In 2011, Paul Michael Glaser obtained a six-month civil
harassment restraining order under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 against Pamela Meserve. Glaser v. Meserve, 2013 WL 1460339
(California Court of Appeals 2013). When that order expired and Meserve “resumed
her harassment,” he “obtained a three-year injunction” against her, after which
Meserve “appealed the second order. Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
According to this opinion, Glaser “was an actor on the
1970's television show Starsky and Hutch”, after which “he became a director
and later an author.” Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. At some point in 2000, Meserve approached Glaser to see if he was
interested
in a Web site she had developed for
him, and he agreed she could maintain it. Over time, he communicated with her
about the Web site, seeking her assistance in handling fan mail. She also began
sending gifts to Glaser. [Meserve] was living in the Boston area and Glaser
thanked her for the gifts by telephone, thinking of her as a passionate fan.
In 2008, [Meserve] flew to London to
see Glaser in a play and attended over 20 performances. Also in 2008, [she]
moved from Boston to the same Venice neighborhood to which Glaser had recently
relocated. She constantly appeared in front of his apartment, and though
Glaser's children questioned her behavior, Glaser tried to remain friendly with
her.
At about the same time, Glaser decided
to self-publish his first book, Chrystallia, and asked [Meserve]
for her assistance. As early as 2007, [she] had been providing Glaser with
editorial comments on the book. Glaser offered to compensate [Meserve] for her
time on publishing, and according to [her], she was to receive five percent of
the royalties generated from book sales.
According to Glaser, after working
with [Meserve] for approximately six to nine months, he realized his
self-publishing efforts were not going to work. He retained professionals, who
after two meetings with [her] said they would be unable to work with her, as
her behavior disturbed them. Glaser terminated her, but told her he would
compensate her for her time once the book made a profit.
[Meserve] continued to contact Glaser
and his friends and colleagues, and ultimately moved in with [his] next-door
neighbor. She would sit on the stairs opposite Glaser's kitchen door while
working on her computer. And at some point she lived only in her car, parked
near Glaser's home.
By early 2011, Glaser's e-mail communications
to [Meserve] were focused on efforts to get control of the Web sites that she
had been managing, offering to pay her for the rights, while [her] e-mails were
focused on efforts to mend the parties' relationship.
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
Glaser applied for the harassment restraining order on April
15, 2011, on the grounds that Meserve “had been continuously lurking near his
home, following him and excessively e-mailing him.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra. In a letter attached as support for the order, Glaser said Meserve “`exhibits both a rational and very irrational
side and has continued to impose herself on me and my life despite my requests
for her to desist.’” Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. Meserve “objected to the
application and wrote a letter to the court in opposition, attaching two
letters of recommendation from Glaser and a number of e-mail exchanges between”
them. Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
At a May 5, 2011 hearing on his application for the order,
Glaser testified that after he
terminated her, she kept showing up in
his neighborhood and approaching visitors to his home, sometimes leaving notes
on their cars and sometimes pleading her case in person. He was also concerned
that [she] had moved into the apartment just behind his, despite his requests
to stay away. He stated that although [Meserve] had not made any threats that
would lead him to fear for his physical safety, he did fear for his safety as a
result of her irrational behavior.
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The judge issued a restraining order that was effective for six
months and required Meserve “to refrain from harassing, threatening, following
or stalking Glaser, and directed that she not contact him by telephone,
message, mail or e-mail.” Glaser v.
Meserve, supra. It also required that she “stay at least 20 feet away from [him]
and his home and vehicle” and barred her from owning, possessing or purchasing
a firearm, and requiring her to turn in any firearm in her possession or
control.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra. Meserve
did not appeal the order. Glaser v.
Meserve, supra.
Glaser applied for a second restraining order on January 25,
2012. Glaser v. Meserve, supra. In
his application, he said that Meserve had resumed
calling him and e-mailing him
constantly; that she walked where he was walking, sometimes circling back just
to interact with him; and that she blogged on his Facebook and Twitter accounts,
representing herself as his `liaison.’ He attached some of her recent e-mails.
He sought a three-year restraining order and asked that [she] be ordered to
keep at least 100 yards away from him, his family and certain business
colleagues.
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. This time, Meserve objected to the order and “denied there was a
factual basis for it.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
Meserve and Glaser testified at a February 8, 2012 hearing
on the application. Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. “At that point,” she still
lived in Glaser's neighborhood “in an apartment about 400 yards from his
apartment.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
Glaser testified that while he asked Meserve to leave him alone, “`she
continues to call me, e-mail me, repeating, repeating constantly to read the
e-mails. It's kind of bizarre. It's like, you know, “I'll never stop. I'll
never stop e-mailing you no matter what. And I will do this because this is my
calling. This is what I'm about.”’” Glaser
v. Meserve, supra. Meserve “offered various explanations for each time she
contacted or attempted to contact Glaser and his family and friends” and “denied
she was pursuing him.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
At the end of the hearing, the judge “issued
a three-year restraining order” commenting that Meserve “had contacted Glaser
excessively, even after he asked her not to,” and said he “understood why
Glaser was concerned.” Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. The judge told Meserve,
`[e]ven though you yourself may not
appreciate how your conduct appears to others, I will tell you from an
objective point of view, it appears excessive. And I am concerned with the fact
that you specifically started when the first restraining order ended and you
stopped as soon as you were served with this. So even though you say you can
control yourself, I'm not confident that you can.’
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra. The order prevented Meserve “from
contacting Glaser directly or indirectly, either in person, by telephone, by
any electronic communication or through social media.” Glaser
v. Meserve, supra.
In appealing the second order, Meserve argued that it “was
not supported by substantial evidence.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra. The Court of Appeals began its analysis of
her argument by noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6
was designed to supplement existing law
by providing an expedited procedure to harassment victims and was `enacted to
protect the individual's right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as
guaranteed by the California Constitution.’” Grant v. Clampitt, 56
Cal.App.4th 586, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 (California Court of Appeals 1997).
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The court also explained that California Code of Civil
Procedure § 527.6(b)(3) defines
`harassment’ as `unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person and
serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause
a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually
cause substantial emotional distress. . . .’
Subdivision (b)(1) defines `course
of conduct’ as `a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following
or stalking an individual, . . . or sending harassing correspondence to an
individual by any means. . . .’ (California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6(b)(1))
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The court then addressed the issues raised in this appeal,
noting, first that to support the
“issuance of an injunction” under these standards, Glaser “was
required to show that [Meserve] had engaged in a course of conduct constituting
harassment that would both cause a reasonable person and actually caused him to
suffer substantial emotional distress.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
It found, first, that the evidence showed Meserve engaged in
a course of conduct that
both annoyed and harassed Glaser, and
served no legitimate purpose. Even assuming [Meserve] had a legitimate basis to
contact Glaser while she was working with him on his book, . . . by January
2011 the parties no longer had a working relationship. Nonetheless, [she] continued
to e-mail and call Glaser, to walk by his home and to approach him in person,
even though he told her he wanted nothing to do with her. There was sufficient
evidence to show that her contact had no legitimate purpose.
For example, in a January 2011 e-mail [Meserve]
wrote: `I am NOT letting GO. I AM NOT forget [t]ing and I will not let YOU
forget either . . . no sir . . . no more BS from you. I LOVED YOU. It is not a
terrible thing!’ In April 2011 [she] wrote: “I loved you Paul . . . I trusted
and believed everything, every word you shared and promised me . . . I can't
let go or forget that. Why can't you understand this? I need to know why!’
And after the first restraining order
expired, [Meserve] wrote in a January 2012 e-mail, `Paul . . . don't you think
that maybe fate brought us together? Or maybe in our next life, when we meet
again, we will really know that the reason we ARE here IS to help each other .
. . to appreciate the gift of each other, what we can learn from each other and
teach [each] other with open kindness, understanding and compassion. . . .’
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The Court of Appeals also found that the evidence was
sufficient to show that Meserve’s
harassment would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. [Her] conduct was akin to that
of the defendant in R.D. v. P.M., 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 135
Cal.Rptr.3d 791 (California Court of Appeals 2011). There, the court found
substantial evidence supported the conclusion that a reasonable person would
have suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of the defendant's unwanted
contacts with the plaintiff spanning almost one year. . . .
The defendant . . . engaged in conduct
including confronting the plaintiff at a local market, posting negative
consumer reviews on the Internet and distributing flyers with disparaging
messages about the plaintiff, and engaging in volunteer activities at the
plaintiff's children's schools. . . .
Here, beyond her unwanted contact with
Glaser, [Meserve] similarly blogged on Glaser's Facebook and Twitter Web sites,
contacted his children and volunteered for a foundation he founded on behalf of
his deceased wife. Correspondingly, this evidence supported the conclusion that
Glaser had suffered substantial emotional distress. . . .
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
Meserve then claimed “there was insufficient evidence to
show that her actions caused substantial emotional distress, either objectively
or subjectively.” Glaser v. Meserve, supra.
The court explained that “emotional distress” is “generally understood”
to
include, among other emotions, fright,
nervousness, anxiety, humiliation and worry. . . . `Section 527.6 does not
define the phrase ‘substantial emotional distress.’ However, in the analogous
context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
similar phrase ‘severe emotional distress' means highly unpleasant mental
suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable conduct’ [citation], which
entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that ‘no
reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ (Schild
v. Rubin, 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 283
Cal.Rptr. 533 (California Court of Appeals 1999)).
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The court also
noted that, in entering the restraining order, the trial judge
explained
to [Meserve] that she had `really gone overboard and beyond the pale. And I
understand why Mr. Glaser is concerned.’ Substantial evidence supported the
trial court's conclusion that Glaser should not have been expected to endure [Meserve’s]
excessive and accusatory e-mails, unwanted personal contact and irrational
behavior.
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
And the Court of
Appeals explained that “substantial evidence” also showed that Glaser
suffered
substantial emotional distress. Evidence satisfying the subjective prong
of § 527.6 may be circumstantial. . . . Ensworth v. Mullvain, 224
Cal.App.3d 1105, 274 Cal.Rptr. 447 (California Court of Appeals 1990). . . .
[T]he Ensworth court rejected the proposition that direct testimony is
required to establish that a plaintiff actually suffered substantial emotional
distress; it found sufficient the plaintiff's testimony that the defendant
followed and spied on her, repeatedly drove around her house, made numerous
phone calls and sent threatening letters, and contacted other professionals in
the community in an effort to harm the plaintiff's reputation. Ensworth v.
Mullvain, supra.
Here,
in addition to testifying about [Meserve’s] conduct, Glaser testified at the
first hearing that he had gotten to the point where he could not control or
manage [her] behavior and that, because of her irrational behavior, `I fear for
my safety.’ At the second hearing, he reiterated that he did not believe [she] was
able to stop herself from contacting him, and he felt as if he were being
pursued.
He
worried that if [Meserve] was incessantly e-mailing, calling and approaching
him, he did not know whether she was capable of more. Any further evidence on
the point would have been cumulative. . . .
Glaser v. Meserve,
supra.
The Court of Appeals therefore held that the order was
supported by substantial evidence. Glaser v. Meserve, supra. It also found that Glaser had shown there was
“sufficient evidence of a threat of continued harassing harm” to support to
entry of another restraining order. Glaser v. Meserve, supra. It noted, among other things, that the trial
judge “repeatedly pointed out that [Meserve] had demonstrated she was unable to
control herself in the absence of a court order.” Glaser
v. Meserve, supra.
For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed entry of the second restraining order.
Glaser v. Meserve, supra. The story you can find here adds
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