois law, the validity of a warrantless arrest is determined by the law of
the state in which the arrest occurred. State v. Morris, 522
S.W.2d 93 (Missouri Court of Appeals 1975); People v. Clark, 46
Ill.App.3d 240, 360 N.E.2d 1160 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1977). Williams was
arrested in Illinois, and, therefore, the validity of his arrest is determined
by Illinois law.
State v. Williams,
supra.
It then explained that under Illinois law, as codified in
Illinois Compiled Statutes 725 ICSA 5/107–4(b),
[a]ny peace officer of another State
who enters this State in fresh pursuit and continues within this State in fresh
pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he has committed
an offense in the other State has the same authority to arrest and hold the
person in custody as peace officers of this State have to arrest and hold a
person in custody on the ground that he has committed an offense in this State.
State v. Williams,
supra. The court also noted that section 725 ICSA 5/107–4(a)(3) defines “fresh pursuit” as “the
immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest.” State
v. Williams, supra. It then
explained that the first requirement under this statute is that the officers must be
pursuing a person
in order to arrest that person on grounds that the suspect committed an offense
in the other state, in this case Missouri. 725 ICSA 5/107–4(b). The relevant inquiry
under the first element is whether the officers were properly in pursuit of
Williams given the fact that the officers did not observe him commit any crime,
and did not have a warrant for his arrest.
State v. Williams,
supra.
did not see the person who removed the
laptop from the bait car, and did not have visual contact with the individual
possessing the laptop as the officers pursued that person into East St. Louis,
Illinois. Instead, the officers pursued the suspect by following the electronic
signal of the device in the suspect's possession. While this factual scenario
is somewhat different from the fresh pursuit cases we have reviewed, we find
this factual distinction immaterial to our analysis.
State v. Williams,
supra. The court also noted that under Illinois law, an officer can
`perform a warrantless
arrest when the officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is
committing or has committed an offense.’” People v. Lee, 214
I11.2d 476 (Illinois Supreme Court 2005)
(quoting 725 ILCS 5/107–2(1)(c)). Where officers are working
together, the sum total of the knowledge of all involved officers is used to
determine whether probable cause existed. People v. Long, 369
Ill.App.3d 860, 861 N.E.2d 335 (Illinois Court of Appeals 2007).
State v. Williams, supra.
The Court of Appeals then found that in this case,
although the officers were following
the tracking signal being sent from the laptop, the tracking device on the
laptop was the means of following a suspect, not the object of the chase. The
record reflects that the laptop was part of a bait car sting, and the officers
received a radio notification that the laptop had been stolen.
The fact
the laptop bag was reported stolen gave the arresting officers reasonable
grounds to believe that the individual found in possession of the bag,
regardless of that person's identity, would be guilty of felony stealing or, in
the alternative receipt of stolen property, as Williams was initially charged.
The officers had every reason to
believe they were in pursuit of a person suspected of committing a felony. The
officers' reasonable belief that they were in pursuit of a suspect who had,
just moments before committed a felony, is a sufficient basis for the officers
to pursue and arrest the suspect in possession of the laptop. People v.
Long, supra. See also People v. Schaefer, 343 Ill.App.3d 159, 796
N.E.2d 686 (Illinois Court of Appeals 2003) (725 ICSA 5/107–4(a–3)(1) `imposes
no requirement that an officer must conclusively know an
offense has been committed before the officer may follow a driver outside the
officer's jurisdiction and arrest the driver for offenses that occurred within
the officer's jurisdiction. Rather, the statute specifically provides that an
officer may make an arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction if the officer is
investigating whether an offense occurred within the officer's
jurisdiction.’) (emphasis in original).
State v. Williams,
supra.
The court then addressed the second element: “that the pursuit must be immediate.” State
v. Williams, supra. It found that
[a]lthough Williams does not challenge
the trial court's ruling on this point, we also find that the officers
immediately began their pursuit. Prior to the pursuit, the officers were informed
of the existence and location of the bait car, and were informed that the
laptop and tracking device had been taken from the vehicle.
The record reflects
that immediately upon being notified of the movement of the tracking device,
and while still within the City of St. Louis, the officers began a continuous
pursuit of the suspect via the tracking signal until they located Williams in
Illinois with the laptop and tracking device. Accordingly, we find sufficient
evidence to conclude that the officers' pursuit of Williams was immediately
undertaken within the meaning of 725 ICSA 5/107–4.
State v. Williams,
supra.
Finally, it took up the third and final factor, noting Williams
argued that the evidence was
unlawfully obtained on the ground
that . . . Williams was
not endeavoring to avoid arrest within the meaning of 725 ICSA 5/107–4.
Williams principally argues . . . that the officers were not engaged in fresh
pursuit because the record does not contain any evidence Williams was aware of
the pursuit. Williams contends that because he was unaware that officers were
chasing him, by definition he could not have been `endeavoring to avoid arrest’
under 725 ICSA 5/107–4(a)(3).
State v. Williams,
supra.
The Court of Appeals found
no support in Illinois law for the
proposition that a suspect must have actual knowledge that he or she is being
chased by specific police officers in order to be `endeavoring to avoid
arrest.’ To the contrary, in People v. Wolfbrandt the court
explained:
`While the Illinois fresh pursuit statute is not
applicable to this case, even if it were, we believe that the phrase
“endeavoring to avoid arrest” does not mean that a person must be consciously
aware of the pursuit, but rather that a person is fleeing the scene of the
crime to avoid arrest.’
State v. Williams, supra (quoting People v. Wolfbrandt, 127 Ill.App.3d 836, 469 N.E.2d 305 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1984)).
The court also noted that “the absence of any requirement that the suspect must have actual knowledge of the fresh pursuit is consistent with Illinois courts' construction of Missouri law.” State v. Williams, supra (citing People v. Clark, 46 Ill.App.3d 240, 360 N.E.2d 1160 (Illinois Court of Appeals 1977). In Clark, the Illinois court “focused on the immediacy with which the officers pursued the suspect, and did not impose a requirement that the suspects have any actual knowledge that they were being pursued by the officers at the time they, or the arresting officers, traversed into Missouri.” State v. Williams, supra.
The Court of Appeals then applied this law to the facts of
the case, explaining that it found
ample evidence in the record to
conclude that Williams was endeavoring to avoid arrest under 725 ICSA
5/107–4(a)(3). Williams initially removed the laptop computer from a vehicle at
1401 Chestnut Street in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. [He] then left the
parking garage, boarded a MetroLink train, and traveled to East St. Louis,
Illinois. Williams immediately left the area once the laptop was removed from
the bait car, strongly suggesting [he] fled the area with the purpose of
avoiding arrest.
Second, almost immediately upon
boarding MetroLink, Williams attempted to sell the laptop computer. McCaster
testified that Williams asked him to `crack the code’ of the computer, and,
when McCaster refused, Williams offered to sell him the computer for $100.
Williams's attempt to immediately sell the computer at a marginal price is
strongly corroborative of the conclusion that Williams was attempting to
dispose of evidence of his crime in order to avoid arrest.
These facts provide compelling evidence
that Williams was endeavoring to avoid arrest at the time the officers pursued
him into Illinois. Under Illinois law, it is of no consequence that [he] was
unaware of the pursuit at the time he took actions designed to evade the
arresting officers. . . .
State v. Williams,
supra.
It held that the “officers’ pursuit and arrest of Williams” complied with Illinois
law’s requirements for fresh pursuit, which meant both were lawful . . . which
meant the evidence . . . did not need to be suppressed. State
v. Williams, supra.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Williams argued, in
part, that it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “he was
the individual who stole the laptop and tracking device”. State
v. Williams, supra. More precisely,
he argued that because “no one saw him take the laptop bag from the car, the
record lacks evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that he stole
the laptop.” State v. Williams, supra.
The Court of Appeals did not agree, explaining that the
evidence at trial included
testimony from police officers and an
eyewitness that Williams had possession of the laptop shortly after it was
taken from the bait car, and offered to sell it for $100 to a nearby stranger
after first asking the stranger to `hack the code’ of the computer. The entire
episode lasted only about 15 minutes. . . .
[T]he testimony at trial also
established that Williams attempted to resist arrest upon being found with the
laptop. This testimony provides a sufficient foundation for the jury to infer
that Williams was the person who removed the laptop and tracking device from
the bait car. The fact no one saw Williams remove the laptop bag does not bar
the jury from drawing such an inference. See State v. Evans, 740
S.W.2d 364 (Missouri Court of Appeals 1987) (circumstantial evidence may be
used to prove every element of the offense of stealing).
State v. Williams,
supra.
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