Michael Anthony Greene was charged with four crimes under
Michigan law: “use of a computer to
commit a crime” in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws §§ 752.796 & 752.797(3)(d), unauthorized access of a
computer in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws §§ 752.795 &
752.797(2)(a), “common-law misconduct in office resulting in obstruction of
justice” in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.505, and “common-law
obstruction of justice” in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.505. People
v. Greene, 2013 WL 1352448 (Michigan Court of Appeals 2013).
In this opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals is ruling on
the prosecution’s appealing the trial judge’s dismissal of the charges. People
v. Greene, supra. The court began
its opinion by noting that the case arose from an incident that
occurred at the 22nd District Court in
Inkster, involving [Greene], a court officer at that court, who allegedly
accessed city attorney Milton Spokojny's email account from [his] work computer
and printed a sensitive document that was sent to that account. The document
was a defense-strategy memorandum pertaining to a lawsuit in which the city of
Inkster was a defendant and Kevin Smith, an employee of the city, was the
plaintiff.
The prosecution contended that [Greene] transmitted the document to
codefendant Ronald Wade, who in turn delivered it to Smith.
People v. Greene,
supra.
In its appeal, the prosecution argued that the trial judge
(the circuit court) erred in dismissing the four charges because the court “had
probable cause to believe [Greene] committed the crimes alleged and, thus, did
not abuse its discretion in binding [him] over to the circuit court for trial. People
v. Greene, supra. The Court of
Appeals began its analysis of the argument by noting that “[w]hen the
prosecution demonstrates, by competent evidence, that there is probable cause
to believe that (1) a felony was committed and (2) the defendant committed the
crime, a district court must bind the defendant over to the circuit court for
trial.” People v. Greene, supra. It also noted that probable cause exists
where there is `evidence sufficient to
cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief of the accused's guilt. . . . [A] showing of probable cause
may stop short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and evidence that leaves
some doubt may yet demonstrate probable cause.’ People v. Justice, 454
Mich. 344; 562 N.W.2d 652 (Michigan Supreme Court 1997).
People v. Greene,
supra.
It began its analysis of the specific offenses with
common-law obstruction of justice, noting that obstruction of justice involves “`interference
with the orderly administration of justice’”. People v. Greene, supra (quoting People v. Thomas, 438
Mich. 448, 475 N.W.2d 288 (Michigan Supreme Court 1991)). The prosecution argued that Greene’s conduct
constituted common-law obstruction because it “falls under one of Blackstone's
categories: `officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by
maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise.’” People v. Greene, supra (quoting People v. Thomas, supra.)
The Court of Appeals noted that the claim at issue in the
obstruction-of-justice charge
involved Kevin Smith (the plaintiff)
and the city of Inkster. It is undisputed that [Greene] was not involved in [it].
Evidence was presented showing that a defense-strategy memorandum was printed
from [his] computer and that [he[ distributed that memo to Wade, who distributed
[it] to Smith. Judge Sylvia James, of the 22nd District Court, testified [Greene]
told her he printed the document. Further, a forensic examination of [his]
computer revealed someone with the username `ofcmgreene’ . . . logged onto
`LPPolice.com’ and searched for the name `Kevin Smith.’
This occurred about 80 minutes before
the user spent 45 minutes viewing, printing, and saving documents from Spokojny's
email account. Because the `ofcmgreene’ username can fairly be attributed to
defendant, it can be inferred from this evidence that it was [him] who was
using the computer during the timeframe at issue.
Further, Judge James
testified [Greene] told her he shared the printed `email’ with Wade.
It can be inferred from the evidence that [he] gave the document to Wade to
assist Smith because it appears he was doing research about Smith relatively
close to the time the document was printed.
Based on the evidence, a person of
ordinary prudence could reasonably believe [Greene’s] actions were for the
purpose of intermeddling in the lawsuit by assisting Smith, i.e., by providing
this sensitive defense-strategy document. Thus, a reasonably prudent person
could find that the elements of Blackstone's category of obstruction of justice
were present.
People v. Greene,
supra.
The Court of Appeals next addressed the misconduct in office
charge, noting it involves
`”’corrupt behavior by an officer in
the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his
office.’”’ People v. Coutu, 459 Mich. 348, 354, 589 N.W.2d 458
(Michigan Supreme Court 1999), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d
ed), p 543. There are three elements to this offense: (1) defendant is a public
officer, (2) `the misconduct occurred in the exercise of the duties of the
office or under color of the office,’ and (3) the misconduct `is corrupt behavior.’ People
v. Milton, 257 Mich. App 467, 668 N.W.2d 387 (Michigan Court of Appeals
2003).
Misconduct in office can be shown by (1) commission of a wrongful act, (2)
commission of a `lawful act in a wrongful manner,’ or (3) `fail[ure] to do an
act required by the duties of the office.’ Id.
People v. Greene,
supra.
The trial judge presumed Greene was a public official and he
did not challenge the presumption on appeal, so the first element of the
offense was established. People v. Greene, supra. The court then addressed whether there was
probable cause to believe that he engaged in “corrupt behavior.” People
v. Greene, supra. Greene claimed he
merely printed a document that appeared
on his own computer because it contained his name and that he shared that
document with Wade; he argues this did not constitute corrupt behavior.
However, while [Greene’s] act of printing a document from his own computer and
giving the document to Wade may have been a lawful act, because there is
evidence that [he] did not have the authority to access Spokojny's email
account and was accessing Spokojny's email account for 45 minutes, there is
evidence that the allegedly lawful act was done in a wrongful manner. People
v. Milton, supra.
Further, because of the evidence that
someone with the username `ofcmgreene’ logged onto LPPolice.com and searched
for the name `Kevin Smith,’ it can be inferred that [Greene] engaged in these
actions to give Smith an unfair advantage in his lawsuit.
People v. Greene,
supra.
The court noted that other
courts have found that “corruption” involves “taint”, and taint has been
defined, among other things as to “`affect slightly for the worse.’’ People
v. Greene, supra (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (9th 3d)). It therefore found that “[i]t It can be
inferred from the evidence that [Greene] intended to taint the lawsuit by
giving Smith an unfair advantage.” People v. Greene, supra. The Court of Appeals also found that Greene
“acted under the color of office” because he
printed the document from his work
computer, and the document was accessible on this computer because it was a
court computer used by Spokojny with [Greene’s] permission. Therefore, there
was probable cause to believe that but for [his] position as a court officer,
he would not have had the opportunity to access the document.
People v. Greene,
supra.
The court then took up the using a computer to
commit a crime charge. People v. Greene, supra. Michigan law makes it a crime to use a “computer
program, computer, computer system, or computer network to commit, attempt to
commit, conspire to commit, or solicit another person to commit a crime’”. Michigan Compiled Laws § 752.796(1). The court found there was probable cause to
believe Greene committed obstruction of justice and “probable cause . . . to
believe [he] used a computer in doing so.” People
v. Greene, supra.
Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed the unauthorized use
of a computer charge. People v. Greene, supra. The charge was brought under Michigan
Compiled Laws § 752.795(a), which states that a person shall not intentionally
and
without authorization or by exceeding
valid authorization . . . [a]ccess or
cause access to be made to a computer program, computer, computer system, or
computer network to acquire, alter, damage, delete, or destroy property or
otherwise use the service of a computer program, computer, computer system, or
computer network.
People v. Greene,
supra. Another statute defines
“computer program” as “a series of internal or external instructions
communicated in a form acceptable to a computer that directs the functioning of
a computer, computer system, or computer network in a manner designed to
provide or produce products or results from the computer, computer system, or
computer network.” Michigan Compiled Laws § 752.792(5).
The Court of Appeals noted that the trial judge “found that
the elements of intent and lack of authorization were not met in this case
because `if anybody had come by and touched that mouse or keyboard, they would
have seen that document. . . . It was an accident.’” People v. Greene, supra. In
a footnote, it explained that the premise of the judge’s finding was that “the
document was up on [Greene’s] computer screen and that [he] simply saw the
document when he moved his mouse.” People
v. Greene, supra.
The Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial judge on
this issue, either:
[I]t is not clear from the evidence . .
. whether this is actually how [Greene] came across the document. To the
contrary, there was evidence presented . . . suggesting that [he] spent 45
minutes looking inside Spokojny's email account and that documents were viewed,
saved, and printed from the email account during this time.
This evidence
suggests that the document did not just inadvertently pop up on the screen when
[Greene] moved the mouse but that, instead, [he] intentionally searched through
Spokojny's email account, ostensibly for the document.
Further, [Greene] did not have
authority to access Spokojny's email account, nor did Spokojny give [him] his
password. Therefore, the evidence established probable cause to believe [Greene]
intentionally and without authority accessed Spokojny's email account to
acquire the document and use the email account.
The language in the `computer program’
definition encompasses the AOL website from which Spokojny's email account was
accessed. . . . In addition, the language `a set of related, connected or
unconnected, computer equipment, devices, software, or hardware’ in the
definition of `computer system’ is broad enough to encompass AOL's server,
which communicated with [Greene’s] computer to create access to the AOL website
and Spokojny's email account on [Greene’s] computer. . . .
People v. Greene,
supra.
The court therefore found that the “evidence presented was
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe [Greene] intentionally and
without authorization accessed a computer program and computer system to
acquire the document at issue or, more generally, to use the service of
Spokojny's email account.” People v.
Greene, supra.
So it reversed the order dismissing the charges and
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. People
v. Greene, supra. If you would like
to read a little more about the facts in the case, check out the news story you
can find here.
No comments:
Post a Comment